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Abstract 
This thesis is comprised of three integrated studies highlighting the financial capital 
markets and corporate finance decisions in response to market conditions.  
The first study (Chapter 2) looks at the stock-like/bond-like behavior of Canadian income 
trusts, in particular how the sensitivities of income trusts’ returns to stock and bond 
market factors change over time, around different events, and depending on corporate 
strategy and firm characteristics. We find that income trusts are priced more like bonds 
compared to matched corporations before a surprise announcement that removes the tax 
advantage of income trusts (the Tax Fairness Plan announcement), while they become 
more stock-like and have risk profiles similar to matched corporations after this event. 
Income trusts with characteristics related to the stronger ability to maintain cash 
distribution, more suitability to the trust structure, and higher tax shield prospect still 
behave more like bonds even after the Tax Fairness Plan announcement. This chapter 
shows how organizational structure choice and firm characteristics are related to an 
asset’s risk profile, in particular, the pricing behavior as bond-like or stock-like. 
The second study (Chapter 3) discusses a potential valuation premium for Canadian 
income trusts through looking at the valuation throughout the life cycle of the income 
trust structure. We find there is a valuation premium for the trust structure, as shown by 
the increase in valuation around the conversions into income trusts. The higher valuation 
of income trusts can be largely attributed to tax motives, as evidenced by the positive 
(negative) abnormal returns after positive (negative) tax-related events. However, we find 
a higher valuation premium enjoyed by income trusts early in the life cycle, which exists 
even after we account for tax and trust characteristics. Characteristics pertaining to the 
suitability of firms to the income trust structure also seem to deteriorate over time. The 
evidence suggests that other factors, including behavioral factors from both investors’ 
and managers’ sides, can influence income trusts pricing besides the tax rationale.  
The third study (Chapter 4) investigates whether firms are able to diversify the maturity 
structure of their bond profiles given the availability of the offshore bond markets. I look 
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at average maturity, maturity structure, and the inverse of the Herfindahl index to explore 
the maturity diversification effect. This chapter finds that while the average maturity of 
offshore bonds is different from that of domestic bonds at the aggregate level, over the 
years, a firm issues new offshore bonds and new domestic bonds into similar maturity 
ranges. The degree of maturity diversification as measured by the inverse of the 
Herfindahl index is also lower in the years a firm issues new offshore bonds. By looking 
at how firms manage the yearly maturity structures of new and pre-existing offshore and 
domestic bonds, the study finds that new offshore bonds may diversify the maturity 
structure of pre-existing domestic bonds, but this happens only in the middle maturity 
ranges. Taken together, the study challenges the maturity diversification motivation and 
suggests that other motivations such as asset matching and foreign currency hedging also 
matter in bond maturity management with the presence of offshore bond markets.  
Overall, the thesis shows an interrelationship between financial capital market conditions 
and firms’ financing and strategical choices.  
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Chapter 1  
1 General Introduction 
Firms finance themselves through several channels, one of the most important being the 
issuance of stocks and bonds in the financial capital markets. Therefore, financial market 
conditions are a key factor in firms’ financing choice. In this thesis, three integrated 
essays explore issues in the financial capital market from both the investors’ and the 
firms’ angles. Specifically, the thesis covers asset pricing and bond maturity management 
topics and aims to show an interrelationship between market conditions and firms’ 
financing choice. 
 The first two studies (Chapters 2 and 3) focus on the pricing of Canadian income 
trusts. An income trust is a corporate structure that allows firms to avoid paying tax at the 
corporate level on the income distributed to unit holders. Income trusts therefore provide 
investors with sizeable regular distributions (like bonds) while also providing capital 
gains due to asset ownership (like stocks). This feature of income trusts allows us to 
study how investors price the hybrid attribution of financial assets (Chapter 2). The 
questions we investigate in Chapter 2 are whether investors treat such hybrid assets as 
stocks or bonds, or somewhere in between, and what characteristics determine the degree 
of this stock-like/bond-like behavior. Prior works also address the pricing behavior of 
hybrid assets, for example preferred stocks (Emanuel, 1983, Chan and Seow, 1997), 
convertible bonds (Stein, 1992 and Jen, Choi, and Lee, 1997), and real estate investment 
trusts (REITs) (Karolyi and Sanders, 1998, Clayton and MacKinnon, 2003) to show that 
hybrid assets are priced in between stocks and bonds. However, some empirical evidence, 
except for Baker and Wurgler (2012a), is provided regarding which factors impact the 
degree of this stock-like/bond-like behavior. Such knowledge would improve our 
understanding on the characteristics that are priced by the market for hybrid securities 
and high-dividend-paying assets. 
 Chapter 2 examines the stock-like/bond-like behavior of Canadian income trusts 
around an exogenous event that removes the tax advantage of income trusts and thus 
  
 
2 
decreases their ability to make regular payouts. This surprise announcement (the Tax 
Fairness Plan or TFP announcement) therefore serves as a shock that would presumably 
change the pricing behavior of income trusts towards being less bond-like. We find that 
income trusts, as a group, are priced more like bonds relative to a group of matched 
corporations in the years before the TFP announcement while becoming more stock-like 
and less bond-like after the TFP announcement. This part of the analysis sheds light on 
the practical question of how investors price Canadian income trusts and extends Halpern 
(2004), who also examines the sensitivities of Canadian income trust returns to the stock 
and bond market indices. Secondly, focusing on firm-specific characteristics, we find that 
after the TFP announcement, most income trusts behave more like stocks whereas the 
firms that were most suited, ex ante, to the income trust structure remained priced more 
like bonds. The characteristics that make an income trust remain priced more like bonds 
include having been formed from the selective spin-off of less than 100 per cent assets of 
a previous firm and having low market-to-book ratios, high tangibility, high dividend 
payout, low ROA, and higher prospective tax shields. This second part of the analysis 
extends papers such as Baker and Wurgler (2012) in showing the characteristics that 
drive the bond-like behavior of assets. This chapter therefore illustrates how tax policy, 
corporate structure, and firm characteristics, especially those related to future cash 
generating prospects, impact the risk profiles of assets, in particular whether investors 
perceive the assets as bond-like or stock-like instruments. 
 In the third chapter, we explore the role of rational and behavioral factors in the 
valuation of income trusts throughout the life cycle of the structure. The popularity of 
income trusts in Canada during the early 2000s until 2011, when they lost their tax 
privilege, provides us a setting to assess the potential impact of behavioral factors on 
asset valuation. Specifically, we are able to examine the valuation premium enjoyed by 
income trusts from the early stage where the structure starts to become more popular to 
when it matures in popularity and finally goes to demise. Behavioral papers such as 
Baker and Wurgler (2007), Scheikman and Xiong (2003), and Baker and Wurgler 
(2012b) address the pricing of assets that are new to investors and difficult to price. We 
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add to this literature by examining how investors price assets when their characteristics 
are not well understood such as in the case of Canadian income trusts (King, 2003). 
 We empirically examine the relationship between managers’ strategic choice of 
corporate structure and share price. Managers are believed to make rational decisions to 
improve their firm’s share price. Investors are believed to rationally value shares based 
on their future expected cash flows. Under the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH), we 
would expect decisions to increase the future expected cash flows to investors to increase 
firm value by the amount of the increased cash flows. Behavioral finance suggests that 
other factors may influence how investors value assets. We test the EMH and the 
relationship between possible deviations and factors believed to influence valuations in 
behavioral finance within the context of income trusts—a structure designed to minimize 
taxes paid and maximize shareholder value. We document a valuation premium that 
peaks in the early 2000s where the income trust structure starts becoming popular 
through higher median earnings multiples (EV/EBITDA, P/E, market-to-book, and Q 
ratio) compared to matched corporations. We also find that investors react favorably to 
the conversions from corporations into income trusts through higher abnormal returns in 
the period prior to the actual conversions.  
 Attempting to explain this higher valuation premium using accounting 
characteristics, we find that income trusts have characteristics that demonstrate their 
suitability to the income trust structure (i.e., lower capital expenditures, more tangible 
assets, less depreciation use, lower leverage, less volatile cash flows, and less profitability 
compared to matched corporations). However, the suitability seems to deteriorate over 
time. The higher valuation premium can be explained by some, but not all of the 
characteristics related to suitability to the income trust structure. Also, when we account 
for accounting characteristics, the unexplained portions of earnings multiples are still 
higher in the earlier part of the life cycle for business income trusts, leaving room for 
other factors such as behavioral asset pricing to play a role in the pricing of income trusts. 
The results on the earlier pricing of income trusts therefore adds on the literature on the 
pricing of Canadian income trusts (Amoako-Adu and Smith, 2008, Doidge and Dyck, 
2015) that focuses more on the pricing near the end of the life cycle, where only tax-
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related evidence is found to impact the pricing. We go beyond the tax explanation to 
suggest that other factors, including behavioral factors could be at play, which resonates 
with investor sentiment hypothesis in Baker and Wurgler (2007): when assets are difficult 
to value, investor sentiment is more likely to impact pricing. 
 The fourth chapter studies the international bond market where I investigate how 
firms manage their bond maturity structures with the presence of the offshore bond 
market. This chapter studies whether firms issue offshore bonds to complement the 
domestic bond market in terms of maturity, or in other words, whether there is a maturity 
diversification impact of issuing offshore bonds. In a survey by Bancel and Mittoo 
(2004), foreign exchange risk hedging and keeping the source of funds close to the use of 
funds, tax, and market condition are important reasons why firms use the foreign capital 
market. This chapter investigates another possible motivation for firms to use the 
international financial market, namely, the maturity diversification effect. Through the 
evidence on how the offshore bond and domestic bonds issued by the same firm differ in 
terms of maturities, the chapter has implications on the maturity diversification effect as 
well as other motivations for firms to use the offshore bond market. 
 I compare the average and the structure of maturity of offshore bonds versus those 
of domestic bonds at the aggregate, firm, and firm-year levels. The structure of maturity 
of the bond profile is constructed as the proportion of bonds issued into each of the seven 
maturity bins (1-2 Year, 3-4 Year, 5-6 Year, 7-8 Year, 9-10 Year, 11-20 Year, and >21 
Year). On aggregate, I find that average maturities of offshore bond and domestic bonds 
are significantly different. However, at the firm level, when taking all the bonds a firm 
ever issues throughout the sample period into consideration, I find that firms issue 
offshore bonds and domestic bonds into similar structures. This result provides a different 
viewpoint on how maturity of offshore bonds and that of domestic bonds differ. While 
previous papers conclude that maturities of offshore bonds and domestic bonds differ 
because their average maturities are different (Black and Munro, 2010, Gozzi, Levine, 
Peria, and Schmuckler, 2015), this chapter argues that in terms of maturity structure, 
offshore bonds and domestic bonds issued by the same firm do not differ.  
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 At the firm-year level, I first examine the inverse of the Herfindahl index as a 
measure of maturity diversification degree. The chapter shows that in the years with new 
offshore bonds issued, a firm has a lower degree of maturity diversification as evidenced 
by the lower inverse of the Herfindahl index, while the opposite is true if a firm issues 
new domestic bonds. A closer look at the maturity structures of new offshore, pre-
existing offshore, new domestic, and pre-existing domestic bonds reveals that the 
proportion of new offshore bonds is negatively related to the proportion of pre-existing 
domestic bonds only in the middle maturity ranges. The results on how firms manage 
their yearly bond maturity structure suggest a potential maturity diversification effect for 
pre-existing domestic bonds by issuing offshore bonds; however, this effect is not 
systemic and potentially happens only within a subgroup of firms. This chapter therefore 
challenges the maturity diversification effect, extending papers such as Bancel and 
Mittoo (2004) on why firms use the offshore market. Other motivations to use the 
offshore bond market such as hedging purpose and keeping the source of funds close to 
the use of funds are therefore important as they explain the similarity in structures 
between offshore and domestic bond maturities. While previous studies provide evidence 
based on foreign operations to support the hedging purpose (Kedia and Mozumdar, 
2003), this chapter adds evidence based on bond maturity for the hedging purpose.  
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Chapter 2  
2 Income Trusts: Valued Like Bonds or Equities? 
2.1 Introduction 
As interest rates remain low, investors are increasingly looking for alternative 
investments with reliable cash flows (like bonds) but with more upside (like stocks) such 
as preferred stocks, REITs, and dividend-paying stocks. Understanding the risk of these 
types of assets becomes an important question for investors and portfolio managers. In 
this chapter, we examine the pricing of Canadian income trusts which have return 
characteristics of both bonds and stocks and have a long enough history to allow for 
interesting examinations of how investors price such hybrid assets.  
 The risk aspect of income trusts we focus on is their behavior as bonds or stocks 
and the characteristics that impact their bond-like/stock-like behavior. In asset pricing as 
well as in asset allocation, stocks and bonds have been the two risky asset classes most 
generally examined.1 The literature on the pricing of stocks and bonds has developed 
quite separately because of the differences between the two asset classes. Stocks and 
bonds have been found to be sensitive to different sets of factors. For example, stock 
returns can be explained using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964, 
and Lintner, 1965), the Fama French model (Fama and French, 1993), and various 
models that include macroeconomic factors (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001, Vassalou, 
2003, Petkova, 2006, Campbell, 1996), while bond returns are influenced by interest rate 
dynamics and credit risk (Vasicek, 1977, Merton, 1974). At the same time, efforts have 
been made to jointly price stocks and bonds since the two are related.2 Both of them are 
claims on assets of the same firms and have been modelled to be both impacted, for 
                                               
1 See, among many others, Brennan and Xia (2002), Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003), Liu (2006), 
Huggett and Kaplan (2016). 
2 See, for example, Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Fama and French (1993), Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and 
Mann (2001), Lin, Wang, and Wu (2011), Bekaert, Engstrom, and Grenadier (2010), Gabaix (2012). 
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example, by stochastic risk aversion (Bekaert, Engstrom and Grenadier, 2010) and rare 
disaster risk (Gabaix, 2012). As a consequence, how stocks and bonds are related is a 
question important for portfolio management and asset pricing, but this topic has not been 
well studied. 
 To understand how stocks and bonds are linked, much effort has been spent on 
the aggregate level where the comovement between the two markets is examined (e.g., 
Shiller and Beltratti, 1992, and Campbell and Ammer, 1993, Connolly, Stivers, and Sun, 
2005, 2007, Gulko, 2012, and Bansal, Connolly, and Stivers, 2014), while some studies 
look at individual assets and the roles of firm-specific characteristics. Scholars have 
found that larger size, longer age, lower volatility, higher profitability, lower growth 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2012), and high book-to-market ratio (Koijen, Lustig, and Van 
Nieuwerburgh, 2017) are associated with higher comovement of stocks with bond market 
performance. On the other hand, a longer maturity makes a bond behave more like the 
stock of the same firm (Bao and Hou, 2017). Also, profitability and asset growth, which 
are related to equity pricing, are able to predict returns for corporate bonds of the same 
firms (Chordia, Goyal, Nozawa, Subrahmanyam, and Tong, 2017). By studying the 
stock-like/bond-like behavior of Canadian income trust, we expand this literature by 
showing the roles of firm-specific characteristics on determining how stocks and bonds 
are related. Even though studying individual assets leaves a potential role for 
idiosyncratic risks, we feel that firm-specific factors provide additional insights into what 
investors value. 
 We examine a new set of characteristics related to corporate structure, tax shield 
prospect, and cash generating prospects that can potentially link the returns of stocks and 
bonds and determine the stock-like/bond-like behavior of assets. Our approach is unique 
in that we study the roles of firms’ characteristics through examining assets with features 
of both stocks and bonds and the changes in their stock-like/bond-like behavior instead of 
looking at the cross-section of stocks or bonds as in previous studies. The questions we 
study are the following: How do investors value firms that have adopted a corporate 
structure that has characteristics of both bonds and stocks? How do changes in the value 
of the option to adopt or abandon this corporate structure impact the bond-like/stock-like 
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behavior of their prices? Do characteristics related to the ability to minimize tax expense 
and maintain cash payout outside of the structure impact the stock-like/bond-like feature 
of the firm’s equity? We show in our study that stocks and bonds are linked together 
through characteristics related to organizational structure choice and the ability to save 
tax and generate future cash flows. 
 Canadian income trusts provide an interesting case study as they have many 
characteristics similar to both bonds and equities. Income trusts are designed to return as 
much capital to investors as possible in exchange for the firms not having to pay 
corporate taxes on their profits. Comparable to the master limited partnership (MLP) 
structure in the United States, an income trust is a flow-through structure where the firm 
does not pay corporate tax in exchange for the investors being paid out the vast majority 
of the profits and having to pay only personal taxes on the earnings.3 Although income 
trusts do not guarantee their distributions, the firms make a strong commitment to paying 
regular distributions to their investors. As illustrated in Figure 2-1, the average payout 
ratio of income trusts is approximately 80 per cent whereas it is only 15 per cent for the 
equity firms in the matched sample in 2006. In terms of pricing, we would therefore 
expect income trusts to behave like bonds which also have a commitment to a certain 
cash payment to their investors at regular intervals. Unlike bonds, income trusts are not in 
default if they fail to make these cash payments, and these cash payments can increase 
(decrease) as the firms are more (less) profitable. Since the unit-holders are the ultimate 
owners of the firm’s assets, they can also benefit from capital gains on their shares, so 
they are similar to equities in this regard. As a result, the pricing of income trusts should, 
theoretically, fall somewhere between stocks and bonds.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
3 For references on the tax treatment of MLPs, see Guenther (1992) and Michaely and Shaw (1995). 
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Figure 2-1: Dividend Payout per Share of Income Trusts and Matched Corporations 
 
 
This figure illustrates the average payout ratios for Canadian income trusts and matched corporations from 
1998 to 2011. Payout ratio is calculated as dividends per share/earnings per share expressed in percentage 
(datatype WC09504 from the Worldscope database). 
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 There has been little evidence on the risk profiles of income trusts.4 Although 
Halpern (2004) examines the sensitivities of income trust returns to stock and bond 
market factors, the study is limited to a static examination of risk loadings for the period 
before 2004 and considers only industry classification for firm characteristics. Our study 
is designed to build on Halpern (2004) by carefully looking at the risk profiles of income 
trusts cross-sectionally and over time to identify the relationship between the profile of 
each income trust and investors’ valuations. To examine which factors influence 
investors’ valuations, we have the advantage of the Tax Fairness Plan announcement 
(TFP), an event which unforeseeably impacted the cash generating abilities of our firms 
and their future outlook in 2006. 
 Because income trust is an organizational structure that became popular for firms 
in the Canadian market in the late 1990s, peaking in the early 2000s and drying up in 
2006, there are many interesting aspects to the time varying nature of their loadings to 
stock and bond risk factors. To examine how income trusts are priced, we compare the 
pricing of income trusts to a group of ordinary corporations that are matched to each 
income trust using accounting data at the end of 2005. We look at firms with the closest 
size in the same industry and determine whether income trusts are priced differently. 
Since the main difference between our matched firms and the income trusts is that the 
income trusts pay more to their shareholders due to the absence of corporate taxes, our 
first hypothesis is that we expect the pricing of income trusts to be much more bond-like 
than equity-like.  
 Secondly, we examine the changes in sensitivities of income trust returns to stock 
and bond market factors around a surprise announcement by the government of Canada 
to remove the favorable tax treatment for existing income trusts in Canada starting in 
                                               
4 In practice, investors have been advised to treat income trusts as equities, or more specifically, mutual 
funds, however with the noted difference that “the pricing of an income trust is yield-based, meaning that it 
is dependent substantially on expected distributions” (Beck and Romano, 2004). Professionals warn 
investors to avoid treating cash flow from income trusts as cash flow from bonds: “One explanation for the 
popularity of income trusts is that investors rather fallaciously compare the return from income trusts to 
the return received from investing in bonds” (Certified General Accountants Association of Canada, 2006). 
These excerpts highlight that income trusts should be priced more like bonds than the ordinary equities, but 
certainly not completely like bonds. 
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2011 referred to as the Tax Fairness Plan (or TFP) on October 31, 2006. The event is an 
exogenous shock allowing us to examine the role of changes in the size of expected cash 
distributions on the value of the income trust structure as well as the corresponding risk 
profile of these assets. We argue that the TFP announcement changes expected future 
cash distributions to the investors and not the underlying business risk, allowing for a 
clear examination of the impact of characteristics that are related to the ability to raise 
cash flows and suitability to the income trust structure on the sensitivities of the assets’ 
prices to risk factors. As shown in Figure 2-1, income trust payout ratios decrease 
dramatically after this announcement. Due to the expected decrease in payouts and higher 
valuation of the conversion option, the degree of comovement of income trusts to the 
bond market is expected to be lower and the degree of comovement to the stock market is 
expected to be higher. 
 To identify the stock-like and bond-like pricing behavior, we employ the stock 
and bond market factors as in Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). We find that 
prior to the TFP, income trusts comove less with stock market related risk factors and 
more with bond market related factors compared to matched corporations. Specifically, 
income trusts have lower betas to the excess stock market returns (RM-Rf) and the size 
factor (SMB), and higher beta to the term structure of interest rate (TERM) compared to 
matched corporations prior to the TFP. After the TFP announcement, income trusts’ betas 
to stock market factors RM-Rf and SMB increase significantly, while their betas to bond 
market factor TERM decrease significantly. As one would expect, there is no significant 
change in sensitivities to those factors for our matched corporations before and after the 
TFP. The risk profiles of income trusts and our matched corporations become not 
significantly different after the TFP announcement, supporting our hypothesis. 
 We also examine specific characteristics of income trusts to determine if pricing 
depends on certain characteristics of each income trust. In other words, are income trusts 
valued as a class or do investors recognize the value of differences in their corporate 
policies even though they are part of a larger population called income trusts? For 
example, if an income trust were created by the spinning off of some assets from a larger 
corporation, is it valued differently from the conversion of an entire company to an 
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income trust? Would income trusts that are more likely to be tax avoiders and with 
different room for tax shield prospect have different risk profiles? The hypothesis is that 
some income trusts have assets that are more suited to the income trust structure and have 
prospects to pay out high distribution even in the absence of the tax advantage, and we 
would expect these firms to be priced more like bonds and those firms which were less 
suited to the income trust structure to be priced more like equities. We find evidence that 
while in general, firms behave more like stocks after the TFP announcement, firms which 
have structures consistent with the ideal structure for income trusts (consisting of a subset 
of a previous firm’s assets, having high book-to-market ratio, high tangibility, high 
dividend payout, low ROA, and higher prospective tax shields) remain priced more like 
bonds. Our results provide new evidence on the roles of firms’ characteristics on the 
stock-like/bond-like behavior of asset prices and thus have implications on the 
characteristics that can link the returns of stocks and bonds. 
 Apart from expanding the works on the link between stock and bond pricings, this 
study also adds to the topic of the determinants of sensitivities to risk factors—a question 
fundamental to asset pricing (Elton, 1999). Factor-based asset pricing has become 
popular with models such as the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964, and Lintner, 1965), the Fama and 
French three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993), and the Carhart four-factor model 
(Carhart, 1997). Studies have examined the characteristics of the betas in these factor-
based models—they are not static and may change over time (Campbell and Mei, 1993, 
and Jagannathan and Wang, 1996). Consistent with such time-varying asset pricing 
models, we find that the sensitivities to stock and bond market factors change over time, 
and they change not only with macroeconomic risk factors as suggested by studies such 
as Jagannathan and Wang (1996) but also with variation in expected cash flows and firm-
level characteristics. Our results also extend papers such as Barberis, Shleifer, and 
Wurgler (2005), Ball and Kothari (1991), Patton and Verardo (2012), Foerster and 
Karolyi (1999), and Lewis (2017) on beta changes around events. In our case, tax policy 
change is the event that has an impact on the risk profiles of assets. 
 Finally, our study is related to the literature on the pricing of hybrid assets. Hybrid 
assets possess characteristics similar to bonds and equities (and possibly other types of 
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financial securities), and most studies in this literature conclude that hybrid assets 
comove with both the stock and the bond markets. Examples are the studies on REITs 
(Karolyi and Sanders, 1998, and Clayton and MacKinnon, 2003), mandatory redeemable 
preferred stocks (Chan and Seow, 1997), high-dividend-paying stocks (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2012), and also Canadian income trusts (Halpern, 2004), where returns of the 
hybrid assets are often found to be sensitive to both stock and bond market movements. 
Scholars are also interested in the conditions that make the hybrid assets change their 
stock-like/bond-like behavior. Emanuel (1983) built a model where firm value and 
expectation on dividend suspension impact the bond-like characteristic of preferred 
shares. Chan and Seow (1997) show that mandatory redeemable preferred stocks of high-
rated issuers are more bond-like. Kwan (1996) also finds that ratings impact the 
comovement of bonds with equities of the same firm. Our study exploits an unexpected 
event (the TFP announcement) that presumably changes the bond-like/stock-like 
characteristic of a hybrid asset class, which goes beyond previous studies where only a 
static setting is examined. Through such a setting, we show which characteristics make 
hybrid assets behave more or less like stocks versus bonds, including expected cash flows 
and the suitability of the business to provide steady cash distributions to investors. The 
findings of those new characteristics help guide investors to better understand their risk 
exposure if the assets they hold share similar characteristics. While income trusts have a 
similar tax incentive to pay out distributions as REITs, our study differs from those on 
REITs in that the underlying assets of income trusts are operating firms and not real 
estate properties. Therefore, our study is applicable when considering the stock-
like/bond-like behavior of firms, especially dividend-paying firms. We also differ from 
studies on preferred stocks in that preferred stock is a class of security issued by a 
corporation while we study the stock-like/bond-like behavior of an organizational 
structure. The study therefore adds new understanding on the pricing of hybrid assets. 
 This chapter proceeds as follows. First, we give a brief introduction on the income 
trust structure in Canada and the TFP announcement in Section 2.2. The literature review 
follows in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 develops the hypothesis while Section 2.5 describes 
the data. Section 2.6 provides empirical results and Section 2.7 concludes. 
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2.2 A Primer on the Canadian Income Trust Market 
2.2.1 The Income Trust Structure 
Income trusts are investment entities that own underlying assets such as properties (i.e. 
REITs), pipelines and oil wells (i.e. energy trusts), and operating firms (i.e. business 
trusts). Those assets will typically generate income such as rents from real estate, royalty 
from the properties, and the profits from the business of the firms. In the case the 
underlying asset is an operating firm, the trust structure is set up such that there will be a 
trust in between the investors (i.e. the unit holders) and the firm. The trust will sell units 
to the investors and use the proceeds to acquire the underlying assets, which will be under 
the forms of equity and internal debt (King, 2003, Doidge and Dyck, 2015).  
 The income generated from the underlying operating firms or assets will be 
distributed by the trust to the investors in a way such that double taxation is avoided. The 
earnings generated from the assets are not taxed before it is distributed to the end 
investors. Investors are taxed only on the distributions from the income trusts at the 
personal level, and the personal tax depends on each investor’s tax bracket. This is 
different from investing in a corporation’s stock in that a corporation’s operating profits 
is taxed at the corporate level and after the income is distributed to the investor (for 
example in the form of dividends), the investor is taxed on the dividend received. 
Although the dividend tax has been reduced to make taxation of dividend-paying 
corporations more comparable to that of income trusts, there is still a discrepancy 
between the tax treatments for the two organizational forms, especially for tax-exempt 
and foreign investors. In general, tax treatment for income trusts has been more 
advantageous. 
 The tax environment discussed above has been one of the important differences 
between an income trust and a traditional corporation. While an operating company can 
convert itself to a trust to get advantage of the tax shield on trusts, there could be 
differences as to how the company will operate as a trust. The company may not have as 
much incentive to use leverage and other techniques to reduce tax. Another consequence 
of being structured as a trust rather than a traditional corporate form is that a trust may 
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not be growth-focus because it will pay out almost all of its income to investors and does 
not retain money for future investment. In term of corporate control, holders of income 
trusts may not have the same voting rights entitled to holders of common equities. Those 
can be the reasons why not all firms choose to be structured as income trusts despite the 
tax advantage they enjoy from being organized this way. 
 
2.2.2 The Tax Fairness Plan (Halloween Massacre) 
With a concern of the situation that Canadian companies are taking advantage of the 
special tax treatment for income trusts to avoid paying corporate tax and potentially 
create a distortion for the Canadian economy, the TFP was announced after market close 
on October 31, 2006 by the Minister of Finance, Jim Flaherty (Department of Finance, 
2006). From 2011, all income trusts except for passive REITs are subjected to taxation 
that resembles the tax on corporations. That is, income from the income trusts will be 
taxed before being distributed to investors. In the investors turn, they are taxed once more 
similar to when they receive dividends from corporations. This means that the tax 
benefits enjoyed by income trusts holders will no longer exist, which causes the value of 
those trusts to decrease.  
 Following is an example to illustrate the tax consequences of this announcement. 
Supposed there is a sole investor with a personal tax rate of 46% (the highest marginal 
tax rate) investing in a firm with an annual income of $1, the whole of which will be 
distributed to the investor. Before the TFP, if the firm has been structured as an income 
trust, there is no firm-level tax for this $1 before it is distributed to the investor. The total 
tax collected by the government will be 46% of $1, which will be $0.46. If the firm has 
been structured as a corporation, the firm first has to pay a corporate tax of 32%5 on the 
                                               
5 The personal income tax rate of 46% is the average top personal income tax rate (Government of Canada, 
2006, Backgrounder for the TFP, https://www.fin.gc.ca/n06/data/2006-061e.pdf). The corporate tax rate of 
32% is based on an expected figure for 2010 corporate tax rate in 2006 (Government of Canada, 2006, 
Budget 2006/ Budget Plan - Chapter 3 - Building a Better Canada/ Opportuniy, 
https://fin.gc.ca/budget06/bp/bpc3b-eng.asp).  
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$1, or $0.32, before the net income of $0.68 can be distributed to the investor. In turn, the 
investor will pay dividend tax on the after-tax dividend distributed by the firm. The 
dividend tax can be set up with a dividend tax credit such that the investor will pay a 
dividend tax of $0.14. In total, the government collects $0.32 in corporate tax and $0.14 
in dividend tax, or $0.46.  
 The tax treatments will be comparable between income trusts and corporations 
under those schemes. However, as the investors of income trusts also include pension 
funds and foreign investors, the tax treatments are not compatible between the two 
structures. For example, as pensions and RRSPs are tax-exempt entities, paying personal 
income tax of 0%, the government collects $0 in tax if the firm has been organized as an 
income trust and $0.32 if the firm has been organized as a corporation. Therefore, the 
TFP was proposed such that income trusts also pay tax at the firm-level to bring the 
government tax revenues for the two structures closer for different types of investors.  
 The Halloween Massacre comes at a surprise to the market because the Canadian 
government had promised before that they would not tax income trusts. The Globe and 
Mail reported that “Finance Minister Jim Flaherty apologized Monday for the "hardship" 
his surprise income trust tax has caused”6. As a result, many income trusts were taken 
over while some converted themselves back into corporation forms. 
 
2.2.3 Stock-like/Bond-like Characteristics 
How can a firm, structured as an income trust, behave more like bonds compared to a 
similar firm (i.e. having a similar business and a similar cash flow risk) which adopts the 
corporate structure? How can the TFP announcement impact the bond-like/stock-like 
behavior of income trusts?  
 An income trust can behave more like bonds than stocks (compared to a similar 
corporation with the same business risk) due to several factors. A firm organized under 
                                               
6 See “Flaherty says sorry to stung investors,” The Globe and Mail, November 7, 2006. 
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the income trust structure can have a higher incentive to payout cash distributions 
compared to if it has been organized as a corporation because of the tax advantage of the 
income trust structure- the firm will not have to pay tax on the distributed income. 
Furthermore, the investors of income trusts may resemble bond investors (e.g. pension 
funds) and thus are more sensitive to changes in the bond market than to changes in the 
equity market. When the TFP announcement takes place, investors seeking for high yield 
may stay away from income trusts that will be less likely to continue providing high 
distributions outside of the trust structure, leaving those unable to generate steady cash 
flows to be owned by investors who are more concentrated on equity growth. Those 
investors seeking for yield stay with firms that could generate steady cash flows, creating 
an investor base that is still sensitive to the bond market for those firms. This also helps 
explain the heterogeneity in why there is a change in stock-like/bond-like behavior after 
the TFP announcement. 
 To see how an income trust changes its stock-like/bond-like behavior around the 
TFP announcement, and why the degree of change varies cross-sectionally across income 
trusts, we could also use the following analogue. Presumably, an income trust always has 
the choice of either remaining an income trust or converting to a corporation. If we 
consider income trusts a type of investment similar to the investors holding a perpetual 
coupon paying bond7 and the firm holding a conversion option to convert from an income 
trust to a corporation, the degree of bond-like/stock-like behavior can be considered a 
function of how investors value this conversion option. The value of an income trust to 
the investors will then be the value of the bond less the value of the option. The higher 
the value of converting into a corporation, the higher the likelihood that an income trust 
will convert, and thus the stronger it will comove with the equity market. The value of the 
                                               
7 Here, we hypothesize that investors expect to receive steady cash distributions from the investment in 
income trusts just like how they expect to receive payments from a bond that pays coupons perpetually. 
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option is higher if the cost of being structured as an income trust is high compared to the 
benefits (of preferable tax treatment)8.  
 The TFP announcement which necessarily eliminates the tax advantage of the 
income trust structure arguably increases the value of the conversion option, as the 
benefits of remaining an income trust decreases. This makes income trusts behave more 
like stocks in general. For firms less suited to the income trust structure, the value of the 
conversion option becomes even higher now as tax advantage is expected to be 
eliminated. Thus, the changes towards being more stock-like for those firms will be 
stronger. Whereas, the benefit of the tax treatment may not have been high for some 
firms if they could, for example, provide steady cash flows or maintain low tax expenses 
outside of the trust structure. As a result, the changes towards being more stock-like for 
those firms will be less strong. The TFP announcement therefore provides an 
experimental setting where we can study the effect of firm characteristics related to the 
ability to generate cash flows and to keep tax expenses low on the bond-like/stock-like 
behavior of an asset. 
 
2.3 Literature Review 
Our study builds on the asset pricing literature that examines how different assets are 
priced, specifically how different factors can be used to explain price changes in equity 
and bond markets. We will start with a brief discussion of some of the main factors 
considered in the valuation models for different asset classes by themselves building on 
the asset pricing literature. Then, we will discuss some of the research looking at how 
                                               
8 It is not costless to convert from a corporation to an income trust. As discussed in Section 2.1.1, the two 
structures are not similar. The income trust structure generally suits firms coming from mature industries 
generating stable cash flows. A firm needing more growth may not find the structure ideal since it has the 
needs to retain the income to invest and grow. As a result, the firm may have to forgo investment 
opportunities if it adapts the income trust structure, where it has the incentive from tax advantage to pay out 
virtually all of its income. The boards may also have concerns about the governance, efficiency, or can be 
conservative as to changing the organizational structure of the firm (King, 2003, Edgar, 2004, Doidge and 
Dyck, 2015). 
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equity and bond prices are related and how they are valued jointly. We will also give a 
review of the literature on varying beta and finally the works on the pricing of Canadian 
income trusts. 
2.3.1 Equity and Bond Pricing Separately 
Equity is a form of security that helps firms tap into the capital market by entitling equity 
holders to a fraction of ownership of the firm and thus, a fraction of the firm’s assets after 
serving all financial obligations such as debt repayments. The first asset pricing model for 
equities is the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), 
who use covariance with market beta as the only priced risk factor. However, empirical 
findings challenge the notion that the market risk is the only risk factor, leaving room for 
other factors to explain asset prices. The consumption-based capital asset pricing model 
(CCAPM) by Breeden (1979) uses the covariance with aggregate consumption instead of 
the market as the main source of risk. Non-arbitrage pricing theory (APT model) by Ross 
(1976) provides the theoretical background to investigate multiple factors that are related 
to movements in asset returns. Notably, Fama and French’s (1993) three-factor model 
uses “small-minus-big” market value (SMB) and “high-minus-low” book-to-market value 
(HML). The four-factor model uses the momentum factor UMD (Jegadeesh and Titman, 
1993, Carhart, 1997). Other factors related to the macroeconomic economy (Lettau and 
Ludvigson, 2001, Vassalou, 2003) and innovations in state variables (Petkova, 2006, 
Campbell, 1996) considered in equity pricing models include the difference between long 
and short term interest rates, expected and unexpected inflation, the difference between 
the yields of high and low rated bonds (Chen, Roll and Ross, 1986), labor income 
(Mayers, 1972, Fama and Schwert, 1977, Jagannathan and Wang, 1996), industrial 
production (Chen et al. 1986), the profitability factor, which is the difference between 
return of high-low ROE portfolios (Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2011), the investment 
factor, which is the difference between return of high-low investment (PPE) portfolios 
(Chen et al. 2011), liquidity (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2003), and innovations in the 
dividend yield, term spread, default spread, and short-term T-bill (Campbell, 1987, 
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Campbell and Shiller, 1988, Fama and Schwert, 1977, Fama and French, 1989, Petkova, 
2006). Another discussion on the factors can be found in Cochrane (2005).  
 Corporate bonds, on the other hand, entitle the bond holders to a promised stream 
of coupon and principal repayments. Bond returns then comprise the Treasury yields and 
the yield spreads; the latter depends on the creditworthiness of the issuer, the maturity of 
the bonds, the options attached to the bonds, tax treatment to the bond holders, and also 
the liquidity of the bonds (Fabozzi, 2005). The term structure of interest rate dictates how 
the maturity of a bond impacts its price (Fama and French, 1993). Researchers have 
modelled the dynamics of interest rate (the Treasury yield part) using stochastic 
processes. The models differ in terms of the sources of variation in the interest rate. For 
example, the one-factor Vasicek (1977) model takes interest rate as a stochastic process 
with one stochastic driver and a drift exhibiting a mean-reversion tendency. An example 
of the two-factor model is the two-factor Hull-White model where the two stochastic 
variables represent dynamics in the level and the slope of the yield curve.9 The interest 
rate is also explained by macroeconomists as a result of the macroeconomic condition; 
therefore, it can be impacted by macroeconomic factors such as lagged interest rate, 
lagged inflation, output, unemployment, and exchange rates (Taylor 1993, Cochrane, 
2005). 
 Theoretical models used to price credit risk are usually classified as either 
structural models or reduced form models. Structural models model explicitly the value 
of the firm and the process that makes default occur. The basic Merton’s model (Merton, 
1974) assumes that the value of the firm’s total assets follows a geometric Brownian 
motion and default occurs if, at maturity, value of the firm’s assets is less than debt 
obligation. This makes the debt claim equal to holding the safe claim on debt obligation 
and shorting a put option on the firm’s asset with strike price equal to debt obligation. In 
this model, equity can be viewed as a call option on the firm’s asset, with strike price 
equal to the debt obligation. Using the Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing model, 
                                               
9 Other one-factor model examples are Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (1985), Ho-Lee (1986), and Hull-White (1990). 
Other multi-factor model examples are Longstaff-Schwartz (1992), Chen (1996). 
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the prices of debt and equity can be calculated, which depend on the volatility of the 
firm’s assets, the firm’s leverage, and time to maturity.10 Reduced form models, on the 
other hand, do not model the firm’s value or how default occurs. Instead, the default 
event is taking an unpredictable event that follows a stochastic process and occurs 
depending on the state of the economy. The Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) model, for 
example, specifies that default events follow a Poisson process, and a fixed recovery 
amount is paid at maturity. Duffie and Singleton (1999) assume that a partial amount of 
the firm’s debt obligation is paid at the time of default.  
 Volatility can also matter in the pricing of bonds if one considers bond holders to 
be holding a safe claim to the bond repayment and a short position on a put option written 
on the firm’s asset with strike price equal to the bond repayment as in the Merton’s 
model. Value of the bond should decrease with volatility since option value should 
increase with volatility. Intuitively, since value to bond holders is bounded from below, 
as volatility of the firm’s assets increases, more value is geared towards equity holders 
and less towards bond holders. Liquidity impacts bond returns especially because 
liquidity in the bond market tends to be low (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin, 
2001, Li, Wang, Wu, and He (2009), de Jong and Driessen, 2012, Lin, Wang, and Wu, 
2011, Bao, Pan, and Wang, 2011). Scholars have also considered jumps, i.e. large 
negative changes, in firm’s value and changes in business climate (Collin-Dufresne et al., 
2001). 
2.3.2 Joint Pricing of Bonds and Stocks 
Some studies value both stock and bond markets jointly. Bonds and stocks are linked 
since, if one considers the prices of stocks to be the sum of discounted dividends, the 
macroeconomic factors that impact the yield curve drive the prices of both stocks and 
bonds. Furthermore, both stocks and bonds are claims on the assets of the same 
                                               
10 Further developments include the Black-Cox model, where the default event can occur whenever the 
value of the firm falls below a time-dependent threshold (Black and Cox, 1976), the Leland and Toft (1996) 
model, where leverage can be reduced by issuing new equity on coupon date, the extension by Collin-
Dufresne and Goldstein (2001), where leverage is assumed to be constant, and the extension of Hurd 
(2009) to generalize the process of the firm’s assets as a time-changed Brownian motion. 
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underlying firms. Empirically, Keim and Stambaugh (1986) use three stock and bond 
market variables to predict stock returns, long-term bonds, and government bonds. Fama 
and French (1993) show that stock returns are sensitive to two bond market factors: the 
maturity risk and the default risk factors. Therefore, bond market factors explain common 
variation in stock returns. However, the 25 portfolios sorted on size and book-to-market 
have similar sensitivities to bond market factors, which means that their bond market 
factors do not explain cross-sectional differences in stock returns. Elton, Gruber, 
Agrawal, and Mann (2001) find that bond spreads and returns comove with the same 
systematic factors as stock returns. They argue that this is mainly because the changes in 
the prices of risks in the capital market impact both stock and bond markets. Lin et al. 
(2011) show that the same equity-based liquidity factors price both stock and bond 
returns, which has implications on unifying pricing theory for financial assets.  
 Theoretical models that price both stocks and bonds or use both stock and bond 
market factors in pricing assets can be found in Bekaert, Engstrom, and Xing (2009), 
Bekaert and Engstrom (2010), Bekaert, Engstrom, and Grenadier (2010), Gabaix (2012), 
Lettau and Wachter (2011), and Koijen et al. (2017) among others. Bekaert, Engstrom, 
and Grenadier (2010) present a model with stochastic risk aversion and accommodating 
the stock-bond return relationship. Lettau and Watcher (2011) consider both the term 
structure of interest rate and returns on growth and value stocks in modelling the 
stochastic discount factor. Gabaix (2012) introduces a rare disaster risk that impacts the 
pricing of stocks, bonds, and options. Koijen et al. (2017) find that value stocks (with 
high book-to-market ratio) comove more with bond market factors than growth stock 
(low book-to-market); they argue this is because of the differences in the cash flow 
(dividends) between the two groups of stocks. As dividends of value stocks fall more 
than dividends of growth stocks during recessions, and bond yield factors predict future 
macroeconomic activity, bond market factors can predict stock returns. They then build a 
factor model to explain the cross-section of stock returns with bond market factor as one 
of the three explanatory factors.  
 The literature to explain the comovements of stocks and bonds is also relevant in 
specifying how stock and bond returns are linked and in determining the economic forces 
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behind the variations in the comovements. Early works such as Shiller and Beltratti 
(1992) and Campbell and Ammer (1993) characterize the relationship between the two 
markets. In Campbell and Ammer (1993), inflation shock is the only factor that can 
produce a negative correlation between stock and bond markets, whereas real interest 
rates and expected excess return component load with a similar sign on stocks and bonds. 
Recent works attempt to determine the economic sources behind the varying 
comovement between stock returns and bond returns. Evidence on changing risk aversion 
impacting the comovement related to the “flight-to-safety” effect can be found in papers 
such as Connolly et al. (2005, 2007), Gulko (2012) and Bansal et al. (2014). Connolly et 
al. (2005) find that correlation between stock and Treasury bonds decreases as stock 
market volatility increases. Gulko (2012) finds that stocks and Treasury bonds have a 
negative relationship during times of financial crises. Theoretically, Baele, Bekaert, and 
Inghelbrecht (2010) build a dynamic factor model to explain the relationship between 
stock and bond returns, especially when it is negative. They examine fundamental as well 
as non-fundamental factors and find that the non-macrovariables such as stock and bond 
market illiquidity factor are most useful in explaining comovement between bond and 
stock returns. Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (forthcoming) build a model where the 
term structure of interest rate is related to the comovement between stock and bond 
markets. Within this literature, Baker and Wurgler (2012) is the closest to our work as 
they study the relationship between bond-like stocks and bonds. They find that large 
stocks, long-list stocks, low-volatility stocks, stocks from profitable and dividend-paying 
firms, and those with growth opportunities comove positively with government bonds. 
Such a relationship persists through periods of negative comovement between the overall 
stock and bond markets. Meanwhile, more speculative stocks have weaker comovement 
with bonds.  
2.3.3 Pricing of Alternative Assets and Hybrid Assets 
Economic factors employed to study returns of stocks and bonds are also used to explain 
returns on alternative assets, such as derivatives, collectibles, and real estates. The prices 
of derivatives such as options, forwards, and futures are derived from the price of the 
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underlying assets. Therefore, factors that impact the prices of the underlying stock or 
bond will also drive prices of the derivatives. Furthermore, depending on the type of the 
derivative contract and its specifications (e.g., the strike price and time to expiration), 
other factors such as market volatility (e.g., in option pricing) and interest rates (e.g., in 
forwards and futures) also determine the price of the derivative (Hull, 2006). Stock and 
bond market factors such as returns on the S&P 500 Index and Treasury bill rates have 
also been used in the valuation of collectibles such as wine, paintings, and violins (Frey 
and Eichenberger, 1995, Burton and Jacobsen, 1999, Agnello, 2002, Ashenfelter and 
Graddy, 2003).  
 In addition to stocks and bonds, a firm can issue hybrid securities that have 
characteristics of both bonds and equities. While preferred shares are often classified as 
equities, they can deliver a stream of dividends that is subordinate to the coupon from 
bonds. Emanuel (1983) employs the option pricing theory to model preferred stock with 
the possibility that dividend from preferred stocks be omitted if firm value falls below 
some amount. When the dividend is more/less likely to be suspended (i.e., firm value is 
low/high), preferred stock behaves more/less like equity than bond. Chan and Seow 
(1997) find that mandatorily redeemable preferred stocks are sensitive to both stock and 
bond market movements. Convertible bonds are bonds that can be exchanged into stocks. 
Therefore, their prices can be sensitive to both the movements in bond prices and stock 
prices of the issuers. Convertible bonds have been argued to be an alternative when it is 
not preferable to issue either debt or equity (Stein, 1992 and Jen et al., 1997). Bonds of 
different seniorities have also been found to comove differently with stocks. Kwan 
(1996) finds that bonds comove more with equities if they are issued by firms with lower 
credit rating, indicating that lower rated bonds are more like equities than higher rated 
bonds. Bao and Hou (2017) provide evidence that bonds maturing later in the maturity 
structure should be considered as more senior bonds and have greater comovement with 
equity. The studies on the pricing of REITs using stock and bond market factors imply 
that REIT is a hybrid product that is between stock and bond in terms of risk exposures 
(Karolyi and Sanders, 1998, Clayton and MacKinnon, 2003). 
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2.3.4 Change in Risk Loadings 
This part reviews works on changes in risk loadings around events. Barberis et al., (2005) 
examine the change in betas around inclusions into the S&P 500 Index to show the 
impact of sentiment on the pricing of stocks. They find that after inclusion to the index, a 
stock’s beta with the index goes up. This indicates that when a stock is viewed as 
belonging to a certain group, and not necessarily when its fundamentals change, investors 
price it together as other stocks in that group. Ball and Kothari (1991) find an increase in 
market beta increases on earnings announcement day. Patton and Verardo (2012) also 
find that daily betas estimated from intraday prices increase on earning announcement 
days then decrease afterwards. The authors use a learning model to explain the results 
where investors infer about other firms in the market when a firm announces its earnings. 
Foerster and Karolyi (1999) study the change in betas to the global and domestic market 
around cross-listing events and find that local market beta drops in the post-listing period. 
Lewis (2017) finds that the changes in betas to the foreign market happen after cross-
listing events, suggesting a role for cross-market correlation to explain increase in foreign 
market betas. 
2.3.5 Pricing of Canadian Income Trusts 
Scholars have examined the valuation of income trusts in different contexts. Amoako-
Adu and Smith (2008) compare the reactions of income trusts prices and dividend-paying 
stock prices to the two tax-related announcements: the reduction of taxation of corporate 
dividends in November 2005 and the Tax Fairness Plan in October 2006. They find that 
the reactions to the two announcements are stronger for income trusts, suggesting that the 
tax status and not the dividend is the main driver for the valuation changes. Elayan, Li, 
Donnelly, and Young (2009) show that an income trust performs worse if it is held more 
by tax-exempt, low tax, and foreign investors, supporting the tax clientele hypothesis. 
Edwards and Shevlin (2011) examine trust price changes around the TFP to estimate the 
effect of tax benefit to the clientele investors. They document a significant abnormal 
return of -13 per cent due to the announcement, which represents the amount investors 
are willing to pay for the favorable tax treatment to income trusts. They also perform a 
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cross-sectional analysis by grouping the trusts into those with growth prospects versus 
those without growth prospects and REITs versus non-REITs. Trusts with growth 
prospects perform better during the TFP, indicating that growth trusts are now less 
constrained to use their resources to invest in projects rather than paying them out. 
Klassen and Mescall (2012) show that income trusts have higher earnings ratios, meaning 
that there is a premium for the tax advantage of holding income trusts. Doidge and Dyck 
(2015) find that income trusts with prospective tax shields fare better around the TFP 
announcement. Less attention has been paid to the risk profiles of Canadian income 
trusts. Halpern (2004) is the closest to our study to address the role of stock and bond 
market factors on the pricing of income trusts. The paper finds that during the period 
before 2004, income trusts were sensitive to both stock and bond market factors, with the 
beta on the excess return on 5-year Canadian government bond index higher than the beta 
on the TSX/S&P index. 
 
2.4 Hypothesis Development and Methodology 
To examine the bond-like/stock-like behavior of income trusts, we first focus on the 
comparison between income trusts and a matched sample of corporations before and after 
the TFP announcement. We also look at how the TFP announcement leads to changes in 
sensitivities to different market factors for income trusts and for the group of matched 
corporations. The TFP announcement heightens the value of the conversion option, 
making the income trusts’ prices behave more like equities. We then consider the 
differences in changes in risk loadings across types of income trusts—not all income 
trusts are created equally. Business versus energy versus real estate investment trusts 
have different characteristics and are based on the cash generating ability of different 
assets, which may also impact the valuation of the conversion option. The value of the 
conversion option may also depend on the firm’s corporate strategy where the firm 
adopts the income trust structure through either converting all of the assets or less than 
100 per cent of the assets to a trust. Different ultimate outcomes of the income trust after 
the TFP announcement can also be related to how the income trusts have been suited to 
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the structure. Consequently, we consider different aspects of the set of income trusts 
related to how the income trust is suited with the structure and how these differences may 
impact the value of the option to convert to a corporation and hence the degree of 
sensitivities to stock and bond market factors. 
2.4.1 Sensitivities to Stock and Bond Market Factors of Income 
Trusts and Matched Corporations 
To study whether income trusts behave more like bonds or stocks, we examine the 
sensitivities of their returns to different risk factors related to movements in the stock and 
bond markets. We expect a role for both bond and equity factors in the pricing of income 
trusts with the role of bond factors to be larger for income trusts than for regular 
corporate equities. We therefore form our hypothesis and employ the five factors on stock 
and bond pricing in Fama and French (1993) and also the additional momentum factor of 
Carhart (1997) for the testing. Fama and French (1993) use three stock market factors: 
the excess return on the market (MKT), the difference between returns of a portfolio of 
small stocks and a portfolio of big stocks (SMB), the difference between returns of a 
portfolio of high book-to-market firms and a portfolio of low book-to-market firms 
(HML), and two bond market factors—the term premium (TERM) and the default 
premium (DEF)—to explain returns of stocks and bonds. The SMB factor is to represent 
risk factor related to size, and the HML factor is to represent risk factor related to growth 
as proxied by the book-to-market ratio. The UMD factor developed by Carhart (1997) 
accounts for the fact that stocks that have performed well in the last few months continue 
to perform well in the next month (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, Carhart, 1997). TERM is 
the return on a long-term government bond index minus the one-month T-bill rate of the 
previous month, which proxies for unexpected change in long-term bond returns. The 
reason for the term structure of interest rate to appear is that the discount rate will change 
with the level and slope of the interest rate curve, which are the two most important 
determinants of interest rates. Term spread has been used in Fama and French (1989) and 
Campbell and Shiller (1991) to predict bond returns. DEF is constructed as the 
differences in returns between the low and the high rating bonds and is interpreted by 
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Fama and French (1993) as the default probability that changes with economic 
conditions. Chen et al. (1986) study stock returns and use the default factor to proxy for 
the change in the premium required to compensate for risks. Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer, and 
Swaminathan (2005) conclude that betas to the default and term factors are significant in 
pricing bonds even after controlling for other bond characteristics.  
 In Fama and French (1993), excess returns on market, the size factor and the 
book-to-market factor capture most of the common variation in stock returns. In their 
five-factor model for stock portfolios, MKT has loadings of around 1 for stock portfolios, 
SMB loadings take both signs and are higher for small stocks; HML loadings have taken 
both signs and are higher for high book-to-market portfolios. Loadings of MKT, SMB, 
and HML are close to zero for bond portfolios. Loadings on the momentum factor UMD 
take both signs and are higher for mutual fund portfolios with higher returns in Carhart 
(1997). In Fama and French (1993), TERM and DEF load positively when used alone but 
load insignificantly negative when used with stock market factors to explain stock 
returns. Without stock market factors, loadings on TERM are all positive and close to 1 
for stock portfolios and long-term bond portfolios. Baker and Wurgler (2012) interpret a 
higher loading on the excess return on a long-term government bond after controlling for 
excess stock market return as an indication of bond-like behavior. Loadings on the 
default factor DEF are positive and get smaller as one moves from small stocks to big 
stocks and government bonds (Fama and French, 1993).  
 Based on evidence from previous studies, we would interpret higher betas on RM-
Rf, SMB, and DEF or lower betas on HML and TERM as indications of a stock-like 
behavior. The expected sign on UMD in indicating a stock-like/bond-like behavior is 
unclear. The first hypothesis regards the sensitivities to different bond and stock markets 
factors of income trusts and matched corporations: 
 
H1a: Income trust returns are sensitive to both stock and bond market factors, with bond 
market factors adding power to explain the returns of income trusts. 
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H1b: Income trusts have lower sensitivities to stock market factors and higher 
sensitivities to bond market factors compared to other similar ordinary equities. 
 
 To test hypothesis H1a we examine the CAPM in (1.1), the Fama and French 
(1993) four-factor model in (1.2), and the four-factor model augmented with bond market 
factors in (1.4) to price income trusts. Model (1.3) looks at only bond market factors. The 
models estimated are the following: 
 
Ri,t – Rf,t = a + b * (RM,t – Rf,t) + ei,t (1.1) 
Ri,t – Rf,t = a + b * (RM,t – Rf,t) + s * SMBt + h * HMLt + u * UMDt + ei,t (1.2) 
Ri,t – Rf,t = a + m * TERMt + d * DEFt + ei,t (1.3) 
Ri,t – Rf,t = a + b * (RM,t – Rf,t) + s * SMBt + h * HMLt + u * UMDt + m * TERMt + d * 
DEFt + ei,t (1.4), 
 
where Rit is monthly return of the income trust i in month t. Rft is the risk-free rate. SMBt, 
HMLt, and UMDt are the Fama-French risk premiums. For bond market factors, TERMt 
and DEFt are the term and default factors for the bond markets. 
 To test hypothesis H1a, we examine the significance of stock and bond market 
factors in explaining the returns of income trusts. We will see in models (1.3) and (1.4) if 
bond market factors yield significant results in explaining income trust returns, and 
whether adding bond market factors in model (1.4) add power to the tests compared to 
the models with only stock market factors in (1.1) and (1.2). If income trusts are sensitive 
to bond market factors, the coefficients of TERM (m) and DEF (d) will be significant. In 
model (1.4), we expect that the adjusted R-squared where bond market factors are used in 
addition to stock market factors will be higher than that in model (1.2), where only stock 
market factors are used. This will indicate that bond market factors add powers besides 
stock market factors in explaining income trusts’ returns. Besides R-squared, we also 
employ the Gibbons, Ross, and Shaken (1989) or GRS test to evaluate the fitness of the 
pricing models. The Gibbons et al. (1989) test examines whether the intercept from an 
asset pricing model is significantly different from zero. A better fit model will have 
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insignificant intercept so that all risks are accounted for and the test statistic, which 
follows an F distribution, will be small.  
 To test hypothesis H1b, we compare the results in the four models to the results 
for a matched sample of regular corporations for the whole sample period and for the 
periods before and after the TFP announcement. We expect that bond market factors do 
not add as much power in explaining matched corporations’ returns compared to the case 
of income trusts. The pricing of income trusts would be somewhere between bond-like 
and stock-like whereas it would be more stock-based for the regular corporations. 
Therefore, the price of an income trust will comove more with the bond markets than the 
price of an ordinary equity. More specifically, we expect that the coefficients for RM-Rf, 
SMB, and DEF for income trusts are lower and less significant while the coefficients for 
the bond market factor TERM are higher and more significant compared to those of 
matched corporations. For H1b, we also formally test how being an income trust, as 
opposed to being a corporation, makes the sensitivities to stock and bond market factors 
different. We introduce the variable Di,tIT, which is a dummy for being an income trust 
for the firm i in month t. Model (1.5) estimates the impact of being a trust on risk 
loadings and it is run for the both the pre- and post-TFP periods. 
 
Ri,t – Rf,t = a0 + b * (RM,t – Rf,t) + s * SMBt + h * HMLt + u * UMDt + m * TERMt + d * 
DEFt + a1 * Di,tIT + bIT * Di,tIT * (RM,t – Rf,t) + sIT * Di,tIT * SMBt + hIT * Di,tIT * HMLt + 
uIT * Di,tIT * UMDt + mIT * Di,tIT * TERMt + dIT * Di,tIT * DEFt + ei,t (1.5), 
 
where Di,tIT is the dummy for whether the firm i is organized as an income trust in month 
t. bIT, sIT, hIT, uIT, mIT, and dIT indicate the difference in the risk loadings for RM-Rf, 
SMB, HML, UMD, TERM, and DEF factors, respectively, due to being an income trust. 
We expect to see lower sensitivities to the stock market factors (negative bIT, negative sIT, 
and positive hIT) and higher sensitivities to the bond market factors (positive mIT and 
negative dIT) as suggestive of a bond-like characteristic for income trusts versus matched 
corporations.  
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2.4.2 Changes in Stock-like/Bond-like Behavior around the TFP 
Announcement 
In this part, we examine how the risk profiles of income trusts change due to changes in 
the tax treatment of income and distributions. These would be impacted by the 
announcement from the Canadian government to suspend the special tax status of treats 
that is the Tax Fairness Plan on October 31, 2006. 
 
H2a: We would expect to see a decrease in the returns around the announcement of 
changes in government policy related to a removal of the preferred tax treatment of 
income trusts. 
 
H2b: We would expect income trusts to comove more with the stock market and less with 
the bond market after the TFP announcement. 
 
 To test this hypothesis, we examine the changes in equity and bond-related factors 
around the TFP event. The method is adapted from Foerster and Karolyi (1999) where 
they estimate the change in market beta after the cross-listing event. 
 
Rit – Rft = aPRE_TFP + bPRE_TFP * (RM,t – Rf,t) + sPRE_TFP * SMBt + hPRE_TFP * HMLt + 
uPRE_TFP * UMDt + mPRE_TFP * TERMt + dPRE_TFP * DEFt + aTFP * DitTFP + aCh_POST_TFP * D
itPOST_TFP + bCh_POST_TFP * (RM,t – Rf,t) * DitPOST_TFP + sCh_POST_TFP * SMBt * DitPOST_TFP + 
hCh_POST_TFP * HMLt * DitPOST_TFP + uCh_POST_TFP * UMDt * DitPOST_TFP + mCh_POST_TFP * 
TERMt * DitPOST_TFP + dCh_POST_TFP * DEFt * DitPOST_TFP + eit (2.1), 
 
where DitTFP is the dummy for the month of November 2006, DitPOST_TFP is the dummy for 
the period after the TFP announcement. The decrease in excess monthly returns of 
income trusts on the event month (November 2006) will be evidenced by a significantly 
negative aTFP. We expect to see higher comovement to the stock market (positive and 
significant bCh_POST_TFP and sCh_POST_TFP, negative hCh_POST_TFP) and lower comovement to 
the bond market (negative mCh_POST_TFP and positive dCh_POST_TFP) after the TFP 
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announcement to remove the tax advantages of Income Trusts. We will run these models 
on both the income trust and the matched firms’ sample. We expect to see no significant 
changes in risk loadings for matched corporations since they are not impacted by the tax 
changes proposal. 
2.4.3 Changes in Stock-like/Bond-like Behavior around the TFP 
Announcement by Trust Characteristics 
Industry 
 Grouping stocks by industry is one of the most popular ways scholars find 
comovement in returns (King, 1966, Fama and French, 1997, Chan, Lakonishok, and 
Swaminathan, 2007). In the case of income trusts, the ability to pay steady income as 
well as the value of adopting the income trust structure is usually associated with the 
industry a trust is in. Therefore, categorizing income trusts by industry can potentially 
give more insights on the risk of trusts related to the stock and bond factors. We examine 
how the change in risk loadings of income trusts around the TFP announcement vary with 
industries. 
 
H3a: Returns of income trusts coming from industries that are less suitable for the trust 
structure (i.e., business trusts compared to energy) have stronger change to become more 
stock-like after the TFP announcement.  
 
The Ultimate Fate of the Income Trust 
 We examine whether the outcome of income trusts after the TFP is related to the 
changes in risk profiles after the TFP announcement. This will shed light on how much 
the risk profiles depend on corporate strategy and how efficient the market is at being 
able to foresee the ultimate fate of the income trusts. Income trusts that will ultimately 
have no change, reorganize, or be acquired are expected to have been more suitable for 
the trust structure and have lower value of the conversion option and hence will have 
lower changes in risk profiles. Those that will ultimately convert to corporations are 
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expected to have stronger change towards being more stock-like since they can survive 
outside of the trust structure and the value of the conversion option to them is high. 
 
H3b: Income trusts are expected to have stronger changes towards being more stock-like 
if they would convert to corporation, be acquired, have no change, or reorganize, in that 
order. 
 
Adoption of the Trust Structure 
 We examine how the sensitivities to different risk factors depend on corporate 
strategy, i.e., how firms choose to become income trusts. Some IPOed as income trusts, 
some converted themselves from corporations, among which some were converted 
wholly while some were spun-off partially from the initial corporations. We hypothesize 
that firms that were spun-off partially have been more suitable for the trust structure, as 
the assets have been selectively chosen to be suited to the structure compared to those 
spun-off wholly. Therefore, the value of the conversion option to those partially spun-off 
is low.  
 
H3c: Income trusts that have been spun-off wholly will have stronger change towards 
being more stock-like after the TFP announcement compared to spun-off partially from 
the initial corporations. 
 
Prospect to Lower Tax Expenses Outside of the Income Trust Structure 
 We also examine how the changes in loadings to risk factors around the TFP 
announcement are related to the potential for a firm to keep tax expenses low when the 
tax advantage for the income trust structure would be eliminated. We examine two 
groups of characteristics that may indicate whether there is potential for a firm to lower 
its tax expense outside of the trust structure. The first group of characteristics we examine 
is based on Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008), where they examine the characteristics 
of tax-avoiding firms. Following their paper, we examine the size based on net sales, 
market-to-book ratio, tangibility, dividend payout, and return on assets. Among the 
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variables, size and leverage are shown to be correlated with long-run tax avoidance. 
Conclusions on other characteristics are inconclusive in Dyreng et al. (2008). The second 
group of variables is related to the prospect to employ tax shields as studied in Doidge 
and Dyck (2015). In our study, we look at the amount of tax shields (debt and non-debt) 
used by the income trust (trust tax shields), the median tax shields used by corporations in 
the same industry (industry tax shields), and whether an income trust has used less than 
or more than the amount of tax shields used by a median corporation in the same 
industry. All characteristics are measured in 2005. 
 We hypothesize that an income trust will have lower changes towards being more 
stock-like after the TFP announcement if it has the prospect of lowering its income tax 
expense in the future. The prospect is measured by larger firm size and higher leverage 
(following Dyreng et al., 2008), and larger room for prospective tax shields (following 
Doidge and Dyck, 2015). 
 
H3d: Income trusts that have characteristics of tax-avoiding firms have lower changes 
towards being more stock-like after the TFP announcement. 
 
H3e: Income trusts that have higher prospective tax shields have lower changes towards 
being more stock-like after the TFP announcement. 
 
 Hypotheses H3a, H3b, H3c, H3d, and H3e will be tested using the cross-sectional 
univariate test where we will estimate the changes in each risk factor loading separately 
for each income trust and compare the average across groups of income trusts. The 
changes in each risk factor are estimated separately via the coefficient diCh_POST_TFP using 
the model: 
 
Rit – Rft = aiPRE_TFP + diPRE_TFP * RiskFactort + aiTFP * DitTFP + aiCh_POST_TFP * DitPOST_TFP + 
diCh_POST_TFP * RiskFactort * DitPOST_TFP + eit (3.1) 
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 For income trusts in less suitable industries (i.e., business as opposed to energy, 
those spun-off wholly as opposed to those spun-off partially, and those that would 
eventually convert into corporations), we expect that the increase in comovement with 
the stock market (increase in RM-Rf, SMB, decrease HML loadings) and the decrease in 
comovement with the bond market (decrease in TERM and increase in DEF loadings) 
after the TFP announcement are stronger. 
2.4.4 Changes in Stock-like/Bond-like Behavior around the 
Conversion from Corporations 
We study returns of income trusts that were converted from corporations to determine 
how the pricing of those firms changes around the conversions. To be able to convert to 
an income trust, the firm has likely been a tax avoiding firm with stable cash flows since 
its inception, so it is a logical decision to convert. This suggests that before the 
conversion, the firm should have been priced as a regular equity unless the market also 
prices in tax avoidance and being a tax avoider makes you more bond-like in valuation 
than equity-like. Therefore, in terms of risks, we expect to see returns of firms which 
convert to the income trust structure to comove more with the bond market and less with 
the stock market after the conversions. If that is not the case, it is likely that the converted 
firms have likely been long-term tax avoiders, so there is no real change in their risk 
profile due to changes in tax paid following the conversion. In terms of valuation, since 
there are higher expected cash distributions from those firms due to the tax treatment to 
income trusts, we expect firms that converted into income trusts to experience a boost in 
valuation at conversions. The formal hypothesis will examine how risk loadings (betas) 
with the factors change as a firm converts to an income trust structure, as well as the 
potential boost in valuation on the conversion date.  
 
H4: We expect the relative role of equity factors to be larger for income trusts before they 
convert (i.e., while they are still regular corporations), and the relative role of bond 
factors to be larger after the conversions.  
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 We estimate a pooled regression that could capture the change in factor betas after 
the conversion: 
 
Ri,t – Rf,t = aPRE_CV + bPRE_CV * (RM,t – Rf,t) + sPRE_CV * SMBt + hPRE_CV * HMLt  
 + uPRE_CV * UMDt + mPRE_CV * TERMt + dPRE_CV * DEFt + aCV * DitCV  
 + aCh_POST_CV * DitPOST_CV + bCh_POST_CV * (RM,t – Rf,t) * DitPOST_CV  
 + sCh_POST_CV * SMBt * DitPOST_CV + hCh_POST_CV * HMLt * DitPOST_CV  
 + uCh_POST_CV * UMDt * DitPOST_CV + mCh_POST_CV * TERMt * DitPOST_CV  
 + dCh_POST_CV * DEFt * DitPOST_CV + ei,t (4.1) 
 
 Since the estimation window is shorter (we take one year before and after the 
conversions into income trusts), and weekly data on the Fama-French factors for the 
Canadian market are not available, we use daily returns to estimate betas. Rit is daily 
return of the income trust i in day t. Rft is the risk-free rate. SMBt, HMLt, UMDt are the 
Fama-French risk premiums. For bond market factors, TERMt and DEFt are the term and 
default factors for the bond markets. DitCV is the dummy if the time t is the actual 
conversion day. DitPOST_CV is the dummy for the post-conversion period. bPRE_CV, sPRE_CV, 
hPRE_CV, uPRE_CV, mPRE_CV and dPRE_CV are factor loadings for market beta, SMB, HML, 
UMD, term and default factors, respectively, before the conversions. bCh_POST_CV, 
sCh_POST_CV, hCh_POST_CV, uCh_POST_CV, mCh_POST_CV and dCh_POST_CV are the changes in 
factor loadings for market beta, SMB, HML, UMD, the term structure of interest and 
default factors, respectively, due to the conversions. The period examined is one year 
before and one year after the actual conversion days. The coefficients aPRE_CV, aCV, and 
aCh_POST_CV are designed to capture the valuation not related to risks before, on, and after 
the actual conversion days, respectively.  
 We expect to see the sensitivities to stock market factors decrease (negative 
bCh_POST_CV and negative sCh_POST_CV) and the comovement with the bond market increase 
(positive mCh_POST_CV and negative dCh_POST_CV) as a firm converts from the corporate 
structure to the income trust structure. 
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2.5 Data  
Our list of Canadian income trusts is compiled from several sources including 
Datastream, the CFMRC database, and the reviews from the Toronto Stock Exchange. 
Prices and accounting data are from Datastream for the income trusts and all of the other 
listed firms in Canada. From the SEDAR website, we hand collect data on how income 
trusts became listed (i.e., conversion or IPO) and their ultimate fate. Income trusts are 
matched by industry and size (net sales) in 2005 for the TFP test. We choose net sales 
since it is a measure of size not likely to be impacted by a firm’s organizational structure. 
 For stock market factors, we use returns on the S&P TSX Composite Index for 
stock market return. We use data from Frazzini and Pedersen (2013)11 for other Fama-
French factors of the Canadian market (SMB, HML, UMD). For bond market factors, we 
calculate the TERM factor as the total returns on the Canadian benchmark 10-year 
government index (datatype BMCN10Y) taken from Datastream less the one-month 
Canadian treasury bill rate of the previous month (datatype CNTBB1M) sourced from 
Bank of Canada (BOC). As our TERM factor is measured as the returns on the bonds, a 
positive correlation with the TERM factor means a higher comovement with the bond 
market. 
 For the DEF factor, we use returns on Canadian corporate bonds with maturity of 
10 years or longer sourced from Thompson Reuters (datatype TRCNCTP) for long-term 
Canadian corporate bond returns. The changes in the Canadian benchmark 10-year 
government bonds total return index is deducted from changes in Canadian corporate 
bonds total return index to get the DEF factor. This data is available from 2002 onwards 
so we will miss data points in the period before 2002 for tests that include the DEF factor. 
DEF decreases when the returns on corporate bonds are relatively lower than the returns 
on government bonds, which means that credit spread increases. If an asset has lower 
                                               
11 Frazzini and Pedersen (2013) study financial assets (equities, bonds, and futures) in markets worldwide 
to show that low-beta assets have better performance because of the overweighing of high-beta assets due 
to funding constraint of investors. A betting against beta (BAB) factor, constructed as long low-beta assets 
and short high-beta assets, produces positive returns even when accounting for other risk factors (SMB, 
UMD, and HML). 
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return when credit spread increases, which will be represented by a positive beta to the 
DEF factor, we would interpret it to be more stock-like than bond-like. The reasoning is 
that those securities with less seniority (stocks) will be more subject to credit risk than 
those with higher seniority (bonds).  
 As of 2006, our sample records 213 non-REIT income trusts and 34 REITs. We 
report the summary statistics of the excess returns on income trusts and matched 
corporations, as well as the risk factors in Table 2-1. Table 2-2 provides pairwise 
correlations among risk factors before and after the TFP announcement. 
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Table 2-1: Summary Statistics 
 
 Pre-TFP Post-TFP 
Obs Mean S.D. p25 p75 Obs Mean S.D. p25 p75 
Returns of Non-REIT 
Income Trusts 
6986 -0.022 (0.097) -0.061 0.017 6391 -0.019 (0.141) -0.077 0.036 
Returns of Matched 
Corporations 
6986 -0.009 (0.164) -0.081 0.045 6391 -0.017 (0.145) -0.085 0.041 
RM-Rf 6986 -0.018 (0.038) -0.041 0.010 6391 -0.018 (0.054) -0.042 0.018 
SMB 6986 0.002 (0.020) -0.011 0.018 6391 -0.001 (0.039) -0.019 0.018 
HML 6986 0.009 (0.031) -0.008 0.022 6391 0.004 (0.027) -0.005 0.022 
UMD 6986 0.017 (0.048) -0.002 0.037 6391 -0.001 (0.060) -0.012 0.030 
TERM 6986 -0.025 (0.016) -0.039 -0.012 6391 -0.016 (0.023) -0.034 -0.002 
DEF 5616 0.003 (0.005) -0.000 0.006 6391 -0.001 (0.017) -0.008 0.008 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the monthly returns on the group of non-REIT income trusts 
and stock and bond market risk factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2-2: Correlation among Market Risk Factors 
 
 RM-Rf SMB HML UMD TERM DEF 
RM-Rf 1 0.454*** -0.213* -0.211 0.0424 0.658*** 
SMB 0.0239 1 -0.0807 -0.401*** 0.0531 0.523*** 
HML -0.527*** -0.0606 1 -0.0278 -0.145 0.0295 
UMD -0.0194 -0.0577 0.0310 1 -0.0810 -0.147 
TERM 0.274*** 0.130 0.0769 0.0567 1 -0.0293 
DEF 0.269* 0.0327 0.00388 -0.00136 0.428*** 1 
 
This table reports Pearson correlations among stock and bond market risk factors for the period before 
(lower half of the table) and after (upper half of the table) the TFP announcement 
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Figure 2-2: Comparative Performance of the Income Trust Sector and the Overall 
Stock Market 
 
 
a) Figure 2-2a shows how an $1 investment grows over the period 1998-2011 if it is invested in the income 
trust sector (using the S&P/TSX Income Trust Index) compared to if it is invested in the overall Canadian 
stock market (using the S&P/TSX Composite Index). Nov 06 marks the event month after the TFP 
announcement on market close on October 31, 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
b) Figure 2-2b shows how the monthly S&P/TSX Income Trust Index and the monthly S&P/TSX 
Composite Index change relative to each other.  
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2.6 Empirical Results 
2.6.1 Sensitivities to Stock and Bond Market Factors 
In Figure 2-2, we illustrate comparative performance between income trusts and the 
overall stock market from 1998 to 2011. At a glance, the income trust group (as proxied 
by the S&P/TSX Income Trust index) starts to outperform the overall stock market in the 
early 2000s until after November 2006 when they seem to move in tandem. There are 
more instances where income trusts and the overall stock market move in opposite 
directions in the period before November 2006 than in the period after November 2006 
(Figure 2-2b). 
 Table 2-3 examines the loadings on stock and bond market factors for income 
trusts and for matched corporations as specified in Models 1.1-1.4. REITs are excluded 
from our sample. Panel (a) reports the comparison from 1995 to 2011 (or 2002-2011 for 
models using the DEF factor), while panel (b) and (c) report the comparisons for the sub-
periods before and after the TFP, respectively. We report the results only for those 
income trusts that have been matched with corporations,12 although including income 
trusts that do not have matched corporations yields similar results. Columns (2b) and (6b) 
in Panel (a) and (b) are added to examine models with only stock market factors when 
DEF is not missing. The purpose of the addition is for comparison with the results of the 
models with the DEF factor included. 
 We observe in all three panels that both the groups of income trusts and matched 
corporations are sensitive to stock and bond market factors. Our results for the pre-TFP 
period (Table 2-3b) are in line with Halpern (2004) in that our stock market beta is about 
0.5 when examined for the period before 2006 while stock market betas in Halpern 
(2004) range from 0.4 to 0.5 for different groups of income trusts. Both Halpern (2004) 
and our study report positive and significant loadings on the interest rate factor of close to 
1 (excess return on 5-year government bond index in Halpern (2004) and TERM in our 
                                               
12 We cannot match cases when, for example, an income trust is IPOed in the middle of a year and does not 
have data on net sales for the full year, while it still has price data for that particular year. 
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study, which is the return on the 10-year government bond index less the 1-month 
Canadian T-bill rate of the previous month). We also find that when stock market factors 
are included, the bond market factor TERM is still significant in explaining returns of 
income trusts before the TFP announcement but becomes insignificant in explaining 
returns of income trusts post-TFP and insignificant in explaining returns of matched 
corporations in all periods. The results therefore lend support to H1a.  
 Tables 2-3a and 2-3b show that the inclusion of bond market factors improves 
adjusted R-squared only for the group of income trusts, and this is likely driven by the 
results in the pre-TFP period. Adjusted R-squared increases when we include the TERM 
and DEF factor to Model (1.2) in the tests of all periods (Table 2-3a) and the pre-TFP 
period (Table 2-3b), but not for the tests in the post-TFP period (Table 2-3c). For 
matched corporations, the inclusion of bond market factors does not increase the 
performance of adjusted R-squared. The results on adjusted R-squared performance 
support Hypothesis 1a in showing that adding bond market factors improves performance 
of our pricing model only for the group of income trusts before the TFP announcement.  
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Table 2-3: Sensitivities to Stock and Bond Market Factors Separately for Income Trusts and Matched Corporations 
 
a. All Periods Income Trusts Matched Corporations 
(1) (2a) (2b) (3) (4) (5) (6a) (6b) (7) (8) 
RM-Rf 0.869*** 0.849*** 0.884***  0.911*** 1.008*** 0.932*** 0.934***  0.935*** 
 (28.36) (27.82) (25.61)  (26.31) (32.37) (28.41) (27.10)  (23.67) 
SMB  0.553*** 0.563***  0.602***  0.599*** 0.594***  0.600*** 
  (12.93) (11.85)  (12.50)  (11.94) (11.71)  (11.56) 
HML  0.637*** 0.634***  0.666***  0.346*** 0.330***  0.337*** 
  (20.11) (14.94)  (16.07)  (7.25) (7.10)  (7.13) 
UMD  -0.0804*** -0.0932***  -0.0762**  0.00766 0.0128  0.0169 
  (-3.46) (-3.02)  (-2.51)  (0.27) (0.40)  (0.52) 
TERM    0.493*** 0.292***    0.296*** 0.0765 
    (8.43) (5.26)    (4.54) (1.19) 
DEF    2.343*** -0.264*    2.609*** -0.0303 
    (16.36) (-1.74)    (20.63) (-0.20) 
Constant -0.00713*** -0.0107*** -0.0106*** -0.0131*** -0.00449** 0.00480*** 0.00108 0.00122 -0.00692*** 0.00271 
 (-6.75) (-9.75) (-8.66) (-7.44) (-2.50) (3.51) (0.76) (0.86) (-3.73) (1.43) 
Observations 13553 13553 12183 12183 12183 13553 13553 12183 12183 12183 
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.154 0.157 0.064 0.160 0.088 0.105 0.117 0.053 0.117 
GRS statistic 45.952 102.691 85.247 67.942 8.118 12.377 .608 .782 13.498 2.036 
GRS p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 .004 0.000 .436 .377 0.000 .154 
 
This table examines loadings on stock and bond market factors for income trusts and matched corporations separately using their monthly returns. The base 
model estimated is Ri,t – Rf,t = a + b * (RM,t – Rf,t) + s * SMBt + h * HMLt + u * UMDt + m * TERMt + d * DEFt + ei,t (1.4) (columns (4) and (8)), where columns 
(1) and (5) examine the CAPM, columns (2a) and (6a) estimate the four-factor Fama-French model, and columns (3) and (7) examine only bond market factors. 
Columns (2b) and (6b) are added to examine the four-factor Fama-French model when there are data for the DEF factor. Excess stock market return, RM-Rf, is 
the return on the S&P/TSX Composite minus the one-month Canadian treasury bill rate; SMB, HML, UMD are returns on the zero-investment portfolios on the 
Canadian market from Frazzini and Pedersen (2013) representing the size, the book-to-market, and the momentum factors of the stock market, respectively. 
TERM is the changes in the Canadian benchmark 10-year government bonds total return index less the one-month Canadian treasury bill rate of the previous 
month. DEF is changes in the total return index for Canadian corporate bonds with maturity of 10 years or longer minus the changes in the Canadian benchmark 
10-year government bonds’ total return index. The sample spans from 1995 to 2011 and includes income trusts and their matched corporations only in the years 
the income trusts adopt the trust structure (i.e., we do not count a firm before it converted into an income trust or after it has abandoned the trust structure after 
the TFP). For models that include DEF, the sample spans from 2002 onwards due to data availability. Panel (a) is for all periods, while Panel (b) and (c) estimate 
the models for the pre- and post-TFP period, respectively. REITs are excluded. Newey-West standard errors with 2 lags are estimated to account for 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the error terms; t statistics are reported in parentheses, * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
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Table 2-3 (Continued) 
 
b. Pre-TFP Income Trusts Matched Corporations 
(1) (2a) (2b) (3) (4) (5) (6a) (6b) (7) (8) 
RM-Rf 0.577*** 0.721*** 0.809***  0.776*** 0.881*** 0.955*** 0.937***  0.936*** 
 (17.88) (19.24) (13.80)  (13.94) (17.14) (16.34) (11.04)  (10.16) 
SMB  0.301*** 0.303***  0.355***  0.606*** 0.533***  0.542*** 
  (5.94) (3.97)  (4.60)  (5.78) (4.70)  (4.80) 
HML  0.490*** 0.360***  0.290***  0.348*** 0.251***  0.239** 
  (12.82) (5.32)  (4.37)  (4.30) (2.60)  (2.46) 
UMD  0.0266 0.0548  0.00231  0.0150 0.0673  0.0546 
  (1.25) (1.36)  (0.06)  (0.32) (0.84)  (0.66) 
TERM    0.968*** 0.796***    0.351** 0.156 
    (11.87) (10.48)    (2.30) (1.04) 
DEF    0.175 -0.634**    0.751 -0.231 
    (0.54) (-2.06)    (1.55) (-0.46) 
Constant -0.0111*** -0.0141*** -0.0128*** 0.00306 0.00843*** 0.00646*** 0.00302 0.00349 0.00137 0.00801 
 (-9.34) (-11.45) (-8.05) (1.13) (2.88) (3.04) (1.25) (1.16) (0.30) (1.46) 
Observations 6986 6986 5616 5616 5616 6986 6986 5616 5616 5616 
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.074 0.068 0.021 0.078 0.041 0.049 0.046 0.002 0.046 
GRS statistic 78.602 109.56 43.123 .811 4.333 9.2 1.71 1.449 .073 1.745 
GRS p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 .368 .037 .002 .191 .229 .787 .187 
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c. Post-TFP Income Trusts Matched Corporations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RM-Rf 1.046*** 0.881***  0.939*** 1.079*** 0.916***  0.920*** 
 (24.44) (19.98)  (20.04) (28.01) (22.18)  (19.04) 
SMB  0.581***  0.622***  0.584***  0.589*** 
  (10.23)  (10.40)  (10.25)  (9.73) 
HML  0.458***  0.482***  0.377***  0.394*** 
  (8.17)  (8.64)  (6.38)  (6.47) 
UMD  -0.0566  -0.0416  -0.0240  -0.0172 
  (-1.42)  (-1.07)  (-0.62)  (-0.44) 
TERM   0.349*** 0.0461   0.399*** 0.0978 
   (4.89) (0.66)   (5.35) (1.29) 
DEF   2.545*** -0.303*   2.728*** -0.0283 
   (16.67) (-1.72)   (20.58) (-0.17) 
Constant -0.000887 -0.00526*** -0.0100*** -0.00394* 0.00243 -0.00156 -0.00624*** 0.0000301 
 (-0.53) (-3.21) (-4.51) (-1.86) (1.39) (-0.90) (-2.83) (0.01) 
Observations 6391 6391 6391 6391 6391 6391 6391 6391 
Adjusted R2 0.159 0.190 0.095 0.190 0.158 0.183 0.102 0.183 
GRS statistic .272 9.658 23.715 3.792 1.91 .786 8.647 0 
GRS p-value .602 .002 0.000 .051 .167 .375 .003 .989 
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 When we look at the results for the GRS tests, we observe in Table 2-3b that the 
models using stock market factors perform significantly worse than models using bond 
market factors for income trusts prior to the TFP announcement. The GRS statistics for 
models with only stock factors in columns (1), (2a), and (2b) of Table 2-3b are high 
compared to those of matched corporations. After the TFP announcement, the GRS 
statistics for models with only stock factors perform comparably well compared to those 
of matched corporations (Table 2-3c). Therefore, we can conclude from the analysis on 
the fitness of models with stock and bond market factors that bond market factors are 
more significant in the pricing of income trust before the TFP announcement, and that 
stock market factors are more significant in the pricing of income trust after the TFP 
announcement. The results therefore support hypothesis H1a. 
 While Tables 2-3a, 2-3b, and 2-3c are more descriptive in nature, Table 2-4 
provides formal tests for whether there are differences in risk factor loadings between 
income trusts and matched corporations before and after the TFP announcement. A 
dummy for being a trust is interacted with the risk factors to examine the possible impact 
of being a trust on the risk factor loadings. Table 2-4 therefore corresponds to Model 
(1.5). We find that in the period before the TFP announcement, income trusts comove 
significantly less with the stock market (a lower beta to excess stock market return of 
around 0.2 and a lower beta to SMB of around 0.3 in columns (1), (2), and (4), Table 2-4 
and significantly more with the bond market (higher beta to TERM by about 0.6 in 
columns (3) and (4)). This suggests that before the TFP announcement, income trusts are 
priced more like bonds and less like stocks compared to matched corporations.  
 In the period after the TFP, there is no significant difference between the pricing 
of income trusts versus non-trust corporations. Taken together, the results support 
hypothesis H1b that income trusts behave more like bonds and less like stocks compared 
to ordinary equities before the TFP announcement, while they behave similarly to 
matched corporations after the announcement. 
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Table 2-4: Risk Loadings Due to Being an Income Trust 
 
 Pre-TFP Post-TFP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RM-Rf 0.881*** 0.955***  0.936*** 1.079*** 0.916***  0.920*** 
 (17.14) (16.34)  (10.16) (28.01) (22.18)  (19.04) 
SMB  0.606***  0.542***  0.584***  0.589*** 
  (5.78)  (4.80)  (10.25)  (9.73) 
HML  0.348***  0.239**  0.377***  0.394*** 
  (4.30)  (2.46)  (6.38)  (6.47) 
UMD  0.0150  0.0546  -0.0240  -0.0172 
  (0.32)  (0.66)  (-0.62)  (-0.44) 
TERM   0.351** 0.156   0.399*** 0.0978 
   (2.30) (1.04)   (5.35) (1.29) 
DEF   0.751 -0.231   2.728*** -0.0283 
   (1.55) (-0.46)   (20.58) (-0.17) 
D_ITx(RM-Rf) -0.304*** -0.235***  -0.159 -0.0334 -0.0348  0.0197 
 (-5.01) (-3.38)  (-1.48) (-0.58) (-0.58)  (0.29) 
D_ITxSMB  -0.305***  -0.187  -0.00331  0.0335 
  (-2.62)  (-1.37)  (-0.04)  (0.39) 
D_ITxHML  0.142  0.0514  0.0815  0.0882 
  (1.59)  (0.44)  (1.00)  (1.07) 
D_ITxUMD  0.0117  -0.0523  -0.0326  -0.0243 
  (0.23)  (-0.57)  (-0.58)  (-0.44) 
D_ITxTERM   0.617*** 0.641***   -0.0494 -0.0517 
   (3.56) (3.81)   (-0.48) (-0.50) 
D_ITxDEF   -0.576 -0.403   -0.183 -0.275 
   (-0.99) (-0.68)   (-0.91) (-1.12) 
D_IT -0.0175*** -0.0171*** 0.0016 0.0004 -0.0033 -0.0037 -0.0038 -0.0039 
 (-7.21) (-6.30) (0.32) (0.07) (-1.37) (-1.56) (-1.21) (-1.30) 
Constant 0.00646*** 0.00302 0.00137 0.00801 0.00243 -0.00156 -0.00624*** 0.0000301 
 (3.04) (1.25) (0.30) (1.46) (1.39) (-0.90) (-2.83) (0.01) 
N 13972 13972 11232 11232 12782 12782 12782 12782 
adj. R2 0.045 0.057 0.011 0.059 0.158 0.187 0.099 0.187 
 
We examine in this table how risk factor loadings are explained by being an income trust, and how the 
impact changes with time.  
Ri,t – Rf,t = a0 + b * (RM,t – Rf,t) + s * SMBt + h * HMLt + u * UMDt + m * TERMt + d * DEFt  
+ a1 * Di,tIT + bIT * Di,tIT * (RM,t – Rf,t) + sIT * Di,tIT * SMBt + hIT * Di,tIT * HMLt  
+ uIT * Di,tIT * UMDt + mIT * Di,tIT * TERMt + dIT * Di,tIT * DEFt + ei,t (1.5), 
where D_IT is a dummy for whether the firm i is organized as an income trust in year t. bIT, sIT, hIT, uIT, 
mIT, and dIT indicate the values of the risk loadings due to being an income trust. Excess market return, 
RM-Rf, is the return on the S&P TSX Composite minus the one-month Canadian treasury bill rate; SMB, 
HML, UMD are returns of the zero-investment portfolios on the Canadian market from Frazzini and 
Pedersen (2013) representing the size, the book-to-market, and the momentum factors of the stock market, 
respectively. TERM is the changes in the Canadian benchmark 10-year government bonds total return 
index less the one-month Canadian treasury bill rate of the previous month. DEF is changes in the total 
return index for Canadian corporate bonds with maturity of 10 years or longer minus the changes in the 
Canadian benchmark 10-year government bonds’ total return index. The period before the TFP 
announcement spans from 1995 to Oct 2006 for tests that do not include the DEF factor and spans from 
2002 to Oct 2006 for tests that include DEF. The period after the TFP announcement spans from Dec 2006 
to Dec 2011. REITs are excluded. Monthly returns are used in the models. Newey-West standard errors 
with two lags are estimated to account for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the error terms, t 
statistics are reported in parentheses, * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
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2.6.2 TFP Announcement 
Table 2-5 examines the changes in sensitivities of income trusts returns (REITs excluded) 
to stock and bond market factors due to the TFP announcement, which will complement 
the previous analyses in Table 2-3 and Table 2-4. We make it clear in Table 2-5 how the 
risk loadings change for income trusts and corporations around the TFP announcement. 
Model (2.1) is tested for the case of the Halloween Massacre event on October 31, 2006, 
and the results are reported in Table 2-5. First, we observe a drop in valuation for income 
trusts in November 2006 at an average of 13% after other risks are accounted for, 
supporting hypothesis H2a. After the TFP announcement, monthly returns on income 
trusts comove significantly more with the stock market (positive and significant 
coefficients on D_PostTFPx(RM-Rf) in columns (1) and (2), and (4), positive and 
significant coefficients on D_PostTFPxSMB in columns (2) and (4)) while they comove 
significantly less with the bond market (negative and significant coefficient on 
D_PostTFPxTERM in all specifications). That translates to an increase in stock market 
beta of 0.163, an increase in beta to size factor of 0.267, and a decrease in beta to interest 
rate risk of 0.75 after all other risks are accounted for. On the other hand, the group of 
matched corporations does not exhibit a clear or significant change in risk loadings on 
RM-Rf, SMB, and TERM around the TFP announcement. Both income trusts and 
matched corporations, however, exhibit similar increases in sensitivities to the default 
factor through positive coefficients on D_PostTFPxDEF in all specifications. Income 
trusts have higher positive coefficients on the change in DEF factor, indicating a stronger 
move towards being more stock-like. 
 The results suggest that the changes in risks for income trusts after the TFP 
announcement are in the direction of more stock-like and less bond-like, while there is no 
significant change in the risk profiles of matched corporations after the event, supporting 
hypothesis H2b. The results therefore lend support to the theory that lower expected cash 
distribution after the TFP announcement heightens the value of the conversion option, 
causing lower comovement with the bond market and higher comovement with the stock 
market for income trusts. 
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Table 2-5: Risk Loading Changes around the TFP Announcement 
 
 Income Trusts Matched Corporations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RM-Rf 0.577*** 0.721***  0.776*** 0.881*** 0.955***  0.936*** 
 (17.88) (19.24)  (13.94) (17.14) (16.34)  (10.16) 
SMB  0.301***  0.355***  0.606***  0.542*** 
  (5.94)  (4.60)  (5.78)  (4.80) 
HML  0.490***  0.290***  0.348***  0.239** 
  (12.82)  (4.37)  (4.30)  (2.46) 
UMD  0.0266  0.00231  0.0150  0.0546 
  (1.25)  (0.06)  (0.32)  (0.66) 
TERM   0.968*** 0.796***   0.351** 0.156 
   (11.87) (10.48)   (2.30) (1.04) 
DEF   0.175 -0.634**   0.751 -0.231 
   (0.54) (-2.06)   (1.55) (-0.46) 
D_TFP -0.163*** -0.122*** -0.154*** -0.130*** -0.0267*** 0.0106 -0.0208** -0.000308 
 (-21.91) (-14.81) (-20.52) (-13.02) (-2.77) (0.87) (-2.14) (-0.02) 
D_PostTFP 0.0102*** 0.00884*** -0.0131*** -0.0124*** -0.00403 -0.00458 -0.00761 -0.00798 
 (4.97) (4.31) (-3.73) (-3.43) (-1.46) (-1.54) (-1.51) (-1.35) 
D_PostTFPx(RM-Rf) 0.469*** 0.160***  0.163** 0.198*** -0.0399  -0.0158 
 (8.75) (2.77)  (2.24) (3.08) (-0.56)  (-0.15) 
D_PostTFPxSMB  0.280***  0.267***  -0.0219  0.0470 
  (3.68)  (2.74)  (-0.18)  (0.37) 
D_PostTFPxHML  -0.0316  0.192**  0.0293  0.155 
  (-0.47)  (2.21)  (0.29)  (1.36) 
D_PostTFPxUMD  -0.0832*  -0.0439  -0.0390  -0.0718 
  (-1.84)  (-0.78)  (-0.64)  (-0.78) 
D_PostTFPxTERM   -0.618*** -0.750***   0.0476 -0.0578 
   (-5.71) (-7.29)   (0.28) (-0.34) 
D_PostTFPxDEF   2.370*** 0.330   1.977*** 0.203 
   (6.62) (0.93)   (3.94) (0.38) 
Constant -0.0111*** -0.0141*** 0.00306 0.00843*** 0.00646*** 0.00302 0.00137 0.00801 
 (-9.34) (-11.45) (1.13) (2.88) (3.04) (1.25) (0.30) (1.46) 
N 13553 13553 12183 12183 13553 13553 12183 12183 
adj. R2 0.140 0.167 0.092 0.173 0.090 0.105 0.055 0.117 
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The above table investigates the changes in the sensitivities of monthly returns on stock and bond market factors around the TFP announcement. The model 
estimated is: 
Rit – Rft = aPRE_TFP + bPRE_TFP * (RM,t – Rf,t) + sPRE_TFP * SMBt + hPRE_TFP * HMLt + uPRE_TFP * UMDt  
+ mPRE_TFP * TERMt + dPRE_TFP * DEFt + aTFP * DitTFP + aCh_POST_TFP * DitPOST_TFP   
+ bCh_POST_TFP * (RM,t – Rf,t) * DitPOST_TFP + sCh_POST_TFP * SMBt * DitPOST_TFP 
+ hCh_POST_TFP * HMLt * DitPOST_TFP + uCh_POST_TFP * UMDt * DitPOST_TFP  
+ mCh_POST_TFP * TERMt * DitPOST_TFP + dCh_POST_TFP * DEFt * DitPOST_TFP + eit (2.1), 
where DitTFP indicates the event month (Nov 2006) and DitPOST_TFP indicates the period after the TFP announcement. Excess market return, RM-Rf, is the return on 
the S&P TSX Composite minus the one-month Canadian treasury bill rate; SMB, HML, UMD are returns of the zero-investment portfolios on the Canadian 
market from Frazzini and Pedersen (2013) representing the size, the book-to-market, and the momentum factors of the stock market, respectively. TERM is the 
changes in the Canadian benchmark 10-year government bonds’ total return index less the one-month Canadian treasury bill rate of the previous month. DEF is 
changes in the total return index for Canadian corporate bonds with maturity of 10 years or longer minus the changes in the Canadian benchmark 10-year 
government bonds total return index. bCh_POST_TFP, sCh_POST_TFP, hCh_POST_TFP, uCh_POST_TFP, mCh_POST_TFP, and dCh_POST_TFP indicate the changes in values of the risk 
loadings after the TFP announcement. REITs are excluded. Monthly returns are used in the models. Newey-West standard errors with two lags are estimated to 
account for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the error terms. t statistics are reported in parentheses, * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
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2.6.3 TFP Announcement and Trust Characteristics 
The analysis on the change in betas in Model (2.1) is based on a pooled regression of all 
income trusts. This method might put higher weights on income trusts with higher 
sensitivities to the stock and bond market factors. We account for this bias by estimating 
the changes in risk factor loadings separately for each income trust using Model (3.1). 
The estimation is performed separately for each risk factor since including all of them 
will cause difficulties with the number of observations for income trusts that have few 
observations before or after the TFP announcement (e.g., those abandoning the trust 
structure early after the TFP announcement). Table 2-6a examines whether the changes in 
risk loadings for each income trust are significant on average through the t-test for the 
means of the changes. For the non-REIT income trusts, we confirm the results in Table 2-
5 that there is a significantly positive increase in stock market beta of 0.268 on average 
and a significantly negative decrease in beta to TERM factor of 0.978 on average. The 
results on SMB and DEF are not significant in this test. 
 In this part, we will also examine how the sensitivities of income trusts to stock 
and bond market factors vary with different characteristics of the income trust. We test 
hypotheses H3a, H3b, and H3c on how suitability to the income trust structure based on 
characteristics may create differences in the changes in risk profiles of income trusts. 
Table 6a reports the results for changes in betas after the TFP announcement by industry 
(REITs, energy, and business), subsequent fates after the TFP announcement, and 
whether an income trust has been spun-off from 100 per cent of the assets or less than 
100 per cent of the assets of a previous company. The categorization by industry and by 
the subsequent fate do not disentangle changes in betas greatly, except that we observe no 
changes in risk for REITs. We find that income trusts that have been spun-off from 100 
per cent of the assets of the previous corporations have stronger change towards being 
more stock-like—they have significant increase in stock market beta and significant 
decrease in beta to TERM factor—while there is no significant change for those 
converted partially from the previous corporations.  
 Table 2-6a also reports differences in the changes in loadings to risk factors 
around the TFP announcement based on characteristics related to tax avoidance following 
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Dyreng et al. (2008). This serves to test hypothesis H3d that firms with characteristics of 
long-term tax avoiders will have lower changes towards being more stock-like upon the 
removal of the tax advantage for income trusts. We find that income trusts with low 
market-to-book ratios, high tangibility, high dividend payout, and low ROA have less 
tendency to become more stock-like. They have insignificant increases in stock market 
betas and lower decreases in betas to the TERM factor. The changes in risk loadings 
related to size are inconclusive since large firms have more significant increase in betas 
to ExcMKT but have lower decreases in betas to TERM. In Table 6b, we also examine 
the relationship between leverage and changes in risk loadings. Income trusts with high 
leverage also have less tendency to become more stock-like. Therefore, our analysis lends 
support to H3d in terms of leverage and not to a great extent in terms of size that long-
term tax avoiders maintain their bond-like behavior after the TFP announcement. We do 
find strong evidence that income trusts that are more likely to be more mature and of 
dividend-paying type firms are more likely to maintain their bond-like characteristics 
upon removal of the tax advantage. 
 Table 2-6b reports the degrees of being more stock-like for groups of income 
trusts with different tax shield prospects, which tests hypothesis H3e. The analysis 
employs tax shield prospects proxied by debt (total debt) and non-debt (depreciation 
expense) measures. We find that cross-sectionally, income trusts that have used lower 
debt and non-debt tax shields compared to other income trusts prior to the TFP 
announcement (i.e., having Total Debt/Total Assets and (Total Debt + Depreciation 
Expense)/Total Assets lower than the median for the income trusts) have lower changes 
towards being more stock-like after the TFP announcement. They have insignificant and 
lower increases in coefficients to ExcMKT and lower reduction in coefficients to TERM 
after the TFP announcement. In addition, if the median tax shields of corporations in the 
same industry have been high, the income trust also has less tendency to become more 
stock-like. And finally, when there is more room for the income trust to use debt and non-
debt tax shields, it has less tendency to become more stock-like. If an income trust’s tax 
shield is lower than median tax shield of the industry, the increases in loadings to 
ExcMKT are lower and not significant, while the decreases in loadings to TERM are 
lower in magnitude. The results in Table 2-6b therefore support H3e that if an income 
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trust has a higher tax shield prospect, it will have lower tendency to become more stock-
like. Investors therefore expect the firm to be able to maintain its bond-like risk profile 
even after the tax advantage has been removed, possibly through the use of debt and non-
debt tax shields. 
 In summary, the cross-sectional analysis provides evidence from classifying 
income trusts that their characteristics are related to their risk profiles in terms of bond-
like/stock-like characteristics. In particular, how they become trusts can impact the stock-
like/bond-like characteristics of the asset. However, we do not find evidence for different 
changes in risk profiles from grouping income trusts by industry and subsequent fate after 
the TFP announcement.  
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Table 2-6: Univariate and Cross-sectional Tests 
a) Trust Characteristics 
  ExcMKT SMB HML UMD TERM DEF 
NonREITs 0.268** 0.243 0.313** -1.141*** -0.978*** -0.252 
N 180 180 180 180 180 180 
%Pos 62.8 70.6 54.4 11.1 23.9 55 
By Industry 
REIT 0.063 -0.103 0.708 -0.622*** -0.866 -4.034 
N 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Bus 0.278** 1.004* 0.14 -0.958*** -0.777*** -0.888 
N 129 129 129 129 129 129 
Ener 0.24* -1.682 0.752*** -1.603*** -1.489*** 1.354 
N 51 51 51 51 51 51 
By Subsequent Fates 
NoChange 0.974** 0.984** 0.097 -0.629*** -0.675* 3.094 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Acquired 0.035 0.998 0.641* -1.601*** -1.257*** -4.072** 
N 63 63 63 63 63 63 
Converted 0.306*** -0.326 0.155 -0.912*** -0.819*** 1.555 
N 103 103 103 103 103 103 
By Percentage Assets Spun-off 
100Assets 0.551** 3.109 0.864* -1.332*** -1.451*** -3.133 
N 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Less100Assets 0.037 0.121 0.054 -1.314*** -0.413 -0.926 
N 59 59 59 59 59 59 
By Characteristics at the End of 2005 
SmallSize 0.138 1.203 0.243 -1.276*** -1.12*** -1.264 
N 86 86 86 86 86 86 
LargeSize 0.345** 0.475* 0.345* -1.041*** -0.947*** -0.606 
N 87 87 87 87 87 87 
LowMTB 0.207 0.604* 0.279 -1.209*** -0.592** -0.101 
N 81 81 81 81 81 81 
HighMTB 0.181* 0.2 0.206 -1.095*** -1.285*** -0.942 
N 82 82 82 82 82 82 
LowTangibility 0.314* 0.44 0.215 -1.232*** -1.027*** 0.448 
N 76 76 76 76 76 76 
HighTangibility 0.048 0.34 0.353 -0.951*** -0.882*** -1.52 
N 77 77 77 77 77 77 
LowDivPayout 0.285*** 1.266 0.326 -1.357*** -1.142*** -2.174 
N 76 76 76 76 76 76 
HighDivPayout 0.158 0.58** 0.21 -0.826*** -0.685*** 0.277 
N 77 77 77 77 77 77 
LowROA 0.308 0.732** 0.078 -1.079*** -0.877*** -0.028 
N 85 85 85 85 85 85 
HighROA 0.155* 0.959 0.442*** -1.189*** -1.181*** -1.826 
N 86 86 86 86 86 86 
 
This table presents the results for the univariate test on changes in betas to risk factors. The changes in 
sensitivities to market factors (betas) are estimated for each individual market factor and each income trust 
using the regression: Rit – Rft = aiPRE_TFP + diPRE_TFP * RiskFactort + aiTFP * DitTFP + aiCh_POST_TFP * 
DitPOST_TFP+ diCh_POST_TFP * RiskFactort * DitPOST_TFP + eit (3.1). We then test the significance of the changes 
using a t-test with the null hypothesis that the mean of beta changes for individual income trusts, 
diCh_POST_TFP, equals zero. We summarize the changes by groups of income trusts in different industries, 
fates after the TFP, percentage assets spun-off from previous corporations, and firm characteristics. 
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b) Debt and Non-Debt Tax Shields 
 
  ExcMKT SMB HML UMD TERM DEF 
By Trust Tax Shields  
Lo Debt Tax Shield 0.152 0.548*** 0.276 -1.205*** -0.708*** 0.097 
N 86 86 86 86 86 86 
Hi Debt Tax Shield 0.318* 1.132 0.245 -1.052*** -1.354*** -1.886 
N 87 87 87 87 87 87 
Lo Debt & Non-Debt Tax Shield 0.125 0.48* 0.105 -1.183*** -0.823*** -1.094 
N 86 86 86 86 86 86 
Hi Debt & Non-Debt Tax Shield 0.341* 1.213 0.414* -1.08*** -1.232*** -0.706 
N 86 86 86 86 86 86 
By Industry Median Tax Shields 
Lo Ind Debt Tax Shield 0.448*** 0.181 0.59*** -1.411*** -1.051*** -0.189 
N 90 90 90 90 90 90 
Hi Ind Debt Tax Shield 0.088 0.305 0.036 -0.871*** -0.906*** -0.316 
N 90 90 90 90 90 90 
Lo Ind Debt & Non-Debt Tax Shield 0.507*** 0.217 0.704*** -1.447*** -1.082*** -0.179 
N 87 87 87 87 87 87 
Hi Ind Debt & Non-Debt Tax Shield 0.043 0.267 -0.053 -0.854*** -0.882*** -0.321 
N 93 93 93 93 93 93 
By Tax Shields Compared to Industry Median (Trusts Excl.) 
Lo Debt Tax Shield Compare Ind 0.049 0.46** 0.034 -0.989*** -0.811*** 0.165 
N 72 72 72 72 72 72 
Hi Debt Tax Shield Compare Ind  0.413*** 0.098 0.499** -1.243*** -1.09*** -0.531 
N 108 108 108 108 108 108 
Lo Debt & Non-Debt Tax Shield Compare Ind 0.06 0.481** -0.013 -0.926*** -0.751*** 0.474 
N 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Hi Debt & Non-Debt Tax Shield Compare Ind 0.409*** 0.081 0.536** -1.288*** -1.133*** -0.748 
N 107 107 107 107 107 107 
 
This table presents the results for the univariate test on changes in betas to risk factors. The changes in 
betas are estimated for each factor and each individual income trusts using the regression: Rit – Rft = 
aiPRE_TFP + diPRE_TFP * RiskFactort + aiTFP * DitTFP + aiCh_POST_TFP * DitPOST_TFP+ diCh_POST_TFP * RiskFactort * D
itPOST_TFP + eit (3.1) and we test the significance of the changes using a t-test with the null hypothesis that the 
mean of beta changes for individual income trusts, diCh_POST_TFP, equals zero. We then summarize the 
changes by groups of income trusts by how many tax shields the income trust has used before the TFP 
announcement, the median tax shields used by corporations in the same industry, and if there is room for 
the income trust to increase tax shields to be comparable to a medium firm in the industry. Debt Tax Shield 
is calculated as Total Debt 2005/ Total Assets in 2005. Debt & Non-Debt Tax Shield is calculated as (Total 
Debt in 2005 + Depreciation Expense in 2005)/ Total Assets in 2005. Low/High Debt (& Non-Debt) Tax 
Shield for an income trust means the income trust has Debt (& Non-Debt) Tax Shield lower/higher than the 
50th percentile of the tax shields of all income trusts. Low/High Ind Debt (& Non-Debt) Tax Shield means 
the income trust is in an industry that has Debt (& Non-Debt) Tax Shield lower/higher than the 50th 
percentile of the tax shields of all industries. Income trusts are excluded from calculation of the industry 
median. Low/High Debt (&Non-Debt) Tax Shield Compare Ind is a dummy for whether the income trust 
has used less/more than the median tax shield used by corporations in the same industry. 
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2.6.4 Conversions to Income Trusts 
Table 2-7 examines valuations around conversions for income trusts. A total of 64 
conversion cases including REITs from 2001 to 2006 are in the initial sample. However, 
only those occurring after 2002 are examined in the tests that include the DEF factor due 
to data availability. We look at how sensitivities to risk factors change after the 
conversions where the underlying business should not change and only the expected cash 
flows to investors are changed due to the tax savings. The returns are taken daily one year 
before and one year after the conversions.  
 We find in Table 2-7a that there is little change to the risk profiles of converted 
corporations after the conversions, except for a slightly significant increase in the 
sensitivities to the TERM factor of 0.153. This change is as expected, for a firm would be 
more committed to a steady distribution to investors, making the unit more bond-like for 
investors. However, as the increase in comovement with bond market is only significant 
at the 10 per cent level, it is also suggested that shares of converted corporations may 
have already been priced relatively more like bonds than equities before the actual 
conversions. We also do not find a significant change in valuation on the conversion day. 
Our data on conversion cases has limitation in that we can only identify the dates of the 
actual implementation of the conversions and not the announcement dates. Therefore, we 
are cautious about inferring from the results on valuation changes around conversions. 
Overall, the results lend weak support to hypothesis 4 that converted firms have higher 
comovement with the bond market after the actual conversions.  
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Table 2-7: Risk Loading Changes around Conversions into Income Trusts 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
RM-Rf 0.617*** 0.812***  0.725*** 
 (21.75) (23.83)  (13.01) 
SMB  0.797***  0.667*** 
  (9.89)  (7.16) 
HML  0.275***  0.329*** 
  (2.74)  (4.12) 
UMD  0.0205  0.0714 
  (0.47)  (1.58) 
TERM   0.755*** 0.257*** 
   (12.52) (3.81) 
DEF   -0.662** -0.410 
   (-2.30) (-1.44) 
D_Conversion 0.00356 0.00294 0.00435 0.00300 
 (1.04) (0.88) (0.93) (0.67) 
D_PostConversion -0.000996 -0.000509 0.00395** 0.00217 
 (-0.78) (-0.36) (2.16) (1.25) 
D_PostConversionx(RM-Rf) 0.0233 0.0385  -0.0386 
 (0.51) (0.74)  (-0.43) 
D_PostConversionxSMB  0.0450  0.0882 
  (0.42)  (0.67) 
D_PostConversionxHML  0.0327  -0.0568 
  (0.29)  (-0.57) 
D_PostConversionxUMD  0.105  0.0918 
  (1.55)  (0.96) 
D_PostConversionxTERM   0.192*** 0.153* 
   (2.80) (1.67) 
D_PostConversionxDEF   -0.555 -0.465 
   (-1.08) (-0.89) 
Constant -0.00785*** -0.00301*** -0.00399*** 0.00120 
 (-9.82) (-3.46) (-2.61) (0.83) 
Observations 31717 31717 22942 22942 
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.039 0.035 0.058 
 
This table estimates the models that use stock and bond market factors to explain excess return on 
converted income trusts around the conversions. The model is: 
Rit – Rft = aPRE_CV + bPRE_CV * (RM,t – Rf,t) + sPRE_CV * SMBt + hPRE_CV * HMLt + uPRE_CV * UMDt  
+ mPRE_CV * TERMt + dPRE_CV * DEFt  
+ aCV * DitCV + aCh_POST_CV * DitPOST_CV  
+ bCh_POST_CV * (RM,t – Rf,t) * DitPOST_CV + sCh_POST_CV * SMBt * DitPOST_CV 
+ hCh_POST_CV * HMLt * DitPOST_CV + uCh_POST_CV * UMDt * DitPOST_CV  
+ mCh_POST_CV * TERMt * DitPOST_CV + dCh_POST_CV * DEFt * DitPOST_CV + eit (4.1) 
where Excess market return, RM-Rf, is the daily return on the S&P TSX Composite minus the one-month 
Canadian treasury bill rate; SMB, HML, UMD are returns of the zero-investment portfolios on the 
Canadian market from Frazzini and Pedersen (2013) representing the size, the book-to-market, and the 
momentum factors of the stock market, respectively. TERM is the changes in the Canadian benchmark 10-
year government bonds’ total return index less the one-month Canadian treasury bill rate of the previous 
day. DEF is changes in the total return index for Canadian corporate bonds with maturity of 10 years or 
longer minus the changes in the Canadian benchmark 10-year government bonds total return index. Daily 
returns are used. REITs are included. Newey-West standard errors with lags of 30 trading days are 
estimated to account for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the error terms. t statistics are reported in 
parentheses, * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
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2.6.5 Robustness Checks 
We perform a number of additional robustness checks. Firstly, the S&P/TSX Composite 
Index does include income trusts as constituents, which may bias our results. For 
example, there may be more income trusts included in the index after the TFP 
announcement, causing an increase in stock market beta of income trusts with the index 
after the TFP. We use the S&P/TSX Equity Index, which is the S&P/TSX Composite 
excluding income trusts as an alternative. This index has been formed only since 
December 2005; therefore, we do not use the index in the main tests. Results for the 
robustness check using the S&P/TSX Equity Index are reported in Table 2-8. We still 
observe the changes in risk loadings to the stock and bond market factors as expected. 
 Secondly, we check for the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on our results. As 
illustrated in Figures 2-2a and 2-2b, both income trusts and the overall stock market are 
impacted negatively by the crisis. It is possible that the higher comovement with the 
stock market is impacted by the crisis that drives down the valuation of both income 
trusts and the overall stock market. We restrict the sample to last only until August 2008. 
The results are reported in Table 2-9. The signs of the changes in betas remain unchanged 
although the significance for change in betas to TERM is lowered in column 4.  
 We also check for the impact of extreme values on returns, which could be due to 
the inclusion of penny stocks in the sample, and we use different proxies for the stock 
market return using Canadian stock market returns from Frazzini and Pedersen (2013) 
instead of the changes on the S&P TSX index. Unreported results are similar, indicating 
that income trusts are priced more like bonds before the TFP announcement and more 
like equities after the TFP announcement. There could also be concerns that the 
comovement between the stock and bond markets drives our results; that is, if the stock 
and bond markets move opposite to each other, an increase in betas to stock market is 
associated with a decrease in betas to the bond market. However, the correlation between 
RM-Rf and TERM is non-negative as reported in Table 2-2, mitigating concern about the 
impact of the stock and bond market comovement. 
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Table 2-8: Robustness Check with Stock Market Returns Excluding Income Trusts 
 Income Trusts Matched Corporations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RM-Rf 0.561*** 0.449***  0.326*** 0.969*** 0.782***  0.836*** 
 (9.11) (4.48)  (2.89) (8.90) (4.24)  (4.67) 
SMB  0.301**  0.147  0.753***  0.875*** 
  (2.17)  (1.08)  (3.94)  (5.37) 
HML  -0.448**  -0.858***  0.250  0.232 
  (-2.24)  (-2.67)  (0.82)  (0.66) 
UMD  -0.210*  -0.467**  0.298*  0.252 
  (-1.74)  (-2.26)  (1.82)  (0.97) 
TERM   0.968*** 1.203***   0.351** -1.611*** 
   (11.87) (3.57)   (2.30) (-2.73) 
DEF   0.175 -3.279***   0.751 2.375 
   (0.54) (-3.16)   (1.55) (1.43) 
D_TFP -0.159*** -0.171*** -0.154*** -0.182*** -0.0317*** -0.00919 -0.0208** -0.00625 
 (-19.93) (-12.49) (-20.52) (-12.32) (-2.98) (-0.44) (-2.14) (-0.32) 
D_PostTFP 0.0240*** 0.0173*** -0.0131*** -0.0289** 0.00688 0.0131* -0.00761 0.0711*** 
 (7.61) (4.48) (-3.73) (-2.01) (1.35) (1.91) (-1.51) (3.15) 
D_PostTFPx(RM-Rf) 0.465*** 0.416***  0.592*** 0.0949 0.123  0.0718 
 (6.20) (3.80)  (4.85) (0.82) (0.65)  (0.39) 
D_PostTFPxSMB  0.303**  0.495***  -0.148  -0.267 
  (2.02)  (3.32)  (-0.74)  (-1.53) 
D_PostTFPxHML  0.930***  1.364***  0.154  0.188 
  (4.47)  (4.17)  (0.50)  (0.53) 
D_PostTFPxUMD  0.161  0.432**  -0.313*  -0.262 
  (1.26)  (2.05)  (-1.86)  (-0.99) 
D_PostTFPxTERM   -0.618*** -1.156***   0.0476 1.708*** 
   (-5.71) (-3.37)   (0.28) (2.87) 
D_PostTFPxDEF   2.370*** 3.003***   1.977*** -2.397 
   (6.62) (2.85)   (3.94) (-1.43) 
Constant -0.0249*** -0.0226*** 0.00306 0.0249* -0.00436 -0.0146** 0.00137 -0.0711*** 
 (-9.34) (-6.47) (1.13) (1.75) (-0.91) (-2.20) (0.30) (-3.17) 
N 8291 8291 12183 8291 8291 8291 12183 8291 
adj. R2 0.167 0.197 0.092 0.197 0.136 0.159 0.055 0.159 
 
This table reestimates the results in Table 5 regarding the changes in risk loadings after the TFP announcement for income trusts and matched corporations using 
the S&P/TSX Equity Index as the proxy for Canadian stock market return. This index excludes income trusts and thus can account for the impact of including 
and dropping out of income trusts to the S&P/TSX Composite Index in our results. REITs are excluded. Newey-West standard errors with 2 lags are estimated to 
account for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the error terms. t statistics are reported in parentheses, * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.  
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Table 2-9: Robustness Check before the 2008 Financial Crisis 
 
 Income Trusts Matched Corporations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RM-Rf 0.577*** 0.721***  0.776*** 0.881*** 0.955***  0.936*** 
 (17.88) (19.24)  (13.94) (17.14) (16.34)  (10.16) 
SMB  0.301***  0.355***  0.606***  0.542*** 
  (5.94)  (4.60)  (5.78)  (4.80) 
HML  0.490***  0.290***  0.348***  0.239** 
  (12.82)  (4.37)  (4.30)  (2.46) 
UMD  0.0266  0.00231  0.0150  0.0546 
  (1.25)  (0.06)  (0.32)  (0.66) 
TERM   0.968*** 0.796***   0.351** 0.156 
   (11.86) (10.48)   (2.30) (1.04) 
DEF   0.175 -0.634**   0.751 -0.231 
   (0.54) (-2.06)   (1.55) (-0.46) 
D_TFP -0.163*** -0.122*** -0.154*** -0.130*** -0.0267*** 0.0106 -0.0208** -0.00031 
 (-21.91) (-14.81) (-20.52) (-13.01) (-2.77) (0.87) (-2.14) (-0.02) 
D_PostTFP 0.00505* 0.0138*** -0.0328*** 0.0183** -0.0130*** -0.00491 -0.0347*** 0.000386 
 (1.71) (3.75) (-5.35) (2.35) (-3.69) (-1.15) (-4.72) (0.04) 
D_PostTFPx(RM-Rf) 0.432*** 0.408***  0.392*** 0.0727 0.0359  0.0358 
 (6.09) (5.41)  (4.14) (0.90) (0.40)  (0.29) 
D_PostTFPxSMB  0.152*  0.166  -0.162  -0.0840 
  (1.76)  (1.58)  (-1.21)  (-0.60) 
D_PostTFPxHML  0.131  0.393***  -0.0848  0.0474 
  (1.39)  (3.59)  (-0.65)  (0.34) 
D_PostTFPxUMD  -0.0454  -0.102  -0.00987  -0.103 
  (-0.48)  (-0.95)  (-0.09)  (-0.75) 
D_PostTFPxTERM   -1.032*** -0.109   -0.586*** 0.0934 
   (-6.68) (-0.68)   (-2.77) (0.42) 
D_PostTFPxDEF   1.404*** 1.046***   0.971* 0.616 
   (3.67) (2.63)   (1.77) (1.05) 
Constant -0.0111*** -0.0141*** 0.00306 0.00843*** 0.00646*** 0.00302 0.00137 0.00801 
 (-9.34) (-11.44) (1.13) (2.88) (3.04) (1.25) (0.30) (1.46) 
N 10385 10385 9015 9015 10385 10385 9015 9015 
adj. R2 0.103 0.127 0.065 0.137 0.051 0.059 0.017 0.063 
 
This table reestimates the results in Table 5 using months before Sep 2008 to account for the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the comovement between 
income trusts and the overall stock market. REITs are excluded. Newey-West standard errors with 2 lags are estimated to account for autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity in the error terms. t statistics are reported in parentheses, * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
 We examine in this chapter the role of stock and bond market factors in the 
pricing of Canadian income trusts—a special vehicle that allows firms to avoid paying 
corporate tax through income distributions to unit holders. Since the structure provides 
the advantage of higher cash payouts to the investors with similar underlying business 
compared to a firm that does not adopt the structure, the pricing of income trusts is 
expected to be more bond-like than ordinary equities yet cannot be done completely as 
bonds. Along with the unexpected Tax Fairness Plan announcement that effectively 
removes the tax advantage of the structure for existing income trusts, our sample provides 
a unique setting where we can study the changes in sensitivities to risk factors due to 
changes in tax policies, corporate structure, and firm characteristics related to cash 
generating prospects. 
 We find that income trusts comove significantly less with the stock market 
(significantly lower loadings on excess return on the stock market RM-Rf of about 0.2, 
and lower loadings on the size factor SMB also of around 0.2), and significantly more 
with the bond market (significantly higher loading on the term structure of interest rate 
TERM of about 0.6) compared to matched corporations in the period before the TFP 
announcement. After the TFP announcement, income trusts comove more with the stock 
market and less with the bond market. The differences in risk loadings in the pre-TFP 
period reverse and the pricing of income trusts becomes similar to that of matched 
corporations. The results illustrate the impact of tax policy and corporate structure on the 
bond-like/stock-like characteristic of assets. 
 We also find evidence that income trusts have stronger change towards being 
more stock-like if they are originally spun-off from 100 per cent of the previous 
corporations compared to those spun-off selectively from less than 100 per cent assets. 
Income trusts with low market-to-book ratios, high tangibility, high dividend payout, and 
low ROA and higher prospective tax shields in 2005 have weaker changes towards being 
more stock-like after the TFP announcement and thus are expected to be more bond-like 
even in the absence of the tax advantage for income trusts. We find that income trusts 
comove slightly more with the bond market after the conversions to income trusts from 
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ordinary corporations. These results suggest a link between corporate strategy and firm 
characteristics related to future cash generating capability and sensitivities to stock and 
bond market factors. An investor may infer about the risk of a firm through how its assets 
are formed, its tax saving prospect, and expected cash generating ability in the future.  
 Taken together, our results are indicative that not all equities are created equally. 
Although income trusts are classified as equities, they have changing risk profiles that are 
impacted by factors such as changes in expected cash flows and corporate strategy. 
Therefore, our work has implications on asset allocation and risk management. By 
showing that tax policy and firm characteristics are relevant to the sensitivities to stock 
and bond market factors, we recommend that investors be aware of the risk and 
diversification properties of the assets in their portfolios based on characteristics and not 
only the security classification.  
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Appendix 2-A: Matching Method 
We match income trusts with control corporations by industry and net sales in year 2005, employing the 
restriction that the matched corporation is alive during the years that the income trust exists. Our 
classification of industry is based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) with data taken from 
Datastream. There are 41 sectors in total including the REIT sector. A firm that assumes the income trust 
status will be matched with a corporation that is never an income trust in the exact same industry and with 
the closest net sales (i.e., smallest absolute value of the difference in size). We use non-replacement method 
to avoid duplication in the matched sample. However, up to only ten different control corporations will be 
used. In case multiple income trusts compete for a control corporation, priority will be given to the largest 
income trust in the industry. There are 214 income trusts including 30 REITs matched in 2005. 
 
Table 2-A1: List of Industries and Sectors for the Income Trusts 
This table lists the sectors and industries for the group of income trusts to match. The industry classification 
is based on the ICB system with data taken from Datastream. 
Industry Sector Industry Sector 
Basic Materials Chemicals Industrials Aerospace & Defense 
Forestry & Paper Construction & Materials 
Industrial Metals & Mining Electronic & Electrical 
Equipment 
Mining General Industrials 
Consumer 
Goods 
Automobiles & Parts Industrial Engineering 
Beverages Industrial Transportation 
Food Producers Support Services 
Household Goods & Home 
Construction 
Oil & Gas Oil & Gas Producers 
Leisure Goods Oil Equipment & Services 
Consumer 
Services 
Food & Drug Retailers Real Estate Investment 
Trusts 
Real Estate Investment Trusts 
General Retailers Technology Software & Computer Services 
Media Technology Hardware & 
Equipment 
Travel & Leisure Telecommunications Fixed Line 
Telecommunications 
Financials Financial Services (Sector) Utilities Electricity 
Real Estate Investment & Services Gas, Water & Multiutilities 
Health Care Health Care Equipment & Services   
 
Table 2-A2: Characteristics of Income Trusts versus Matched Corporations 
This table compares the characteristics of the income trust sample and the matched corporations from 2000 
to 2010. A t-test is used to test the difference between characteristics of the two samples, * p < .1, ** p < .05, 
*** p < .01. 
  MV TA NetSales NI NTA DY DivPayoutSh 
2000 40.11 -445.07 -720.39 -6.35 32.59 11.93*** 63.96** 
2001 145.49 -459.39 -710.55* -13.75 26.63 6.94** 6.35 
2002 131.18 -16.66 -250.93** 4.48 100.62 8.12*** 51.15*** 
2003 135.88 95.68 -162.73* 9.84 107.39* 8.04*** 46.45*** 
2004 203.07** 72.99 -140.66* 7.45 124.10** 7.20*** 52.43*** 
2005 -83.45 -229.08 -251.57** 8.07 1.65 8.33*** 63.63*** 
2006 -298.96 -251.7 -299.69** 12.06 -15.09 10.41*** 71.85*** 
2007 -462.87 -320.66 -371.14** -27.27 -86.55 9.13*** 48.22*** 
2008 -95.74 -114.63 -204.12 45.12* 78.02 13.39*** 54.15*** 
2009 -49.24 -272.3 -202.38* -1.22 39.56 5.81*** 39.01*** 
2010 -258.54 -543.35 -350.68** -38.55* -84.28 4.46*** 24.13** 
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Chapter 3  
3 Behavioral Finance Meets Market Efficiency—the 
Case of Income Trusts 
3.1 Introduction 
Are capital markets efficient? Are managers rational? Are investors rational? Although 
we would like to assume the answer to all of these questions is “yes,” there are many 
examples suggesting that this is not always the case. In this chapter, we use a unique 
example to examine several facets of these questions. Specifically, we can study how 
managers make corporate financial decisions and how investors react to these decisions 
as well as how these relationships vary over time. This allows us to study market 
efficiency from the two most important perspectives—the corporate managers and the 
investors. Although most academic research separates how managers make decisions and 
how investors value assets, we explicitly acknowledge that they are not independent. We 
assume that any pattern in how investors value assets will be observed by managers and 
managers will rationally take advantage of these patterns. This study is therefore 
designed to contribute to the growing area of behavioral finance (both behavioral 
corporate finance and behavioral asset pricing). The corporate structure we focus on is 
income trusts because they are a structure that was designed to minimize the taxes paid 
by corporations. As Edgar (2004) argues, beyond tax minimization there is no other 
rationale for the income trust structure to exist. Looking at their characteristics, one can 
see few differences beyond their tax status from the standard corporate structure. Income 
trusts should therefore be valued differently from regular equity firms and the difference 
should be a result of income trusts paying virtually no taxes—these firms make larger 
payouts to investors, so investors will be willing to pay more for these assets. An increase 
in valuation for the same assets obtained simply by changing corporate structure makes 
the structure an attractive and rational alternative for managers, if possible. We therefore 
examine questions such as: How large is the premium for being an income trust? What 
factors contribute to the valuation premium? What characteristics are required to become 
an income trust? Have these changed over time? 
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The increase in valuation for income trusts has been studied in previous 
research.13 In previous studies of income trusts the increase in value has been related to 
the increase in fundamental value due to the increased cash flows resulting from the 
lower effective tax rate paid by income trusts. Consequently, we should expect to see a 
boost in valuation of, theoretically speaking, about 30 per cent.14 Although researchers 
have found an increase in valuation for income trusts, the premium has been less than this 
theoretical 30 per cent (e.g., Amoako-Adu and Smith, 2008, and Klassen and Mescall, 
2012). An important caveat of these results is that most existing studies of the valuation 
of income trusts have focused on the changes in firm valuation as the tax advantage of the 
structure was being phased out. Consequently, they have used event studies to look at the 
changes in prices resulting from the announcement of changes in tax rules directly or 
indirectly focused on income trusts and their dividend paying ability. We go beyond these 
studies by examining how, if at all, the valuation premium for income trusts evolved over 
time, how these may have been related to managers’ decisions to adopt this structure, and 
how their prices reacted to different tax policy related announcements, which broadens 
the scope of the previous studies. 
The adoption of the income trust structure was clearly a rational decision by 
managers observing an increase in valuation simply by converting to an income trust. 
Assuming markets are efficient, we would expect the market price to incorporate all 
relevant information, but behavioral finance suggests that aspects of manager and 
investor decision-making may impact valuation, in particular deviations from the 
efficient price over time. Specifically, behavioral corporate finance suggests that firms in 
a particular industry or having a specific structure will achieve the highest valuations 
(potentially overvaluations) when they are new and not as well understood (for a survey 
                                               
13A similar increase in valuation for a specific structure was observed during the tech bubble in the late 
1990s. There was a surge in technology firms publicly listing their shares to take advantage of the high 
valuations at the time, and there was also evidence that firms changed their name to appear more tech-
related in order to receive a higher valuation (e.g., Cooper, Dimitrov and Rau, 2001). Consequently, there is 
evidence consistent with managers observing patterns in equity pricing and responding accordingly.  
14 The tax savings from converting to an income trust should be the decrease in taxes from the standard 
corporate tax rate of over 30% to the tax rate for income trusts of 0% since income trusts are flow-through 
entities with no taxes being paid at the firm level.  
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of this growing literature see Baker and Wurgler, 2012). The valuations will decrease as 
the firms and structures mature because 1) investors begin to gradually improve their 
understanding of the assets and 2) managers may start to overuse the structure causing 
saturation. Our study provides a unique opportunity to examine these issues as the 
income trust structure went from “birth” to “death” over a long enough period to provide 
sufficient data but a short enough period to ensure comparability (taking off in 2000 and 
collapsing in 2006).  
Even though the income trust structure was established in 1985, growth did not 
really take off until 2001. There was a rapid increase in its use from 2001 to 2005 with 
firms either doing their initial listing (IPO) as an income trust or converting from 
standard equity to an income trust. In late 2006, the structure lost the tax advantage for all 
except for REITs. At their peak, income trusts constituted about 10 per cent of the market 
value of the Toronto Stock Exchange and in some years, trusts were the majority of IPOs 
in the market. Much of the motivation for the use of the income trust structure and its 
improved valuations was the tax advantage, but there were also those who suggested 
other factors led to the increase in their valuation such as novelty, decreased cost of 
capital versus regular equity firms, and liquidity (income trusts provided regular cash 
payments which were also valued by investors). This leaves multiple avenues to explore 
regarding the source of the valuation premium for income trusts. 
To allow us to make relatively clear statements about the role of the income trust 
structure in our analyses, we matched a regular equity firm to each income trust. 
Comparing income trusts to a matched sample of firms of similar size in the same 
industry, we can more clearly identify the differences between these firms. Since not all 
firms would be ideally suited to the income trust structure, we expect to find (and do 
find) substantial differences between our income trusts and regular equity firms. 
However, we find that the size of these differences peaked around 2002 and decreased 
afterward. Looking at the valuation premium for income trusts, we find that as the 
structure became more popular in 2000, the valuation premium for business trusts started 
to increase and was substantially higher than the predicted premium based purely on the 
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tax advantages of the income trust structure.15 The premium peaked in 2002 and 
gradually declined until income trusts and regular equity firms were valued with a 
premium of roughly the size of the tax advantage in early 2006 and virtually vanished by 
the end of 2006 when their tax advantage was removed. Since there were few tax changes 
over the 2000-2006 period, it appears that there were factors beyond just the tax 
advantage of income trusts which influenced their valuation over time. Some of these 
factors could be related to firm-level characteristics based on the changes in their 
characteristics over the same period. 
Since we assume managers observed this increase in valuation and it may have 
impacted the attractiveness of the income trust structure, these results suggest there may 
have been a shift in the type of firms becoming income trusts over time. Managers saw 
the valuation advantages of this structure and thus made their corporate structure decision 
increasingly on the valuation impact and less on the applicability of their business to the 
corporate structure. Firms most ideally suited for the income trust structure have been 
argued to be similar to those ideal for a leveraged buyout (e.g., King (2003), Halpern and 
Norli (2006)), i.e., having mature and stable cash flows, little need for capital 
expenditures, and being in later life cycle stages. We find that our income trusts do differ 
from their matched counterparts in each of these dimensions; however, we find the 
differences decrease for firms entering the market as income trusts from 2002 on. 
With substantial suggestive evidence consistent with many of the predictions of a 
behavioral role in the corporate financial decisions being made by firms and the pricing 
of these assets, we formally examine the role of different factors in explaining the 
valuation premium of income trusts versus regular equities. In our regressions, we 
examine the role of the factors believed to be related to the “ideal” income trust firm to 
determine their role in explaining the valuation premium assuming that in the post-2002 
                                               
15 Although most discussions surrounding the valuation of income trusts focus on the P/E ratio and 
hypothesize an increase in the P/E ratio for income trusts, we consider the EV/EBITDA multiple as it 
evaluates the valuation difference before taxes are removed from the operating income. This allows our 
measure to capture the valuation impact of the tax advantage. For the P/E ratio if the earnings increase by 
30% due to a decrease in taxes paid and the valuation increased by 30%, the P/E ratio would be unchanged, 
but we would see an increase in the EV/EBITDA multiple as EBITDA would be unaffected by the change 
in tax. 
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years it is possible that the firms listed at income trusts were less ideally suited to this 
structure and thus less deserving of the valuation premium. We are not the first to 
examine whether securities prices are affected by more than just fundamentals, but we 
are, as far as we know, the first to examine how it evolves over the life cycle of a 
corporate structure, especially considering the role of potential behavioral factors in both 
corporate finance and asset pricing. 
After studying the growth in number and valuations of income trusts, we end our 
study by examining the ultimate crisis of the structure—the surprise announcement by the 
Canadian federal government to eliminate the tax advantage of the income trust structure. 
Tax rates essentially went from 0 per cent to 31.5 per cent over night. There were no 
other major reforms, so any observed changes in prices were truly just about taxes. Since 
we found some firm valuations where the premium was higher than the tax difference and 
there were differences in the suitability of firms to the income trust structure, we study 
market efficiency using the reactions to this announcement for firms and how the reaction 
relates to their suitability for the structure, their earlier valuation premium, and their 
ultimate fate following their loss of their tax advantage (e.g., converting to regular equity, 
being acquired or failing).16 We study the factors influencing the market reaction and 
find some factors play a significant role in all reactions (positive or negative) and some 
play a significant role in only one or the other.  
The rest of the paper discusses the relevant literature in Section 3.2. The 
hypotheses, their motivation, and models used in their testing are presented in Section 
3.3. The fourth section discusses the data used with the fifth and sixth sections discussing 
the results and concluding. 
 
                                               
16 This was not the only announcement over the sample period which brought the future of the structure 
into question so we consider the other announcements as well allowing us to consider both positive and 
negative shocks. The impact of the announcements was different because they did not completely remove 
the tax advantage of trusts (unlike the announcement in October 2006); they simply brought it into 
question. 
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3.2 Motivation for the Study of Income Trusts 
The academic literature has studied extensively how managers choose between different 
sources and uses of scarce financial resources. A key goal for managers is increasing the 
value of the firm. Shareholders are happy because it means their investment is generating 
higher returns, management is happy as it likely means higher compensation, and it is 
good for the firm itself as it means improved potential to raise capital in the future. These 
relationships highlight the important interrelationship between managers and investors 
which we examine in this study. Income trusts provide a great test case because income 
trusts are a tax-motivated corporate structure designed to increase the cash flows to 
investors (and thus increase the share price) and were conceived, grew up, and ultimately 
reached a crisis within a short period of time. Empirically, we will study how these 
relationships develop and are utilized by both managers and investors in a manageable 
window. Before doing that, it is important to understand why income trusts and to place 
our analysis within the literature. 
Over the past couple of decades, we have seen many booms (bubbles?) and busts. 
Many theories exist regarding bubbles and what creates them, but the increase in 
valuation of income trusts does not fit the pattern of a bubble. Their increase in valuation 
was, at least partially, related to a true increase in the fundamental value of the asset to 
investors. We want to study the role played by both this increase in fundamental value 
and any other possible explanations for the increase in value of income trusts over regular 
equity firms. Income trusts grew in popularity over the early 2000s because they traded at 
a premium to similar standard equity firms and, unlike tech stocks, at least part of the 
source of the valuation premium was clearly visible to investors.17 Examining pricing 
patterns and determining whether stocks are over- or undervalued is challenging as we do 
not have any pricing models to identify the “correct” price. To address this problem, we 
use a matched sample of regular equity firms of the closest size in the same industry to 
obtain estimates for the “correct” price against which we compare the trusts’ price to 
                                               
17 Unlike the situation for technology companies in the period preceding the bursting of the bubble where 
investors were unclear of the exact sources of value (Warren Buffett was famous for his avoidance of the 
tech sector because he could not clearly determine their source of value), we can see that the tax savings of 
income trusts should contribute substantially to their value relative to standard equities.  
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estimate the premium paid. We will also complement the matching method by comparing 
valuation of income trusts with average valuation of firms in the same industry. Income 
trusts can provide unique insights into the source of these premiums because some firms 
converted to income trusts, which allows us to estimate the differences in valuation for 
the same firm under one structure and then under the other. This is an ideal matching of 
income trusts and standard equity firms as they are the same firm with the only 
significant difference being its tax situation. Therefore, studying income trusts allows us 
to examine the impact on firm value of changes in corporate structure. 
 
3.2.1 What is Special about Income Trusts? 
Income trusts allow firms to avoid paying corporate taxes because income trusts are 
designed as a flow-through entity—they pay out most of what they earn, and therefore do 
not have to pay taxes on the earnings. The investors to whom the profits “flow through” 
pay the taxes on the income they receive. Income trusts can hold different types of assets 
such as equities, debt instruments, royalty interests, real estate, energy production 
facilities, and manufacturing facilities, but the key is that the trust must pass-through the 
cash flows it receives from some asset or group of assets to the owners of the trust. 
The main attraction of income trusts is that they consistently pay cash flows to 
their investors and these cash flows are higher than would be possible using other 
corporate structures. This was especially attractive when cash yields on bonds were low 
(as has been the case since the early 2000s). The attraction for managers is the increase in 
valuation for their assets due to the absence of taxes on corporate profits. Other sources 
of value which have been proposed are related to the novelty of the structure, a decrease 
in the cost of capital due to the more debt-like characteristics of trust ownership, and an 
increase in liquidity.18  
                                               
18 As Keynes (1936) states, people value money for both "the transaction of current business and its use as 
a store of wealth." Thus, they will sacrifice the ability to earn interest on money that they want to spend in 
the present. Consequently, investors will pay a premium to obtain cash today. The income trust structure 
provides a regular stream of cash flows to investors potentially leading to a liquidity premium in the 
valuation as Krishnamurthy (2002) finds that on-the-run Treasury issues trade at a premium to other bonds, 
which is likely related to their increased liquidity over the off-the-run bonds. 
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Because of the relative simplicity of either converting from a regular equity 
structure to an income trust or simply doing an IPO as an income trust, using income 
trusts allows our study to examine the role of various financial and behavioral factors in 
valuing firms over the life cycle of the income trust structure. A key aspect of this 
analysis is how decision-making by firms and market valuations changed as more and 
more firms started to adopt the income trust structure.19 Conventional wisdom is that the 
premium is due to the tax advantage of income trusts, but behavioral finance suggests 
that there could be more.  
The evolution of income trusts started in 1985 with the first income trust. While 
the income trust structure has enjoyed a long history in the real estate industry, it was not 
until the late 1990s that it started to gain popularity in other sectors of the Canadian 
equity market. A crucial part of the valuation of income trusts is the nature of the 
underlying assets the income trust is using to generate the cash flows it sends to its 
owners. We focus on the three main types of income trusts in Canada: real estate trusts 
(or REITs), energy and resource trusts, and business trusts. We do not examine 
investment trusts as they are generally flow-through entities for the returns on financial 
assets (e.g., mutual funds) rather than the returns on business-related assets. For REITs, 
the underlying investments are income-producing properties. Energy and resource trusts 
have cash flows based on the production of energy and resource assets. Business trusts 
are based on manufacturing assets, in general. Although the underlying risk is 
comparable to that for corporations operating in similar lines of business, income trusts 
differ because of the regular cash payouts to their investors. These payouts must be the 
majority of the profits to avoid taxation at the corporate level.  
Because of the flow-through nature of income trusts, another characteristic of 
trusts which needs to be evaluated is their cost of capital. In a fundamental valuation of a 
firm, it is both the size of the cash flows and the cost of capital which influence the 
                                               
19 As discussed in Baker and Wurgler (2012), when firms enter a certain class they start to be valued as a 
class rather than on an individual basis. Did we start to see this in the income trust sector and, if so, what 
were the implications of this? We are also able to observe how firms in this sector were able to grow as a 
result of the lower cost of capital they would have as a result of their use of significant quantities of debt (or 
debt-like) instruments to raise capital allowing them to outbid rivals in the quest for acquisitions to grow. 
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valuation. Up to this point, the focus of the discussion in the literature has been on the 
cash flows, but the discount rate is equally important. The reason for the need to 
discussion this is that the income trust structure is such that each unit owned by an 
investor is essentially a combination of subordinated high-yield debt and high-risk equity. 
This means that investors get a relatively stable series of high yield cash flows and the 
potential for capital gains. For the firm, this means the firm gets a tax-minimizing way of 
paying out excess cash with lower costs of financial distress then for comparable types of 
high yield debt. Further, the unit holders (similar to the subordinated debtholders) are 
likely to be much more cooperative than ordinary subordinated debt holders since the 
benefits of doing so accrue to the equity portion of their units. Units in an income trust 
therefore share many of the risks inherent in stock ownership despite having many 
characteristics which look like debt. This means that income trusts could have an increase 
in valuation over regular equity firms related to i) their lower tax payments, ii) their lower 
cost of capital, iii) their increased liquidity provided to investors, and iv) the novelty of 
the structure. On the other hand, a deterioration of the suitability to the income trust 
structure due to overuse of the structure, and the correction in pricing as investors start to 
be aware of the risk characteristics of the structure may bring a decrease in valuation 
premium over time. Most studies focus on the impact of the tax advantage, but we 
examine the potential role for the others as well. 
  
3.2.2 Development of the Income Trust Market 
Pre-1995, over 90 per cent of income trusts were traditional real estate or royalty trusts. 
However, after the rapid market decline in the mid-1990s, interest in the structure started 
to increase. By the early 2000s, trusts had become an increasingly important part of the 
Canadian market. Investors were attracted by the relatively high yield of trusts and firms 
were attracted by the higher valuations for adopting this structure. Established publicly-
traded corporations from a broad cross section of industries converted to the trust 
structure; some firms spun off specific assets as trusts and some firms entered public 
markets through IPOs as trusts.  
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Since we propose a potential role for novelty in the valuation of trusts and there 
are specific characteristics which define the optimal firms suitable for this structure 
where many are related to “mature” firms, we also consider the “life cycle” for the 
income trust structure in addition to the “life cycle” for firms mentioned earlier. For the 
income trust structure, “adolescence” would be between 1985 and 1999 when the 
structure was first used and was being experimented with—at this time, it was mainly 
used for energy and real estate trusts. Young adulthood could be said to have started in 
2000 through to 2005. The start of this phase coincided with the surge of interest 
following the bursting of the tech bubble. The trust structure provided a new opportunity 
for investors looking for yield and new opportunities for mangers looking to raise capital 
or monetize their assets at favorable prices. As in people in young adulthood, this period 
is characterized by the identity of the structure being developed, regulations being 
developed, and valuation practices being developed. Concerns about the future of income 
trusts started near the end of this phase in 2005.  
Problems started to appear on the horizon on September 8, 2005 when the 
Canadian Department of Finance suggested in a white paper that the government could 
have lost hundreds of millions in tax revenues from firms being structured as income 
trusts as opposed to corporations. This release was closely followed by the chief 
executive officer (CEO) of Canada's largest bank mentioning he was not opposed to their 
converting into a trust to increase their valuation and improve the returns to their 
investors. By September 19, 2005, the Department of Finance was forced to take action 
and it announced that it was suspending advance tax rulings. Since advance tax rulings 
were essential for future trusts, it caused an immediate slump in the trust market. In 
November 2005, the government announced that it would not tax trusts and the advance 
tax rulings would resume. These announcements were the mid-life crisis for the income 
trust structure and provided both a negative and positive shock to determine the 
magnitude of the tax related valuation premium for income trusts. 
Because of these conflicting announcements in 2005, all parties, during the 
Canadian general election in 2006, promised to leave the tax status of income trusts 
unchanged. Nevertheless, on October 31, 2006, following the election, the finance 
minister of the new government announced a new 34% tax on income trust distributions 
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to be phased in over the next five years to stem the growing number of companies 
converting to trusts. This announcement was such that it effectively removed the tax 
advantage of trusts by 2011 and caught the markets by surprise. One could argue that the 
period from 2006 to 2011 was the retirement phase of the income trust structure. 
Below is a timeline of some of the key events in the development of the income 
trust market: 
 
1985   First business trust conversion (Enermark Income Fund) 
1986-1997  Predominantly energy trusts and REITs being formed 
1998-2000  Some activity in the trust sector with business trusts being more actively 
considered 
2001       Income trusts begin to attract significant interest with many new listings 
2002       Importance of income trusts in the Canadian market recognized with S&P 
and the TSX creating three trust indices  
2003 First large scale IPO as an income trust (Yellow Pages Income Fund—the 
third largest IPO in the decade) 
2003-2004  Establishment of limited liability for income trusts 
2005-2006  S&P announces inclusion of trusts in S&P/TSX Composite Index 
2005-2006 Canadian government starts raising concerns about the tax losses and other 
issues associated with the increased use of this structure in Canada 
2006 After several announcements suggesting concerns about the structure, in 
October 2006 the Canadian government announces the cessation of the 
favorable tax treatment for trusts. 
 
The growth in the income trust market is well illustrated in Figure 3-1. In Figure 
3-1a, we can see the slow growth until 2000, the rapid growth until 2006 and the decline 
afterwards. It is important for our study to note that the growth mainly occurred in the 
areas of energy and, especially, business income trusts. The number of real estate income 
trusts (REITs) was relatively stable over this period. Looking at their role in Canadian 
markets, the total number of IPOs in 2000 was fairly large due to the ongoing tech boom. 
In 2000, technology firms provided over 57 per cent of the IPOs with a small portion of 
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the remaining IPOs being related to income trusts. In 2001, there was a general decrease 
in all IPO activity due to the dot.com crash and 9/11. In 2002, the market rebounded, and 
it was a result of the income trust sector with over 85 per cent of the market value of all 
IPOs coming from income trusts. In 2003, the market for IPOs continued to grow though 
it was becoming more balanced with only about half from income trusts. This trend 
continued in 2004, 2005, and 2006 with income trusts accounting for about 60 per cent of 
all IPOs over this period. Figure 3-1b demonstrates the surge in market value for the 
income trusts. From the end of 2001 to the end of 2004, the total market capitalization for 
income trusts increased by a factor of four, and by October 2006, the market 
capitalization of these entities exceeded $207 billion (more than 10 per cent of the 
domestic market).  
Probing the structure of the income trust market a bit further, Figure 3-1c 
illustrates the number of income trusts which were the result of a conversion of an 
already existing firm with a standard equity structure into an income trust as well as the 
number for which their initial public listing was as a trust. Although the majority did an 
IPO to become a trust, the interest of managers and investors in this structure is clear by 
the number of firms that converted to become trusts. The separation of income trusts into 
those that did an IPO using all of their assets versus those that did not in Figure 3-1d 
allows us to identify which used this structure selectively for assets which may have been 
better/worse suited for public markets using a standard equity structure. The relative 
number of firms listing only a portion of their assets was increasing later in the sample 
suggesting some differences in the types of firms becoming income trusts later in the 
period. 
The situation with income trusts in Canada therefore provides a novel opportunity 
to study the phenomenal growth and decline of a corporate structure with a couple of 
surprise announcements during their lifetime to observe how markets react to both 
positive and negative shocks.  
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Figure 3-1: Growth in the Use of Income Trust Structure 
 
a) Number of Income Trusts by Type by Year from 1998 to 2012 
 
This figure shows the number of business, energy, and real estate income trusts, excluding the investment 
trusts. The list of income trusts is obtained from the CFMRC database, the TSX Reviews, and Datastream. 
 
 
b) Market Value of Income Trusts  
 
This figure shows the market value of each type and the corresponding percentage of the overall market 
capitalization of the income trust market by type by year from 1998 to 2012. The number and market 
capitalization of income trusts is obtained from the CFMRC database, the TSX Reviews, and Datastream, 
excluding the investment trusts. The overall market capitalization for the Toronto Stock Exchange was 
from the World Bank. 
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c) Number of New Income Trusts by Conversions and IPOs 
 
This figure shows the number of income trusts which were the result of conversion from regular equity and 
the number resulting from IPOs from 1998 to 2012. The number of income trusts is obtained from the 
CFMRC database, the TSX Reviews, and Datastream, excluding the investment trusts. How the firms 
became income trusts was hand-collected from regulatory filings. 
 
 
d) Number of New Income Trusts by Percentage Assets Spun-Off 
 
This figure shows the number of income trusts created by an IPO using 100% of a firm’s assets and those 
created using less than 100% of one firm’s or multiple firms’ assets from 1998 to 2012. The number of 
income trusts is obtained from the CFMRC database, the TSX Reviews, and Datastream, excluding the 
investment trusts. The percentage of assets involved in the IPO was hand-collected from regulatory filings. 
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3.3 Literature Review 
3.3.1 Behavioral Asset Pricing 
The growth of the income trust sector has been characterized as “phenomenal” and was 
thought to be influenced by high investor sentiment towards high-yield investment 
alternatives (Hayward, 2002, King, 2003, Aggarwal and Mintz, 2004). This suggests that 
behavioral factors could also drive the valuation of income trusts besides the fundamental 
ones. Below we discuss the channels through which behavioral factors may impact the 
pricing of income trusts. 
Studies have found that investors react differently to new asset classes often 
providing higher valuations due to the novelty. King (2003) addresses the concern that 
investors may not fully understand the complexity of the income trust structures. Baker 
and Wurgler (2007) make the point that there are certain firms that are more sensitive to 
investor sentiment, for example, young and small startup firms. Those firms attract a 
great level of investor excitement, and they are difficult to value. When investors are not 
certain about the business or the structure, there will be grounds for overconfidence, 
representativeness, and conservatism20 to impact the pricing. During the Internet bubble, 
for example, investors do not have the time or expertise to examine the stocks carefully 
and are attracted by any technology firm, overvaluing the stocks and creating a bubble 
(Scheikman and Xiong, 2003, Baker and Wurgler, 2012). A channel for overvaluation of 
those difficult-to-value stocks to take place is through belief dispersions and limit to 
arbitrage, such as short-selling restriction. Since the trust structure is new and complex, 
there could be different beliefs on how to price income trusts, including assessing the 
associated risks thoroughly. Investors with negative prospects about trusts cannot 
perform short-selling on the trusts, leaving the market with optimistic investors and 
                                               
20 Overconfidence refers to the fact that people are overconfident in their judgments (Daniel, Hirshleifer, 
and Subrahmanyman, 1998, 2001, Alpert and Raiffa, 1982, Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein, 1977, 
Barber and Odean, 2001, Daniel and Hirshleifer, 2015). Representativeness refers to the fact that people do 
not get the true probability of events, for example they rely too much on a small sample (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1973, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998, a review by Hirshleifer, 2015). 
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creating overvaluation of income trusts.21 Therefore, we would expect to see income 
trusts being priced differently over their life cycle, with mispricing being large when the 
structure is in its early days. 
Related to the novelty of the structure, it has also been asserted that income trusts 
received higher valuations due to their return of capital to the investors. Business profits 
can be paid out in cash not only in the form of distribution but also as a portion of the 
cost of acquiring the unit (return of capital) so that the cost of acquiring the security is 
lower. This form of payout increases capital gain, which is not taxed until the units are 
sold (King, 2003). This form of capital gain should be preferable to share repurchasing by 
ordinary corporations since investors still receive cash and enjoy capital gain at the same 
time. Scholars have observed that investors favor cash dividend over non-cash forms of 
payout such as share repurchase and stock dividend (Long, 1978, Ben-David, 2010, and 
Baker and Wurgler, 2012). Behavioral explanations for this preference is the bird-in-hand 
theory and the mental accounting theory.22 Tax deferral is another aspect that investors 
value in this return of capital in comparison to dividend payment. Capital gain tax is 
deferred into the future, as opposed to the immediate tax on dividend or distribution. 
Although investors will eventually have to pay tax on this capital gain, the deferral may 
give the investors more control over when to realize the gain and an option to gain 
interest on the deferred amount of tax. The bird-in-hand theory supports a possible 
overvaluation of this deferred tax. Investors may favor to keep money in their hand for 
longer instead of having to pay it back immediately as tax. Consequently, we may see 
differences in trust price sensitivity to different factors if investors are overvaluing the 
asset due to this return of capital. 
There could also be another channel for income trusts to receive a valuation 
                                               
21 The literature related to belief dispersions and limit to arbitrage can be found in DeLong, Shleifer, 
Summers, and Waldmann (1990), Ofek and Richardson (2003), Baker and Wurgler (2007), Yu (2011), 
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), among others. 
22 The bird-in-hand theory of Gordon (1959) and Lintner (1962) proposes that investors prefer to receive 
cash in the form of dividend instead of leaving it in the hands of managers because of the risk of not 
receiving the money back in the future. Therefore, a premium is paid for the money that is received now 
rather than later. The mental accounting explanation argues that investors prefer a series of small gains over 
one big gain, thus a gradual capital gain is preferred over a large capital gain (Shefrin and Statman, 1984, 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Barberis and Thaler, 2003, and Ben-David, 2010). 
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premium in a way that is not fully rational. Long (1978), Baker and Wurgler (2004), and 
Li and Lie (2006) argue that investor sentiment and preference for dividends, as opposed 
to non-cash payment, vary over time. Managers then “cater” the distribution form to this 
varying investor preference so that cash dividend will be paid when investors overvalue 
cash returns (e.g., in pessimistic times). The growth of the income trust sector was during 
a period of low interest rate and the aftermath the dot-com bubble. A sentiment for 
“safety” may become high during such time (Baker and Wurgler, 2007). Thus, the 
valuation of dividend-paying investment alternatives such as income trusts and the 
sensitivities to different market factors may vary with time due to fluctuations of this 
sentiment. 
 
3.3.2 Valuation of Income Trusts 
We are not the first to study income trusts; however, we are the first, of which we are 
aware, to examine how their valuation may have changed over the life cycle of the 
structure. Most studies have focused on the role of taxes in their valuation (Edgar (2004) 
argues that trusts have no non-tax rationale for existence). The analyses have focused on 
the changes in income trust valuations around announced changes in their tax status. We 
go beyond this to try to improve our overall understanding of how different factors 
(economic and behavioral) influence how equities are valued by investors.  
One of the first studies to examine the valuation of trusts was Amoako-Adu and 
Smith (2008) who analyze the valuation effects of the Canadian federal government's 
announcement on November 23, 2005 to reduce the taxes on corporate dividends and the 
announcement on October 31, 2006 to eliminate the tax-deductibility of income trust 
distributions. The price changes they found following these announcements provide 
insight into the role of taxes in how investors value trusts. Though high dividend stocks 
and income trusts reacted positively to the 2005 announcement, the abnormal returns 
were greater for income trusts. Following the later announcement in 2006, both securities 
reacted negatively with the decline bigger for income trusts. The larger price reactions by 
income trusts suggest the popularity of income trusts in Canada was mostly driven by 
their favorable tax treatment.  
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Diving more deeply into the role of taxes in income trust valuations, Klassen and 
Mescall (2012) use a matched set of income trusts and corporations and find that the tax 
rate paid by the marginal investors is lower for income trusts, which helps to explain why 
income trusts sell for higher prices than regular corporations. The difference in implied 
tax rates is less than the difference in official tax rates due to differences in the tax 
clienteles of income trusts and standard equity firms. Although they find this influences 
firm valuation, they do not estimate the size of the premium relative to tax rates. 
Focusing on the tax shield associated with debt and how it would be impacted by 
the special tax treatment of income trusts, Doidge and Dyck (2015) use the October 2006 
announcement to estimate the tax impact for firms with different degrees of leverage and 
different investor types (for a discussion of the role of investor types see the appendix 3-
C). Because the income trust structure had investors paying the taxes, tax exempt 
investors received even larger benefits from the income trust structure than regular 
individual investors did. Beyond the differences in taxes paid by investors, there were 
also differences in the amount of taxes to be paid by the income trust depending on the 
amount of debt. Correcting for the capital structure and observed investor types for each 
firm, they find a lower fall in prices after the October 2006 announcement for firms for 
whom the tax advantage was less (i.e., those with fewer institutional investors and those 
with larger potential tax shields).  
Although there are relatively few studies in the literature, they all highlight the 
significant role played by taxes in this structure and they focus on the events in late 2005 
and 2006. The goal of our analysis is to go beyond focusing on the clear tax advantages 
of income trusts and see how all of the key differences between income trusts and regular 
equity firms influence their relative valuations over the life cycle of the structure. We 
discuss this in more detail below where we motivate our hypothesis. 
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3.4 Hypothesis Development 
Our analysis is designed to use both univariate and multivariate tests to empirically 
examine how income trusts have been valued over time and relate this to potential 
reactions by managers to what they are observing with respect to these valuations. We 
define what we expect to see through a series of testable hypotheses.  
 
3.4.1 Valuation of Income Trusts 
Our analysis begins by confirming the popular assertion that income trusts are valued at a 
significant premium relative to similar equities. Conventional wisdom is that income 
trusts have valuation premiums of about one-third higher (i.e., roughly the amount of the 
difference in tax rates between equity firms and income trusts). Anecdotal evidence 
demonstrates that merely mentioning the possibility of converting to an income trust 
results in an increase in valuation though slightly less than one-third. For example, Telus 
formally announced its consideration of the trust structure on September 11, 2006: “Telus 
Corporation today announced that its Board of Directors has unanimously approved a 
proposal from Telus management to reorganize Telus in its entirety into an income trust.” 
Both Telus and BCE had an increase in valuation of about 20 per cent (see Figures 3-2a 
and 3-2b). Although BCE did not formally announce its intention to consider conversion 
until October 11, 2006, the rumors of BCE’s ultimate conversion had started with Telus’s 
announcement—it had been known that both firms had been considering such a 
conversion for some time so Telus’s announcement was viewed as confirmation that it 
was an option for these competitors.  
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Figure 3-2: Impact on Firm Valuation of the Possibility of Converting to an Income 
Trust 
a) Telus Share Price and Trading Volume Around Conversion Announcement 
 
 
 
 
This figure highlights the increase in Telus share price and trading volume surrounding the company’s 
announcement of its intention to convert to an income trust on September 11, 2006. One can also see the 
offsetting decline in share price (and increase in trading volume) following the announcement that the tax 
advantage for income trusts was to be discontinued on October 31, 2006. 
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b) BCE Share Price and Trading Volume Around Conversion Announcement 
 
 
 
 
This figure highlights the increase in BCE share price and trading volume surrounding the Telus 
announcement of its intention to convert to an income trust on September 11, 2006. This announcement 
was viewed as confirmation that BCE was going to make a similar announcement (which it formally did in 
early October). One can also see the offsetting decline in share price (and increase in trading volume) 
following the announcement that the tax advantage for income trusts was to be discontinued on October 31, 
2006. 
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c) Impact on Share Price of the Conversions from Equity to an Income Trust 
This figure illustrates the cumulative abnormal returns around the actual conversions of a corporation to an 
income trust. The calculation of abnormal return is based on a CAPM model with changes in the S&P TSX 
Index to be the market return. Time 0 is the date on which the firm officially converted from a regular 
equity firm to an income trust. We go back 120 business days to ensure we have captured the majority of 
the announcement effects from the firm informing the market of its intention to convert. All returns are 
standardized to zero at time t-120. 
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Before examining potential sources for this increase in valuation, we confirm its 
existence leading to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Income trusts are valued at a premium to comparable regular equity firms 
 
Taxes are an obvious factor to consider in this premium, but we also consider 
other factors beyond taxes which may impact the valuations. Some of the relative 
costs/benefits across these structures which may influence the valuation premium for 
income trusts include the following: tax advantages of income trusts as a flow-through 
entity; liquidity provided by regular payouts to investors; lower cost of capital due to the 
more debt-like nature of the equity for income trusts; increased agency costs due to 
concerns about governance and oversight at income trusts; limited business growth 
opportunities as the majority of profits are paid out leaving little for capital expenditures 
(beyond what is available through depreciation expenses); lack of diversification as 
income trusts are generally concentrated in a single sector; and exposure to regulatory 
change if the government decides to remove some of the tax benefit. From a more 
behavioral perspective, investors may be overvaluing a firm in its early stages because 
they are unsure how to best value its characteristics. For example, investors may add 
extra value to income trusts due to the novelty of some of the features they are offering 
the market (i.e., the extra liquidity from the regular distribution payments of income 
trusts). As the structure matured and more firms adopted the structure (possibly even 
some for whom it was not suitable) the novelty of these features would decline as would 
the premium attributed to them, so another factor influencing valuation could be the stage 
of the income trust life cycle. 
Next, we investigate the characteristics of firms using the income trust structure. 
Firms using this structure would ideally have characteristics similar to those for an 
optimal leveraged buy-out (LBO) target: stable operating cash flows, low capital 
expenditures, stable sales, low effective tax rates being paid, and a mature business 
model. This leads to our next hypothesis regarding the characteristics of income trusts: 
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H2: Income trusts will have characteristics similar to those for an LBO 
 
Although we expect the firms adopting the income trust structure early in the structure’s 
life cycle to have these characteristics, behavioral finance suggests that managers 
observing the boost in valuation obtained by adopting this structure may choose to adopt 
it for their firms even when the income trust structure is not ideal. Consequently, over 
time we expect to see firms rationally choose to become income trusts or to list some of 
their assets as an income trust even when they are less than ideally suited to the structure. 
They use the structure to take advantage of the valuation bump. 
Hypothesis two allows us to empirically characterize the types of firms that 
became income trusts and whether they changed over time. Though the ideal 
characteristics for firms to succeed under this structure would not have changed over 
time, corporate behavioral finance suggests that we would expect to see changes in the 
characteristics of the firms adopting these strategies as managers observe the ability to 
get a higher valuation from this structure with few added costs (assuming the results from 
hypothesis H1 confirm the increased valuations for income trusts).  
As income trusts gained wider acceptance and the valuation premium was 
observed more often, we would assume the potential existence of a class pricing effect—
all income trusts received an increase in valuation even if they did not deserve it. This 
concept from behavioral asset pricing that was observed in the tech boom, suggests that 
we may find income trusts were actually mispriced (i.e., given a valuation premium even 
in cases where it was not deserved). We expect that we will see this through the changes 
in the characteristics of the income trusts over time and their relationship (or lack thereof) 
to firm valuations. Consequently, we wish to examine the following: 
 
H3: Income trusts will trade at a premium to comparable corporations; however, 
as the number of key characteristics included in the newly listed income trusts 
changes over time, we expect to see the valuation premium decreasing—investors 
start to realize that all income trusts are not all created equal.  
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Related to the changes in the types of firms becoming income trusts, we may also expect 
to see differences related to the nature of firms and their valuations for firms which 
become income trusts through a conversion from a corporate structure, or for firms where 
they did an IPO but the firm was either based on 100 per cent of the firm’s assets (or less 
than 100 per cent of one or several firms’ assets) before the IPO. 
 
3.4.2 Market Reactions to Significant Events 
The final stage of the analysis considers how the valuations for income trusts changed as 
the level of uncertainty about the tax situation evolved. These analyses most directly 
extend the work from the previous studies. We consider all of the announcements directly 
related to government policy on the tax advantages of income trusts. Since one of the 
major sources of value for investors in income trusts is the tax structure, these 
announcements will have the largest impact on income trust valuation. (This intuition is 
similar to that for the studies mentioned earlier.)  
Overall, we expect to see positive (negative) reactions around the announcements 
supporting (decreasing) the tax advantages associated with the structure. If all income 
trusts are not created equally, we expect to see the size of the market reaction depend on 
different firm level characteristics such as those examined above. The conditioning of the 
models on these firm-level characteristics was not part of the previous studies and 
therefore allows us to extend their results. We examine not only the impact of proposed 
tax changes on firm value but also the role of the suitability of a firm for the income trust 
structure and investor-level behavioral characteristics.  
Amoako-Adu and Smith (2008) and Doidge and Dyck (2015) propose that 
markets are efficient and the valuations for income trusts change around these 
announcements but for different reasons, though both related to taxes. We also assume 
that markets are efficient, but we examine whether the market reaction to the 
announcements may be related to both the changes in taxes and other firm-level factors 
which may be the result of behavioral decisions by managers and/or investors. This leads 
to our final set of hypotheses. 
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H4: The size of the price change surrounding announcements related to income 
trusts’ tax status will be: 
- more pronounced for firms with investors with lower tax rates (Doidge 
and Dyck, 2015) 
- more pronounced for firms less suited to the income trust structure 
based on accounting criteria 
- more pronounced for firms that ultimately fail, are acquired, or 
convert to regular equity, in that order 
 
Overall, we expect the market reaction to these announcements to depend on 
different factors. If markets are efficient, we would expect to see different reactions for 
firms which could survive without the structure and those that required the structure to be 
viable. We also expect there to be a role in the reaction for behavioral factors which had 
been related to the pricing premium before the announcements. 
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Table 3-1: Summary Statistics 
 
 Obs Mean Median S.D. min p25 75 max 
EV/EBITDA 670 21.19 10.51 (117.56) 1.82 8.14 14.35 2450.89 
P/E 670 40.43 14.68 (315.66) 1.29 10.71 22.79 7964.60 
MTB 745 1.88 1.38 (1.74) 0.27 1.04 2.07 18.61 
QRatio 745 1.40 1.23 (0.66) 0.48 1.03 1.56 5.97 
MV ($mil) 825 605.02 245.42 (1148.44) 4.63 103.67 611.48 15354.73 
TA ($mil) 759 628.69 299.77 (1013.57) 11.86 133.04 681.70 10401.80 
NetSales ($mil) 759 265.86 125.31 (384.96) 0.00 36.66 320.87 2741.30 
NI ($mil) 759 43.01 12.84 (150.89) -257.82 4.61 37.20 2902.00 
ETR (%) 642 6.39 0.00 (20.73) 0.00 0.00 7.33 418.45 
NTA ($mil)  678 332.04 163.04 (575.37) -92.20 70.55 358.84 5819.00 
NTA/TA (%) 672 56.55 56.39 (22.31) -16.75 42.78 69.79 168.76 
CFVol (%) 637 4.52 3.56 (3.50) 0.02 2.19 5.93 23.91 
CapEx/TA (%)  750 6.74 2.12 (11.11) 0.00 0.44 8.56 115.78 
Depre/TA (%) 749 5.11 4.13 (4.40) 0.00 1.79 7.69 25.19 
Lev (%) 759 22.14 20.08 (16.80) 0.00 10.19 30.76 87.62 
LCStage (1-5) 757 2.56 3.00 (0.69) 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 
DY (%) 825 9.99 9.70 (4.64) 0.00 7.66 12.50 27.27 
DivPayoutSh (%) 228 70.96 80.95 (30.06) 0.00 59.91 94.53 100.00 
CommonDiv/NI (%) 677 279.09 118.28 (2159.45) 0.00 86.31 181.01 50590.00 
Chg_EBITDA (%) 607 65.13 21.00 (668.00) -5228.67 -3.68 69.17 8037.96 
Chg_NetSales (%) 619 759.01 21.07 (16664.39) -100.00 3.67 58.47 414583.34 
Chg_TA (%) 636 43.06 7.12 (312.87) -63.86 -1.77 35.36 7694.74 
ROE (%) 736 20.83 20.71 (41.37) -432.49 11.62 33.58 213.53 
ROA (%) 736 10.92 11.28 (15.31) -146.80 7.07 16.69 73.38 
 
This table reports the summary statistics of valuation multiples and characteristics of non-REIT income 
trusts from 1998 to 2011. Variable definitions can be found in the Appendix. 
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3.5 Data 
To examine the valuations of income trusts, we assemble a complete list of trusts that 
traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) between 1996 and 2011. The sources we 
use to compile the list of income trusts include the CFMRC database and the Toronto 
Stock Exchange’s monthly reviews. We then identify those trusts with identification and 
accounting data available in Datastream over this period. Based on the accounting data in 
Datastream, we identify which trusts are investment trusts, which will be removed. The 
remaining set of income trusts has its maximum number of trusts in 2006 when we have 
247 income trusts with 155 business trusts, 58 energy trusts, and 34 Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs). For each trust, we hand-collected information on whether it 
was a conversion from equity or an IPO. If it was a conversion, we collect all of the 
information available for the firm before conversion. If it was an IPO, we examine 
whether the IPO was for all of the firm’s assets, a subset of the assets, or a subset of the 
assets combined with a subset of the assets from another firm.23 Figure 3-1 shows the 
growth in this structure over this period with the rapid growth between 2001 and 2006, 
especially in the area of business trusts, and the decline post-2006. Table 3-1 provides 
summary statistics for the characteristics of income trusts. 
For our matched sample, we look at all of the Canadian regular equity firms in 
Datastream over this period for which we have the required accounting data. We match 
the equity firms to our set of income trusts based on industry24 and net sales. We match 
on a year-by-year basis to obtain a set of matched firms for each income trust each year. 
To avoid the problem of duplicated matches, we use a non-replacement matching 
method. We supplement this data with information from Bloomberg on the cost of capital 
for our income trusts. We also hand-collect information on what happened to each 
income trust after the 2006 announcement. Tables 3-2 and 3-3 show the similarities and 
                                               
23 The assets being offered in the IPO may provide a proxy for whether the IPO was to take advantage of 
the income trust structure and its higher valuations for some assets which would otherwise be undervalued. 
These structures may be less stable to changes in the income trust regulations than others. 
24 The industry classification is based on datatype ICBSN in Datastream, which uses the FTSE/DJ Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) to classify industries. 
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differences between our set of income trusts and the corresponding matched firms. For 
these firms, we start by considering the most commonly used accounting data. We have 
also grouped the data by years because behavioral finance assumes a role for the life 
cycle of a structure in how investors value assets.  
For the life cycle of the income trust structure, we view the period before 2002 as 
the infancy stage when income trusts are being valued as a novel structure and the rules 
regarding what makes for a good income trust are being followed well. The following 
period, 2002-2004, is a period in which the structure is maturing. Managers are 
identifying the structure as a way to possibly increase firm value, so we are seeing more 
income trusts with characteristics that may be starting to deviate from the optimal, and 
concerns about corporate governance are starting to appear. The period from 2005 to 
2006 is one in which the structure was starting to be viewed with more concern—what 
firms were adopting this structure and how was the regulatory environment going to react 
as it was being proposed that the structure may be over-used. The period after 2006 is the 
period of decline for the structure.  
 A further feature which we investigate is the level of maturity of the firm. Since a 
firm ideally suited to the income trust structure is a mature firm (a firm having stable 
sales and cash flows, and requiring little capital expenditure), we also consider measures 
used to identify the life cycle for firms (LCStage). Following Dickinson (2011) and 
others, we use information from a firm’s statement of cash flows to identify the firm’s 
stage. Using a firm’s cash flows, the patterns of operating, investing, and financing cash 
inflows and outflows provide insight into a firm’s stage in its life cycle at a given point in 
time. The sign (positive or negative) of the net operating, investing, and financing cash 
flows, provides eight distinct cash flow patterns each of which can be associated with a 
stage. The eight classifications are collapsed into five practical life cycle stages: 
introduction, growth, maturity, shake-out, and decline. Appendix 3-B summarizes how 
the life cycle stage is classified based on the signs of the cash flows. We use these to 
identify the stage of each firm to determine if they are ideally suited for the income trust 
structure and how this has changed over time. 
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3.6 Results 
Although conventional wisdom indicated that income trusts were valued at a premium to 
similar regular equity firms, the precise magnitude and source of this premium are not 
well understood. The tax savings of the income trust structure are well-known (about 30 
per cent), but how much was the actual premium? Was there a role played by any other 
factors? In this section, we empirically test our sets of hypotheses to try to provide some 
answers to these questions.  
3.6.1 Initial Evidence on Valuation Premium 
We start by investigating our first set of hypotheses related to the premium with which 
income trusts are valued. Consequently, we are examining if income trusts are, in fact, 
valued more highly than their equity counterparts. Building on the anecdotal evidence of 
price increases for both BCE and Telus when Telus announced its intention to convert to 
an income trust (see Figures 3-2a and 3-2b), we obtain a starting point that income trusts 
are valued with, at least, a 20 per cent premium. To examine whether this is broadly the 
case and if it was the same over our entire sample period, we perform several 
comparisons. 
We start by looking at all cases in which firms converted from regular equity to 
income trusts. How did the market react to these events? Since the prices for our 
converting firms would start their major reactions on the day of the announcement (and 
not the day of conversion), we need to look at the change in share prices around the initial 
announcements. We do not have complete information on the announcement dates, so we 
go back 120 days before the actual conversion—this appeared to capture the 
overwhelming majority of conversions. In Figure 3-2c, we see a similar increase in share 
price of about 20 per cent for all firms converting from regular equity to a business or 
energy income trust. We do not focus on REITs due to their different financial structure. 
Although this increase in value of 20 per cent is less than the theoretical tax savings from 
the conversion, this may reflect the actual tax savings for the firms doing the conversion. 
It is likely that the firms which converted from equity to an income trust were already 
“tax avoiders” and thus had a structure such that the marginal tax rate they were paying 
was already less than the headline top tax rate. This means the increase in valuation could 
 102 
 
be related to the actual tax savings these firms would have received from this conversion 
rather than the theoretical change in tax rates. Existing research into long-term tax 
avoiders suggests that these firms would very likely pay taxes of less than 20 per cent 
(e.g., Dyreng et al., 2007). This means their valuation premium is likely related to the tax 
advantage, but possibly more. Consequently, our results clearly demonstrate that Telus 
and BCE were not exceptions when their value increased upon the announcement of their 
intentions to convert to income trusts. Since it was their intention, and it was not clear if 
it was going to happen, the 20 per cent increase in value they observed was likely a 
fraction of what the value increase of converting to an income trust would have provided 
to their investors. 
With strong evidence that there is an increase in valuation related to becoming an 
income trust, we try to more fully examine the expected size of a valuation premium for 
each income trust in our sample. We first consider the size of the median tax advantage in 
our sample. In Figure 3-3a, we can see that the size of the tax advantage enjoyed by 
income trusts based on a comparison of their effective marginal tax rates varied between 
more than 40 per cent and about 25 per cent. Consequently, the size of the tax advantage 
is not stable over time. This advantage for the cash flows for the income trust would be 
one way in which income trusts could provide a boost in valuation if they were efficiently 
priced using a fundamental valuation (e.g., a discounted cash flow valuation). Another 
way that income trusts could increase valuation is if, as suggested in the literature, 
income trusts have a lower cost of capital. In Figures 3-3b, we can see that the cost of 
capital (WACC) has been lower for income trusts (both energy and business) during their 
popular era (i.e., before 2006), while it was increased in the period after 2006 after the 
TFP announcement. The trend was driven by the increasing cost of equity for income 
trusts, while the cost of debt has been decreasing through time. These findings suggest 
that the cash flows are higher for income trusts due to the tax savings, but the value added 
to the firm may be somewhat enhanced by the low cost of capital when the income trust 
structure was in its growing time. 
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Figure 3-3: Factors Related to Fundamental Valuation of Income Trusts 
a) Effective Tax Rates 
 
 
We measure the effective tax rates paid by income trusts versus their matched sample using the income tax 
expense as a percentage of their pre-tax income using data from Datastream. The effective tax rate impacts 
the size of the cash flows which could be provided to investors from the income trust relative to the 
investors in the matched firms. 
 
b) Cost of Capital 
 
 
We use data on the Cost of Capital (Weighted Average Cost of Capital, WACC) for our income trusts and 
our matched sample obtained from Bloomberg for each firm in each year. This provides the discount rate at 
which the free cash flows would be discounted in a fundamental valuation of the firms.  
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Beyond the influence of factors related to the fundamental valuation, we also 
consider how the returns from income trusts compare to the other fixed income 
investments available over this period. The assets we compare the average dividend yield 
of income trusts to are the long-term Canadian government benchmark bond yield (data 
from Datastream item CNBBLT), long-term Canadian corporate bond yield (data from 
Datastream item CN13869), and average dividend yield of matched corporations. 
Although income trusts are not, technically speaking, a form of fixed income investment, 
they are argued to have been more similar to a fixed income investment than a standard 
equity investment. In Figure 3-4, we can see how the yields on income trusts outpaced 
those of the other asset classes starting in 2002 and going through to after they lost their 
tax advantage. Figure 3-4 therefore demonstrates the widening gap between the yields on 
Canadian government bonds and income trusts. The added yield over fixed income 
instruments would add value to this asset class. 
 
Figure 3-4: Income Trust Dividend Yields versus Bond Yields 
 
 
 
In this figure, we present the yields on alternative forms of fixed income investments over this period. The 
data for the long-term Canadian government bond yield and the long-term Canadian corporate bond yield 
(which was discontinued in 2007) are all from Datastream. The average dividend yields for the income 
trusts and the matched sample are also from Datastream. 
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The next stage of our analysis is to estimate the general premium for income 
trusts by comparing the valuations for our income trusts and our set of matched firms. 
Because of our matching, we are able to determine how much of a premium a similar 
firm would obtain if it were to restructure as an income trust. We start by comparing the 
EV/EBITDA25 values for our two samples and conclude the valuation using multiples 
with a comparison of the P/E values. Since we assume that managers are rational, we 
would expect to see an increase in valuation for firms with the income trusts structure 
because trusts are able to avoid paying corporate taxes (a savings of, possibly, 30 per cent 
or more at this time). Comparing the EV/EBITDA multiples for our set of trusts and our 
set of matched regular equity firms, we find a substantial boost in firm value from the 
trust structure (see Figures 3-5a). We find significantly higher valuation multiples for 
income trusts over the early portion of our sample, between 2002 and 2004. (This is more 
than the maximum possible tax savings.) Despite the large premium in the early part of 
our sample, in the latter part of the sample the premium started to decrease. We also run a 
regression to explain the valuation premium by the differences in characteristics between 
income trusts and matched corporations, the results of which will be reported later in our 
regression analysis. When we obtain the residuals from the regressions for all income 
trusts, which is the unexplained parts of the valuation premium, we show that the average 
of the residuals by year still exhibits a decreasing trend (see Figure 3-5b). 
                                               
25 We also considered the P/Sales, and P/EBITDA as other measures of firm valuation, but we focus on the 
EV/EBITDA ratio as it is more clearly related to the cash flow generating ability of the firms (a key value 
for income trusts) and is not impacted by the relative values of debt and equity in estimating overall firm 
value. 
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Figure 3-5: Valuation Premium for Income Trusts 
 
a) Median Differences in Valuation Multiples between Income Trusts and Matched Corporations  
 
 
 
These figures show the median higher in valuation multiples of income trusts compared to matched 
corporations. The EV/EBITDA values for both the income trusts and matched sample on industry and firm 
size were obtained from Datastream. Similarly, the P/E ratios were obtained using data from Datastream at 
the end of fiscal year stock price and earnings. The matching was performed on a year-by-year basis. The 
period shown is from 1998 to 2006. 
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b) Unexplained Portions of Differences in Valuation Multiples between Income Trusts and Matched 
Corporations 
 
 
 
These figures graph the median by year of the residuals for the regression in Model (1) to illustrate the 
portion of difference in valuation between income trusts and matched corporations unexplained by firm 
characteristics. To avoid the impact of outliers on regression results, we exclude 2% highest and 2% lowest 
of valuation multiple difference in all cases.  
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Much of the discussion by academics and practitioners is focused on the P/E 
ratios, so we also compare these across our set of trusts and regular equities (see Figure 
3-5a). Interestingly, for the business trusts we find an improvement only in the P/E ratios 
in the early part of the sample. After 2002, we do not find a significant improvement in 
the P/E ratios for these trusts. One advantage of using the P/E multiple is that the 
earnings from the income trust would be impacted by the tax advantage, so being an 
income trust would mean the earnings increased by 30 per cent (or the actual size of the 
tax savings for the trust). If the price were to also increase by 30 per cent, this would 
leave the P/E ratio intact and thus no different from the matched sample. Our findings 
therefore suggest that there was something beyond the tax savings which impacted the 
valuations for income trusts in the early stages of their life cycle, but the increase in 
valuation converged to the tax savings later in the sample. Table 3-2 has also confirmed 
the statistical significances of the differences in valuation multiples between income 
trusts and matched corporations through time. In the case of EV/EBITDA, we do find a 
higher average ratio for business trusts in 2002 and a decreasing trend for the differences 
in EV/EBITDA for all income trust types (business and energy) starting in 2005. The 
results from the valuation analysis using multiples suggests that there was more to the 
valuation premium for income trusts, especially early in their use; the price for income 
trusts has increased by roughly the same amount as the earnings were increased due to 
the tax advantage of trusts. 
 It is therefore important to try to understand the initial source of the premium as 
well as how and why the premium changed as the structure matured. The structure is 
relatively new, so we can assume that there was some degree of unfamiliarity on the part 
of investors potentially leading to a premium being paid for income trusts. This should 
not, however, have persisted forever. Using the tech boom as an example, the boost in 
valuation for this new segment of the market lasted for quite some time before the price 
correction occurred. With tech companies, the increase in valuation was due to 
expectations of higher growth, but with income trusts, it was the tax savings allowing 
earnings to be higher and possibly other factors such as the added value to investors of 
the regular returns through distributions. Investors value receiving regular cash payouts 
from the firm and are therefore willing to pay a premium for this. One could also argue 
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that rational managers saw the increase in valuation from adopting the income trust 
structure so started to both saturate the market as well as take advantage of the market so 
later entrants into this segment may not have been well-suited to the structure; rational 
investors may have valued them with a discount relative to other income trusts. The next 
section empirically investigates associated hypotheses.  
3.6.2 Univariate Analysis of Characteristics of Income Trusts 
versus Equity 
The fact that the valuation premium for income trusts appears to change over time sets up 
our tests for our second set of hypotheses—do the characteristics of income trusts change 
over time? The types of firms hypothesized to be most ideally suited to the income trust 
structure and thus listed as income trusts are firms with stable cash flows, low 
requirements for capital expenditures, large percentage of assets being tangible assets, 
and limited leverage, and in a more mature stage of their life cycle. The suitability of 
firms becoming income trusts later in the structure’s life cycle (i.e., post 2004, for 
example) is something we can confirm using readily available information.  
We look at the differences in certain firm-level characteristics between income 
trusts and a matched sample of regular equity firms over our sample period. In Table 3-3, 
we see the differences in many of these factors over our sample period. Focusing on the 
characteristics related to the optimality of the firm for the income trust structure, we find 
that, as expected, trusts had much lower effective tax rates and higher dividend payout. 
Income trusts also have lower capital expenditures, more tangible assets, less used 
depreciation, lower leverage, less volatile cash flows and less profitability (lower ROE 
and ROA) compared to the matched sample. Looking at how these values change over 
the years, we see that in most cases the differences between the income trusts and the 
matched sample were largest at the start of our sample and decreased over time, while the 
difference in effective tax rate has been quite stable from 2000 through 2006. We do note 
that, although we have attempted to match income trusts with corporations within the 
same industry with the closest match in net sales, the differences in size (total assets, net 
sales, net income) remain significant in some of the years.  
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Table 3-2: Valuation Premium of Income Trusts Relative to Matched Corporations  
 
Business and Energy 
Year EV/EBITDA P/E P/Sales P/EBITDA EV/Sales MTB QRatio 
1998 4.23 9.44* 0.65 2.17 0.43 1.13 0.06 
1999 9.79** 1.64 4.74* 9.76** 4.87 0.62 0.04 
2000 3.21** -3.89 2.22*** 3.87*** 2.63** -0.01 -0.1 
2001 2.44* -131.94 44.86 2.09* 53.66 0.02 -0.04 
2002 6.49** 9.42 3.21*** 3.85** 6.05** -0.40* -0.22 
2003 5.79*** -5.55 2.04*** 3.99*** 1.85*** -0.16 -0.14 
2004 6.00** -3.38 2.76*** 4.63** 4.45*** -0.05 -0.14 
2005 0.26 -7.92** 0.2 -0.55 0.82** -0.83*** -0.51*** 
2006 -2.42*** -20.79*** -0.07 -2.58*** 0.14 -0.73*** -0.49*** 
2007 -0.85 -3.6 -0.44 -1.83*** -0.18 -0.56*** -0.41*** 
2008 1.61** -2.52** 0.08 0 0.28 -0.07 -0.08* 
2009 5.40** -3005.25 0.54 0.38 0.96** -0.14 -0.13* 
2010 5.71** -0.88 1.59 2.18 2.70* -0.19 -0.40*** 
2011 0.17 36572.98 0.3 -1.01 0.84 0.89 0.08 
Business Only 
Year EV/EBITDA P/E P/Sales P/EBITDA EV/Sales MTB QRatio 
1998 6.71 9.44* 1.55 3.05 1.89 1.85 0.11 
1999 8.32 4.1 2.74*** 8.43** 3.13** 0.83 -0.03 
2000 5.11** -3.42 2.76*** 5.24*** 3.64** -0.09 -0.21 
2001 4.73** -239.49 3.46*** 3.92** 4.20** 0.24 0.02 
2002 10.43** 21.31 5.31*** 6.74*** 9.43** -0.43 -0.26 
2003 8.30** -11.1 2.84*** 5.82*** 2.59*** -0.24 -0.19* 
2004 9.30** -0.23 4.05*** 7.64*** 5.12*** 0.09 -0.05 
2005 1.81* -2.58 1.10*** 0.9 2.04*** -0.76*** -0.40*** 
2006 -2.24** -23.67** 0.23 -2.46*** 0.58 -0.73*** -0.48*** 
2007 0.04 -2.06 0.22 -0.93 0.51 -0.47** -0.31*** 
2008 2.26** -2.13 0.19 0.13 0.41 -0.15 -0.13** 
2009 2.13 -1409.28 0.85* 1.33 1.13** -0.36* -0.24** 
2010 7.85** 4.34 2.17* 3.49** 3.50* -0.09 -0.37** 
2011 0.73 39899.34 0.6 -0.11 0.98 0.99 0.16 
Energy Only 
Year EV/EBITDA P/E P/Sales P/EBITDA EV/Sales MTB QRatio 
1999 12.74 -3.77 8.73 12.42 8.36 0.19 0.17 
2000 -0.91 -4.92 1.05 0.92 0.44 0.17 0.16 
2001 -0.86 -4.84 93.16 -0.54 111.36 -0.25 -0.1 
2002 -0.99 -17.49 -1.19 -1.65 -1.02 -0.34 -0.12 
2003 1.29 3.58 0.43 0.69 0.46 0 -0.02 
2004 -1.25 -10.41** -0.33 -1.62 2.86 -0.4 -0.34 
2005 -3.04*** -18.92** -1.91*** -3.55*** -2.03*** -0.97*** -0.74*** 
2006 -2.84*** -14.28*** -0.77** -2.85*** -0.87* -0.72** -0.51*** 
2007 -2.88* -8.15 -2.02*** -3.91*** -1.85*** -0.78** -0.64*** 
2008 0.36 -3.20** -0.16 -0.25 0.01 0.11 0.02 
2009 13.27 -7067.72 -0.25 -1.67 0.53 0.35* 0.1 
2010 -1.27 -21.77 -0.7 -2.17 -0.47 -0.53 -0.50** 
2011 -4.01 -16.95 -2.38 -7.75 -0.45 0.01 -0.58 
 
This table shows how the valuation premium for non-REIT income trusts (i.e., the amount higher in 
valuation multiples for income trusts compared to matched corporations) changes over the years. Variable 
definitions can be found in the Appendix. We omit the income trusts that have valuation multiples in the 
2% highest and 2% lowest percentile in the comparison to avoid impact of outliers. A t-test for significance 
of the mean (different from zero) of the differences is employed for each valuation multiple in each year. 
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Table 3-3: Differences in Characteristics Between Income Trusts and Matched Corporations 
Business and Energy 
Year MV TA NetSales NI ETR NTA NTA/TA CFVol CapEx/TA Depre/TA Lev LCStage 
1998 174.14 275.6 62.89 -11.47 -31.64 -25.3 0.01 -1.72 -10.07** 2.69** 5.4 0 
1999 9.64 4.55 -19.24 -3.14 -34.76*** -7 0.02* -6.03 -7.46*** 0.59 -16 0.11 
2000 146.62*** 179.47** -22.06 22.88** -26.10*** 107.81*** 0.02** -19.77 -4.66 -1.1 -6.16 0.35 
2001 192.14*** 275.07** -2.9 11.84* -24.83*** 187.27*** 0.02*** -11.55 -9.34*** -0.84 -6.03 0.1 
2002 63.04 73.85 -58.46 7.45 -25.52*** 151.34*** 0 -8.81* -8.89*** -1.49*** -1.02 -0.37*** 
2003 -7.9 -16.7 -106.10* 5.93 -22.04*** 71.29 0 -11.52 -6.75*** -0.66 -1.55 0.05 
2004 195.02** 83.29 -41.85 9.72 -21.72*** 121.11** 0 -4.28** -2.06 -1.08* 2.44 -0.17* 
2005 -112.47 -168.63 -172.30** 13.39 -25.36*** -30.53 -0.00* -547.61 -6.37*** -0.62 2.41 0.08 
2006 -331.59 -167.45 -216.82* 1.38 -23.73*** -25.94 -0.01 -375.19 -6.17*** 0.04 5.18*** 0.16** 
2007 -394.9 -171.91 -244.60* -38.54** 20.31** -37.86 -0.01*** -2.56*** -6.59*** 0.19 8.04*** 0.29*** 
2008 -307.19* -262.4 -407.04** -11.91 -18.23*** -99.42 -0.01*** -1.61*** -5.16*** -0.37 10.11*** 0.30*** 
2009 -136.52 -172.24 -374.20** -41.45** -20.91*** -104.29 -0.01* -1.31** -4.99*** 0.49 10.09*** 0.33*** 
2010 -50.45 97.5 -98.07 -28.38* 264.79 51.07 -0.01 -1.30* -1.92*** 0.82 11.95*** 0.18 
2011 -148.05 333.41 -218.68 -70.99 3.92 360.77 -0.02 1.97 -1.72 5.87 15.60* -0.2 
 
Year DY DivPayoutSh CommonDiv/NI Chg_EBITDA Chg_NetSales Chg_TA ROE ROA 
1998 10.51*** 22.52 151.5 -125.74 -60.34 -6.51 5.84 -5.58 
1999 12.67*** 96.29** 229.02*** -77.18 8.78 -22.18 -6.87 -5.89** 
2000 11.90*** 60.67* 117.58*** 30.02 6.52 4.89 -18.64** -5.59 
2001 9.86*** 38.31 211.55*** -7.2 1.92 17.41 -20.92*** -7.77*** 
2002 8.36*** 44.52*** 487.69 -62.83 28.92 -22.28 -11.74*** -5.29*** 
2003 8.39*** 49.89*** 108.68*** -156.87 5530.17 -509.13 -26.27* -7.12*** 
2004 7.37*** 56.02*** 130.26*** -101.27 19.39 8.66 -10.07*** -5.49*** 
2005 8.31*** 65.11*** 179.57*** -1370.62 112.64** -31.96** -9.08** -6.33*** 
2006 10.62*** 75.04*** 432.92 -190.69** -107.05** 10.47 8.23 -8.09*** 
2007 9.57*** 51.56*** 126.53*** -878.74 123.32 -717.31 -5.18 -4.65*** 
2008 15.06*** 53.73*** 165.45*** -94.60** -18.28** -17.92*** -5.06 -8.78*** 
2009 6.28*** 27.10*** 55.39 -7.46 6665.39 -13.92*** 0.2 -7.05*** 
2010 4.41*** 23.38*** 415.98** -2.16 -547.38 -39.96 -57.65 -6.72*** 
2011 2.72* -2.31 98.86** -194.11 106.1 10.26 18.2 10 
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Business Only 
Year MV TA NetSales NI ETR NTA NTA/TA CFVol CapEx/TA Depre/TA Lev LCStage 
1999 -24.72 -41.18 -28.45 -10.43 -34.30*** -51.91 0.02 -2.19 -5.77*** -0.56 -13.66 0.27 
2000 178.97** 264.88** -40.69 21.92 -20.03*** 115.89** 0.01 -29.33 -4.45** -3.16** -4.17 0.46 
2001 234.51*** 163.87 -70.96 2.32 -21.82*** 100.14 0.02 -19.01 -7.24*** -2.72** -2.27 -0.13 
2002 -80.48 -162.79 -151.90** -5.37 -23.30*** 55.14 0.01 -12.09 -7.90*** -2.27*** -2.33 -0.51*** 
2003 -234.47 -344.8 -210.05** -13.97 -23.41*** -61.35 -0.01 -4.77** -6.63*** -1.97 -3.32 0.06 
2004 60.34 -199.69 -151.10** -8.25 -17.01*** 0.16 0 -5.72** -1.88 -1.86** 2.39 -0.22* 
2005 -437.82* -530.74** -356.04*** -23.57 -24.21*** -187.39* 0 -40.08 -2.86*** -0.98* 1.65 -0.02 
2006 -790.72*** -608.52** -418.62*** -23.03 -24.65*** -251.59 -0.01 -1.88*** -3.56*** -0.39 4.88** 0.05 
2007 -813.28*** -656.63** -505.50** -58.44** 20.41 -247.43* -0.01*** -2.46** -3.52*** -0.07 7.58*** 0.25** 
2008 -644.72*** -698.35** -749.23*** -55.72*** -17.42*** -316.11** -0.01* -1.06* -2.51*** 0.07 9.08*** 0.11 
2009 -755.77*** -925.59*** -676.05*** -62.55** -20.06*** -352.98*** 0 -0.92 -2.97*** 0.28 6.56** 0.36*** 
2010 -369.62** -322.43 -232.16** -40.29** 347.55 -200.09** -0.01 -0.98 -1.37** 0.66 11.53** 0.07 
2011 -287.70* 179.79 -242.79 -87.71* 3.55 398.08 -0.02 2.87 -2.12 6.55 12.11 -0.22 
 
Year DY DivPayoutSh CommonDiv/NI Chg_EBITDA Chg_NetSales Chg_TA ROE ROA 
1999 12.00*** 96.29** 184.04*** -103.84 -15.37* -31.75 -9.91 -6.29** 
2000 9.55*** 49.28 114.19*** 49.52 13.77 15.37 -22.94*** -10.71** 
2001 6.71*** 32.06 220.53* -13.54 -0.14 -2.66 -14.02*** -7.04*** 
2002 7.43*** 53.77*** 71.07*** -94.84 63.93 -19.62 -13.85*** -6.53*** 
2003 7.48*** 51.72*** 89.52*** 147.75* 127.17** -828.95 -37.19* -9.50*** 
2004 6.17*** 58.89*** 116.19*** -60.89 89.25* -8.66 -10.48** -7.34*** 
2005 8.02*** 64.40*** 126.28*** 53.22 138.43** -17.76 -13.04*** -8.01*** 
2006 9.50*** 74.76*** 546.66 -82.62* 3.56 40.89 16.21 -8.53*** 
2007 9.14*** 48.59*** 112.73** -1504.07 181.09 -8.85 -5.27 -4.54*** 
2008 15.38*** 48.74*** 207.29** -59.02* 0.29 -12.63*** -4.45 -11.18*** 
2009 6.21*** 26.76*** -8.41 -30.6 9625.58 -12.64** -1.78 -9.11*** 
2010 4.36*** 22.61** 488.27* -4.18 -0.1 -4.7 -72.21 -7.71*** 
2011 2.77 -2.56 105.66** -219.82 117.72 11.49 18.48 11.16 
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Energy Only 
 
Year MV TA NetSales NI ETR NTA NTA/TA CFVol CapEx/TA Depre/TA Lev LCStage 
1999 78.36 82.95 -3.46 9.35 -35.68*** 67.85 0.02 -9.88 -10.35 2.55 -20.01 -0.14 
2000 76.52* 20.84 12.53 24.66** -38.25*** 92.98* 0.02** -0.66 -5.04 2.72 -9.85** 0.14 
2001 142.72 411.92** 80.87** 23.57* -28.10*** 281.65** 0.02*** -0.76 -11.93*** 1.48 -10.67*** 0.38* 
2002 356.59*** 536.83*** 124.34*** 32.54** -31.74*** 324.49*** 0 -5.17*** -10.72*** -0.1 1.55 -0.09 
2003 452.57*** 629.25*** 98.55*** 45.11*** -19.53*** 322.36*** 0 -22.56 -6.98* 1.76 1.94 0.03 
2004 487.95*** 705.85*** 187.05*** 47.37*** -31.95*** 359.83*** 0 -2.01*** -2.46 0.6 2.55 -0.05 
2005 646.69*** 676.30*** 256.43*** 99.63*** -27.87*** 345.19*** -0.01* -1750.23 -14.42*** 0.21 4.18* 0.31*** 
2006 750.67*** 872.19*** 258.86*** 58.94** -21.34*** 517.48*** -0.01* -1241.55 -12.28*** 1.06* 5.89** 0.41*** 
2007 641.52 1028.86*** 401.73*** 10.75 20.01 478.00*** -0.01*** -2.80*** -13.99*** 0.84 9.17*** 0.39*** 
2008 477.56** 751.2 388.56** 89.94** -19.71*** 398.39 -0.01*** -2.88*** -11.19*** -1.41 12.50*** 0.75*** 
2009 1334.22*** 1616.98*** 342.68*** 8.68 -23.59*** 558.88** -0.02** -2.20** -9.77*** 0.97 18.26*** 0.28* 
2010 1141.12* 1665.23* 402.55*** 16.09 -28.63*** 1001.91* 0 -2.56** -3.97* 1.4 13.52** 0.60** 
2011 1108.84 1715.96 -1.71 79.49 8.05 -310.83 -0.04 -6.13 1.82 -0.3 47.00* 0 
 
Year DY DivPayoutSh CommonDiv/NI Chg_EBITDA Chg_NetSales Chg_TA ROE ROA 
1999 14.01***   311.48** -37.18 32.93 -12.61 -1.67 -5.22 
2000 16.97***   123.80*** -8.98 -9.43 -16.07 -10.63 3.94 
2001 13.54*** 94.85 199.30*** 4.57 4.91 46.41 -30.12** -8.76 
2002 10.27*** 63.29 1212.25 -28.92 -8.03 -25.1 -7.89** -3.04* 
2003 10.26*** 31.57** 141.61*** -608.56 14286.76 13.24 -6.48 -2.8 
2004 9.98*** 46.78*** 159.52*** -158.22 -91.67 37.81* -9.21 -1.55 
2005 8.99*** 50.51*** 290.59** -4574.27 51.73 -66.99** 0.07 -2.43 
2006 13.28*** 66.58*** 154.89*** -439.45* -361.67** -60.13*** -10.94 -7.03* 
2007 10.64*** 75.64*** 168.45*** 648.22 -21.78** -2472.36 -4.98 -4.92* 
2008 14.31*** 58.70*** 90.64*** -176.71 -59.58*** -30.08** -6.5 -3.2 
2009 6.46*** 60.67*** 223.59*** 45.34 -305.35 -16.88** 4.89 -2.15 
2010 4.62*** 28.67 144.88*** 5.94 -2658.33 -175.96 -4.28 -3.09 
2011 2.27 27.08 24.06 24.46 1.52 -0.79 15.71 -0.44 
 
This table reports the differences in the characteristics of non-REIT income trusts versus matched corporations by years. Variable definitions can be found in the 
Appendix. Significance of the means of the differences for each year is tested using a t-test.  
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Consequently, our analysis of the difference in accounting data suggests that most 
firms adopting the income trust structure were different from the regular equities and 
were suited to the structure. Consistent with behavioral finance we find that the suitability 
of the firms to this structure was decreasing over our sample period. This is consistent 
with the assumption that rational managers will view the valuation premium of this 
structure and therefore use it as much as possible when going public or considering 
making some of their assets public. In an efficient market, investors will recognize this. 
Even though there is a premium for income trusts due to the tax advantage, the reasons 
for an additional premium would be decreasing over time as the quality of firms for the 
income trust structure (as indicated by some of the features viewed as important for the 
optimal income trust structure) was decreasing, its novelty was decreasing, and the 
premium for liquidity would be decreasing. Since we see the valuation premium 
decreasing as our income trusts become less suited for the structure, this suggests that 
investors are rational and markets are efficient in valuing these firms. Since the valuation 
premium by 2006 is similar to the size of the tax advantages, it appears that at least part 
of the valuation premium must be coming from other sources. These results therefore 
suggest that researchers should proceed down several avenues to determine the identity of 
the factors which may influence how investors value assets, especially in a new asset 
class, and how this may (or may not) change over time.  
3.6.3 Regression Results on Valuation Premium 
We examine the sources of valuation premium by testing the following model, which 
explains the higher in trusts’ valuation ratios compared to those of matched firms using 
the higher in effective tax rates and differences in other factors related to the suitability of 
a firm for the income trust structure. 
 
Dif Valuation Multiplesi,t = a1 + b1 * Dif ETRi,t  
+ c1 *Dif CFVoli,t + c2 * Dif CommonDiv/NI i,t + c3 * Dif ROEi,t 
+ c4 * Dif NTA/TA i,t + c5 * Dif CapEx/TA i,t + c6 * Dif Depre/TAi,t  
+ c7 * Dif Levi,t + c8 * Dif LCStagei,t + c9 * Dif Sizei,t  
+ d1 * Sectori + εi,t (1) 
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where Dif ETRi,t is the effective tax rate of trust i minus that of the matched firm in year 
t. The effective tax rates are capped at zero. The remaining factors represent the 
differences between the values for the income trusts and their matched sample with 
respect to the factors believed to be related to the success of a firm taking on the income 
trust structure. Sectori include dummies for the sector of the income trust i, which is also 
the sector of the matched firm. Because there are multiple observations for the same firm 
over time, our standard errors are pooled for each firm to account for the decrease in 
independence between observations for the same firm over time. 
Table 3-4 reports the results for Model 1 which compares the valuation for 
business and energy income trusts versus the entire matched sample. While we expect 
that income trusts that have lower effective tax rates than the matched sample would have 
larger valuation premiums, which would be evidenced by negative coefficients of Dif 
ETRi,t , we do not find the expected results. This suggests that the differences in effective 
tax rate do not play a clear role in explaining the valuation premium. Factors related to 
the suitability of the income trust structure are found to play a role in determining the 
higher valuation of income trusts compared to matched corporations. Income trusts with 
more tangible assets and lower depreciation have a higher valuation premium. The 
evidence for other characteristics is mixed with the coefficients changing with different 
valuation multiples. In summary, those results suggest that other factors besides income 
tax can have a role in determining the higher valuation of income trusts compared to their 
matched corporations. 
We obtain the residuals from this regression every year and replot them in Figure 
3-5b. This unexplained portion of the valuation premium exhibits a pattern corresponding 
to the life cycle of the income trust structure for the group of business trusts. The 
unexplained portion peaks in early 2000s and fades in 2005. This suggests that factors 
other than tax and changes in accounting characteristics matter in the valuation premium 
of income trusts early in the income trust structure life cycle. 
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Table 3-4: Explaining Valuation Premium using Differences in Characteristics between Income Trusts and Matched 
Corporations 
 Business  Energy  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 EV/EBITDA P/E MTB QRatio EV/EBITDA P/E MTB QRatio 
Dif ETR -0.0400 0.377 -0.00194 -0.00107 0.0302 0.566*** 0.00296 -0.000558 
 (-1.55) (1.47) (-0.40) (-0.44) (1.21) (2.83) (0.32) (-0.10) 
Dif CFVol 0.00117* -0.00724** -0.000420*** 0.0000168 -0.000179*** -0.00102*** -0.0000502*** -0.0000252*** 
 (1.81) (-2.42) (-3.60) (0.28) (-4.42) (-3.98) (-4.05) (-3.68) 
Dif CommonDiv/NI -0.000171*** 0.115** -0.0000164* -0.0000194*** -0.00193 -0.0438 -0.00156 0.0000380 
 (-3.79) (2.19) (-1.72) (-2.75) (-0.39) (-1.12) (-0.87) (0.04) 
Dif ROE -0.00691*** -0.0324*** 0.0317*** 0.0191*** -0.0420** -0.392*** 0.0598*** 0.0319*** 
 (-3.09) (-3.56) (4.99) (3.99) (-2.30) (-3.95) (7.20) (5.72) 
Dif NTA/TA 0.0543*** 0.236 0.00474*** 0.00378*** 0.0730*** 0.156 0.0282*** 0.0202*** 
 (8.23) (1.29) (3.80) (2.74) (3.21) (1.60) (3.74) (4.36) 
Dif CapEx/TA 0.124* 0.433 0.0322*** 0.0181*** 0.00623 -0.0314 0.0125 0.0108 
 (1.73) (1.44) (2.96) (3.35) (0.22) (-0.20) (1.12) (1.47) 
Dif Depre/TA -0.693** -0.271 -0.0683** -0.0403** -0.568*** -0.185 -0.171*** -0.110*** 
 (-2.62) (-0.47) (-2.36) (-2.26) (-4.77) (-0.35) (-5.23) (-3.96) 
Dif Lev 0.0905*** 0.640* -0.00722 -0.0111*** 0.00972 0.161 -0.0298** -0.0253*** 
 (3.32) (1.96) (-1.35) (-4.36) (0.32) (0.75) (-2.39) (-3.23) 
Dif LCStage -1.468** -4.373 -0.188* -0.0709 -0.284 0.554 -0.0714 0.0428 
 (-2.30) (-1.56) (-1.96) (-1.52) (-0.51) (0.19) (-0.34) (0.31) 
Dif Chg_NetSales -0.00327 -0.00116 -0.000751* -0.000273 0.00000894*** -0.0000198 0.00000119 0.00000151** 
 (-1.23) (-0.23) (-1.92) (-1.31) (3.44) (-1.12) (1.16) (2.07) 
Dif Net Sales 0.000369 -0.00232 0.000202*** 0.000102*** -0.00350*** -0.0193*** -0.00123*** -0.000645*** 
 (1.56) (-1.38) (3.88) (2.99) (-2.76) (-2.85) (-2.86) (-3.07) 
Constant -0.235 -13.33* 0.148 0.0314 0.413 11.14 0.397 0.0528 
 (-0.22) (-1.82) (0.93) (0.43) (0.39) (1.59) (1.09) (0.24) 
N 254 250 242 246 137 141 137 135 
adj. R2 0.239 0.204 0.249 0.291 0.304 0.172 0.401 0.434 
We examine which factors influence the higher valuation of a trust compared to the valuation of matched firms. We focus on the difference in effective tax rate 
and the factors believed to be important for firms suited to the trust structure. We estimate Model (1) using valuations based on the differences (higher) in the raw 
values of EV/EBITDA, EV/Sales, P/E, Market-to-Book, and Tobin’s Q of income trusts versus their matched corporations. The model is estimated separately for 
business versus energy income trusts. Variable definitions can be found in the Appendix. We exclude the top and bottom 2% of the dependent variables to 
mitigate the impact of outliers.  
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Figure 3-6: Market Reactions to Changes in Tax Regulations 
 
a) Market reaction around the September 2005 announcement by types  
 
 
b) Market reaction around the November 2005 announcement by types 
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c) Market reaction around the Halloween Massacre (October 2006 announcement) by types 
 
 
 
These figures illustrate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around tax policies related events. The prices 
are based on the prices of the income trusts obtained during the relevant periods in Datastream. The three 
periods are based on announcements negatively impacting income trusts in September 2005 (suspending 
advance tax rulings on new income trusts), positively impacting income trusts in late November 2005 
(allowing the tax rulings to begin again), and negatively impacting income trusts in October 2006 (the 
removal of the tax advantage for non-REIT income trusts). 
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3.6.4 Reaction to the Tax-Related Announcements 
We assume the value of firms that are less suited to the income trust structure will be 
most significantly impacted by the Tax Fairness Plan announcement on October 31, 
2006. Specifically, the idea is that firms that are not well-suited to the income trust 
structure are less able to provide reliable, stable cash flows to their investors. These firms 
were issued as income trusts to take advantage of the valuation boost provided to income 
trusts and the tax advantages provided to income trusts but may not have had a 
sufficiently strong structure to be top quality income trusts. There were many examples 
of firms becoming income trusts but having a model requiring significant capital 
expenditures. Since the income trust structure is designed to allow only minimal re-
investment in the company and growth, these firms were not ideally suited to the 
structure. In many instances, their ability to survive outside of this structure was therefore 
questionable. Consequently, we examine whether investor reaction to the TFP 
announcement was related to this as well. 
In Figure 3-6, we can see the market reaction to positive and negative 
announcements. In Figures 3-6a and 3-6c, we see how threats of changes to the tax 
advantage of income trusts caused both a decrease in the valuation in 3-6a and the 
removal of the discount in 3-6c. The gradual decline in valuation in Figure 3-6a is 
consistent with the gradual nature of the threat to income trusts being revealed to the 
markets. It is interesting to see that the fall in value over the period in the Fall of 2005 
was about 20 per cent (similar to the drop in October 2006), but the size of the rebound in 
November 2005 was less than the loss (note: the loss was eventually all earned back). 
The size of the rebound suggests that markets were not entirely convinced that the tax 
advantages of income trusts were truly safe.  
Since the results in Figure 3-6 indicate differences in how the market reacted for 
business, energy, and real estate income trusts, it is important to see if there are other 
factors the market considers in determining how to react to this news. We see that the 
negative reaction to the announcement was less for firms that became trusts earlier in the 
sample. There was little difference in reaction if the firm had been a regular equity firm 
before converting or did an IPO to become a trust. The market did appear to be able to 
forecast the ultimate fate for each trust, and it did appear to influence the size of the 
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market reaction to the announcement. Overall, these results are suggestive that traders 
viewed the firms becoming trusts earlier in the sample as being less sensitive to this 
announcement and those which were going to be kept as independent entities but 
converting to equities as being the most sensitive to the loss of the tax advantage. 
These results provide evidence that there are other factors which we should 
consider in evaluating the valuation premium for income trusts. There is clearly a tax 
advantage, but the influence of these other factors on how investors value income trusts 
after negative shocks indicates that markets incorporate many different sources of 
information when valuing stocks—fundamental and potentially behavioral. 
To more formally examine these questions, we estimate a model with the 
dependent variable as the market reaction, which is the cumulative abnormal return for 
different event windows (event date 1, 2 and 10 days).26  
 
Market Reactioni,t = a1 + b2 * ETRi,t-1  
+ c1 *CFVoli,t-1 + c2 * CommonDiv/NI i,t-1 + c3 * ROEi,t-1  
+ c4 * NTA/TA i,t-1 + c5 * CapEx/TAi,t-1 + c6 * Depre/TAi,t-1  
+ c7 * Levi,t-1 + c8 * LCStagei,t-1 + c9 * Sizei,t-1  
+ e1 * Acquired Post-2006i + εi,t (3) 
 
with explanatory variables as defined in Model (1) and (2) and measured in the year 
before the events. Effective tax rates are capped at zero. The accounting data are taken in 
the year before the events. Acquired Post-2006i is the dummy for whether the income 
trust was eventually acquired after 2006. This variable is the actual measure of whether 
an income trust could survive outside of the trust structure.  
                                               
26 The abnormal return calculation uses November 1, 2006 as the event date. An estimation window from 
the trading day -200 to trading day -16 is used to estimate the market beta for income trusts. The model 
estimated is Ri,t = ai + bi*MKTt + εi,t (2), where Ri,t is the return of the income trust i on day t; MKTt is the 
changes of the S&P TSX index on day t.  
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Table 3-5: Characteristics to Explain Market Reaction for Income Trusts to Events 
 
 Sep 2005 Nov 2005 Oct 2006 
 CAR (0,0) CAR (0,0) CAR (0,0) CAR (0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (0,10) 
Acquired Post-2006 -0.106 -1.206* 2.012** 3.523*** 2.303** 5.641*** 
 (-0.31) (-1.74) (2.44) (2.95) (2.31) (3.39) 
ETR -0.000218 0.0353 0.114** 0.169** 0.187*** 0.235** 
 (-0.01) (1.10) (2.34) (2.40) (3.18) (2.40) 
CFVol -40.22 -14.33 -54.45 6.634 -58.85 427.5 
 (-0.65) (-0.12) (-0.37) (0.03) (-0.33) (1.45) 
CommonDiv/NI 0.000354 0.00736*** -0.000143 0.000873 0.00548 -0.00579 
 (0.30) (3.04) (-0.03) (0.13) (0.95) (-0.60) 
ROE 0.0158 0.0171 0.0289 0.0286 0.0417 0.00890 
 (1.34) (0.74) (1.24) (0.84) (1.48) (0.19) 
NTA/TA 0.0137 0.0126 0.0595* 0.0568 0.0901** 0.0607 
 (1.02) (0.70) (1.88) (1.24) (2.35) (0.95) 
CapEx/TA 0.000241 -0.0226 0.0604 0.0170 -0.0165 -0.0573 
 (0.01) (-0.68) (1.23) (0.24) (-0.28) (-0.58) 
Depre/TA 0.0378 -0.168* -0.0296 -0.151 -0.159 -0.465* 
 (0.80) (-1.79) (-0.24) (-0.85) (-1.08) (-1.89) 
Lev -0.0156 0.00291 0.0869** 0.0760 0.0813* 0.235*** 
 (-1.09) (0.11) (2.18) (1.31) (1.68) (2.92) 
LCStage -0.498* 0.793 0.297 0.233 0.0422 1.798 
 (-1.68) (1.31) (0.43) (0.23) (0.05) (1.29) 
Size  -0.0142 -0.195 0.226 0.0316 0.168 -0.842 
 (-0.10) (-0.66) (0.67) (0.06) (0.41) (-1.23) 
D_REIT 0.280 -3.183*** 8.595*** 12.72*** 10.34*** 18.55*** 
 (0.48) (-2.70) (5.29) (5.41) (5.26) (5.67) 
Constant 1.468 2.615 -20.73*** -24.38*** -23.33*** -29.06*** 
 (0.87) (0.90) (-5.13) (-4.16) (-4.77) (-3.57) 
N 111 112 137 137 137 137 
adj. R2 -0.011 0.155 0.336 0.289 0.308 0.410 
 
Three events are examined: 08 Sep 2005, 23 Nov 2006, and October 31, 2006 announcements. All income 
trusts use the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR %) for windows 0, 1, 2 or 10 days around the 
announcements. These are estimated using Model (2). Size is the log of Net Sales. All variables except for 
the dummy for being acquired post-2006 event (Acquired Post-2006) are measured in the year before the 
event. Variable definitions can be found in the Appendix. 
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Table 3-5 reports the results for Model 3. Firstly, we find that income trusts 
paying more income tax in 2005 are less impacted by the TFP announcement in October 
2006, which is expected. We find that the market reaction is most sensitive to some 
accounting factors—tangibility, leverage, and the percentage depreciation but especially 
sensitive to both whether the firm was a REIT and the ultimate fate of the income trust. 
We continue to find a role played by leverage (likely less negative reaction as these firms 
are tax avoiders so the tax consequences for them are lower) more negative for firms 
using more depreciation (likely due to the nature of their assets being more suited for the 
income trust structure where the use of depreciation allows for investment in growth 
while paying minimal taxes). The sensitivity to the ultimate fate of the trust for both the 
events in 2005 and 2006 suggests that markets are efficient in identifying what firms will 
do in the future and pricing this into their reaction to news and other significant 
exogenous events. The role of being acquired is interesting as a less negative reaction for 
these firms indicates the market was pricing in the fact that their assets were such that 
they would continue to find valuable opportunities later, possible being purchased by 
financial partners.  
In additional analyses reported in Table 3-6, we also consider ownership 
information due to the role played by institutional owners as well as industry dummies, 
percentage of assets spun-off from a corporation when an income trust was formed from 
a part of a business, and the year it became a trust. Following Doidge and Dyck (2015) 
we consider the effect of different owner types as the investors for the firm in the future. 
The type of owner is related to the size of the tax advantage enjoyed by trusts, and it is 
also important to understand the value or costs of the tax changes on the firm, not only 
the investors. For example, the tax implications of the change in taxes applied to income 
trusts would have been greatest for tax exempt investors for whom the change would 
mean a decrease in their return of roughly 30 per cent whereas the change in return would 
have been much lower for a regular Canadian investor (see the Appendix for a 
discussion). The percentage of assets spun-off from original business may matter since if 
an income trust has been formed as a selective part of a business, there can be a higher 
chance that its assets are more suitable to the trust structure. This will impact the 
valuation once the trust structure is no longer available to the firm. We also hypothesize 
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that income trusts that have been formed earlier are better suited to the trust structure. We 
do not find any of those additional variables to be important, and our results for other 
factors remain largely the same. 
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Table 3-6: Additional Checks on Market Reactions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
D_100Assets 1.345    
 (0.74)    
Become Trust Btw 02 and 04 vs. Bf 02  -1.606   
  (-1.60)   
Become Trust Af 04 vs. Bf 02  -1.777   
  (-1.14)   
Inst Own   -0.0391  
   (-1.23)  
Acquired Post-2006 2.184 2.074** 1.964** 2.171** 
 (1.48) (2.50) (2.40) (2.61) 
ETR 0.111 0.120** 0.135*** 0.117** 
 (0.84) (2.32) (2.88) (2.43) 
CFVol -187.8 -40.00 -55.59 23.70 
 (-0.57) (-0.27) (-0.39) (0.16) 
CommonDiv/NI 0.00386 -0.0000364 0.00392 -0.000804 
 (0.37) (-0.01) (0.84) (-0.17) 
ROE 0.0289 0.0282 0.0365 0.0211 
 (0.73) (1.20) (1.60) (0.86) 
NTA/TA 0.0597 0.0435 0.0748** 0.0517 
 (0.89) (1.28) (2.44) (1.61) 
CapEx/TA 0.0632 0.0583 0.0663 0.0360 
 (0.69) (1.19) (1.36) (0.70) 
Depre/TA -0.206 -0.0357 -0.0546 0.0139 
 (-0.68) (-0.29) (-0.46) (0.10) 
Lev 0.108 0.0727* 0.0744* 0.0933** 
 (1.26) (1.77) (1.88) (2.35) 
LCStage 0.812 0.186 0.686 0.328 
 (0.55) (0.26) (1.00) (0.47) 
Size -0.127 0.0285 0.382 0.117 
 (-0.19) (0.08) (1.14) (0.33) 
D_REIT  8.130*** 9.162***  
  (4.93) (5.79)  
Constant -21.24** -17.03*** -23.74*** -19.07*** 
 (-2.65) (-3.56) (-5.95) (-3.94) 
Sector Dummy N N N Y 
N 52 137 127 137 
adj. R2 -0.126 0.340 0.399 0.378 
 
We check for the role of institutional owners, industry dummies, percentage of assets spun-off from a 
corporation when an income trust was formed from a part of a business, and the year it became a trust in 
explaining the abnormal return of the day of the TFP announcement (CAR(0,0) on Nov 1, 2006 (%)). Size 
is the log of Net Sales. All variables except for the dummy for being acquired post 2006 event (Acquired 
Post-2006) are measured in 2005. Variable definitions can be found in the Appendix. 
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3.7 Conclusions 
The preliminary analyses presented in this study suggest some interesting potential 
contributions to the literature in both behavioral corporate finance and asset pricing. 
These contributions raise some questions for further investigation which we continue to 
examine. The contributions start with our documentation of a valuation premium for 
firms adopting the income trust structure. Most of the existing studies focusing on income 
trusts (e.g., Amoako-Adu and Smith (2008), Doidge and Dyck (2015)) have examined 
which characteristics appear to be able to explain the market reaction to the October 2006 
announcement, but little time has been spent studying which factors, beyond taxes, are 
related to the income trust valuation premium and thus what factors could explain the size 
of the market reaction to the announcement for our set of firms. Looking only at the 
valuation premium near the end of the income trust life cycle, there is little remaining 
evidence of the significant valuation which motivated so many firms to adopt this 
structure, so these studies do not consider factors beyond taxes as the motivation for 
income trusts having been so attractive to managers.  
Our study demonstrates that there are interesting forces at play which go beyond 
taxes to explain what factors are valued by investors in relation to income trusts. 
Specifically, we find a substantial valuation premium which decreases over time. 
Although over the entire sample period we find a role played by factors related to the 
suitability of the firm for the income trust structure, the results indicate the presence of 
other factors. When we look at the stability of the relationships over time, we see how the 
premiums decrease, and we therefore attribute part of the size of the premium to a 
premium paid by investors for the liquidity provided to investors by the regular 
distribution payments of trusts and the novelty of this structure. Both of these decrease 
over time, especially as the quality of firms entering the market using this structure 
started to deteriorate—managers were rationally observing how investors were valuing 
the characteristics of this structure and thus adopted it to obtain the higher valuation. 
To formally examine the sources of the premiums, we examine the role of several 
factors in the size of the premium and how this changes over the life cycle of income 
trusts. We also find that the deterioration in the characteristics of the income trusts 
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believed to be important for their survival corresponds to a large portion of the decrease 
in the valuation premium. This suggests that there was, in fact, a premium for income 
trusts beyond that for the increased tax efficiency of this structure. Though we cannot 
confirm whether it is for liquidity, it is a plausible explanation. In our analysis of the 
market reaction to different events, we do not find evidence of these factors playing a role 
at the end of the sample.  
Since our results suggest that some firms were better suited for the income trust 
structure than others and this led to differences in the size of the valuation premium 
across firms, we also examine the relationship between the market reaction to the October 
2006 announcement that income trusts would be losing their preferential tax treatment. 
For firms that were less ideally suited to the income trust structure we would expect the 
market reaction to be larger than for those which were better suited—those firms which 
took advantage of the structure for the higher valuation may have been lower quality 
firms. Consequently, we examine the relationship between our factors measuring income 
trust suitability and the market reaction. We find significant differences in market 
reaction based on some, but not all, of the key characteristics.  
Looking at the final stages of the income trust life cycle, we also consider the 
ultimate fate for our income trusts once the preferential tax treatment has ended. Some 
trusts were able to convert to regular equity firms on their own, some were acquired by 
other trusts, and then the new, larger, entity converted; others were purchased by private 
equity or strategic partners and taken private, while other firms failed. Here we find 
evidence that the market reaction was impacted by the trust’s ultimate fate. Consequently, 
it appears that investors are able to rationally value firms and their valuation depends on 
different, rational factors. Similarly, managers observe this behavior and correspondingly 
make their decisions regarding different financial decisions based on what they observe. 
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Appendix 3-A: Variable Definition 
 
Variable Description 
CapEx/TA (%) Capital Expenditure/Total Assets 
CFVol (%) Cash Flow Volatility, calculated as standard deviation of operating cash over total assets (expressed in %) in the previous five years. 
Chg_EBITDA (%) EBITDA Growth, calculated as (EBITDA(n)-EBITDA(n-1))/EBITDA(n-1) 
Chg_NetSales (%) Net Sales Growth, calculated as (Net Sales(n)-Net Sales(n-1))/Net Sales(n-1) 
Chg_TotalAssets (%) Total Assets Growth, calculated as (Total Assets(n)-Total Assets(n-1))/Total Assets(n-1) 
Depre/TA (%) Depreciation, calculated as Depreciation, Depletion, and Amortization/Total Assets 
DivPayoutSh (%) Dividend payout per share, calculated as Dividend per Share/Earnings Per Share 
CommonDiv/NI (%) Payout Ratio, calculated as Common Dividend as percentage of Net Income 
DY (%) Dividend Yield 
ETR (%) Effective Tax Rate, calculated as 100*Income Tax/Pretax Income, capped at 0, exclude negative Pretax Income 
EV/EBITDA 
Enterprise Value/EBITDA, calculated as (Market Value + Total Liabilities)/EBITDA, exclude 
negative EBITDA 
EV/Sales Enterprise Value/Net Sales Ratio, calculated as (Market Value + Total Liabilities)/Net Sales 
P/E Price/Earnings Ratio=Price per Share/EPS, exclude negative EPS 
Inst Own (%) Institutional Ownership, which is the total percentage of shares held by investment banks, institutions, government, pension funds, or another company 
LCStage 
Life Cycle Stage. 1=Introduction, 2=Growth, 3=Mature, 4=ShakeOut, and 5=Decline. (Life 
cycle stage is calculated using cash flows categorization method in Dickinson, 2011). 
Lev (%) Leverage, calculated as Total Debt/Total Assets 
MV ($mil) Market Value 
NI ($mil) Net Income 
Net Sales ($mil) Net Sales  
NTA ($mil) Net Tangible Assets 
NTA/TA (%) Net Tangible Assets/Total Assets 
R&D (%) R&D/Net Sales 
TA ($mil) Total Assets  
D_REIT Dummy equals 1 for REIT and 0 otherwise. 
Dif CFVol (%) Difference in Cash Flow Volatility between Trust and Matched Corporation 
Dif ETR (%) Difference in Effective Tax Rate between Trust and Matched Corporation 
Dif Div Yield (%) Difference Dividend Yield between Trust and Matched Corporation 
Dif Tangibility (%) Difference in Tangibility between Trust and Matched Corporation 
Dif CapEx (%) Difference in Capital Expenditure between Trust and Matched Corporation 
Dif Depreciation (%) Difference in Depreciation between Trust and Matched Corporation 
Dif Leverage (%) Difference in Leverage between Trust and Matched Corporation 
Dif LCStage Difference in Life Cycle Stage between Trust and Matched Corporation 
Dif Size ($mil) Difference in Net Sales 
Size Log of Net Sales ($mil) 
CAR (%) Cumulative Abnormal Returns, calculated using the CAPM model with changes in the S&P 
TSX Index as the market returns 
Acquired Post-2006 Dummy for if an income trust was subsequently acquired after the TFP 
  
 
Appendix 3-B: Life Cycle Stage Classification 
 
 Intro Growth Mature Shake-
Out 
Shake-
Out 
Shake-
Out 
Decline Decline 
CF Operating - + + - + + - - 
CF Investing - - - - + + + + 
CF Financing + + - - + - + - 
 
Following Dickinson (2011), this table explains how the life cycle stage is defined based on the signs of the 
cash flows. 
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Appendix 3-C: Taxes and Income Trusts 
To provide a better understanding of the tax situation for income trusts, below are some 
examples using federal and provincial taxes to compare the magnitude of the tax 
revenues generated by the government for income trusts relative to standard corporations 
and how they depend on the type of shareholder.  
We will start with the tax situation for a regular corporation. If we start by 
assuming the corporation earns $1 of pre-tax income, we can demonstrate the amount the 
government receives and the investors receive very simply. Since the tax rates differ 
across the provinces, we would need to identify the location in which each corporation is 
carrying on business in Canada. The tax rate also depends on whether the corporation 
was a Canadian-controlled private corporation, the type of income earned, and the 
province in which the income was earned. The following explanation gives an idea of the 
tax situations for companies: a publicly traded corporation operating exclusively in 
Ontario faced a tax rate of approximately 36 per cent during our sample period. The rates 
across Canada in 2005 varied from a low of 31 per cent in Quebec to a high of 39 per 
cent in Saskatchewan. Everything is much simpler for income trusts as an income trust 
would have paid no taxes regardless of its location. This means the regular corporation 
would have between $0.69 and $0.61 to distribute to its investors, if it chose to, and the 
income trusts would have $1 to distribute to investors. (Note: the income trust must 
distribute the majority of this to its investors whereas the regular corporation can choose 
whether to distribute any of the remaining income to its investors or to re-invest it in the 
company.)  
Using the 36 per cent corporate tax rate for Ontario, we will look at the tax 
implications for different types of investors. Starting with foreign investors (say someone 
from the United States), if it was a regular corporation and paid all of its post-tax profits 
to the investors, they would receive a $0.64 dividend. U.S. investors would pay a 15 per 
cent withholding tax of $0.10 so $1 of pre-tax earnings was worth $0.54 to a U.S. 
investor. An income trust would not have to pay any corporate tax so that $1 could be 
fully paid out to the investors. A U.S. investor would therefore have to pay the 
withholding tax ($0.15 in withholding tax) so $1 of pre-tax earnings was worth $0.85 
after all taxes were paid in Canada. If the U.S. investor was a non-taxable entity, no 
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further tax was due in the United States but the withholding tax could not be recovered. 
Taxable U.S. investors could recover the withholding tax but owed personal taxes. Most 
trusts were treated as a foreign corporation for U.S. federal income tax purposes—
distributions were treated as dividends and were subject to the same tax rate as dividends 
paid by a Canadian corporation. 
For individual Canadian investors, the distributions from the income trusts were 
treated as regular income, so they were taxed at individual statutory rates: top statutory 
rates on individuals were 46 per cent in Ontario in 2005 and ranged from 39 per cent in 
Alberta to almost 49 per cent in Newfoundland and Labrador. This is where corporations 
and income trusts have some important differences. Individual Canadian investors 
receiving dividends from corporations did not pay tax on the entire amount of the 
dividends whereas they would pay tax on the entire amount of the distributions from the 
trusts. The government attempted to decrease the double taxation on the dividends from 
corporations to acknowledge the fact that dividends are paid from the corporation’s after-
tax income (i.e., the corporation has already paid some tax on their profits). The tax 
credits provided by the government for the taxes already paid on corporate profits means 
that dividends were taxed at a theoretical maximum rate of 31 per cent in Ontario. For 
investors in other provinces, the maximum rate ranged from 24 per cent in Alberta to 37 
per cent in Nova Scotia and in Newfoundland and Labrador. For public corporations that 
owned shares, dividends were exempt from taxation (that is, corporations received a 100 
per cent dividend deduction) so the only taxes were those paid by the corporation before 
distributing them to their investors. 
Assuming shareholders are 40 per cent regular Canadian individual investors, 40 
per cent are tax exempt Canadian individual or institutional investors, and 20 per cent are 
foreign investors, an idea of the tax implications of the income trust structure for the 
government is as follows: a corporation with $100 in income would pay 36% or $36. 
Trusts with $100 of income would pay no corporate taxes so $100 would flow through to 
the investors. After corrections for double taxation for the regular corporation, the 
Canadian individual investors in the highest tax bracket would pay 31 per cent on their 
$40 of the earnings (or $15.20), the tax-exempt investors would pay no taxes on their 
$40, and the foreign investors would pay a 15 per cent withholding tax on their $20 (or 
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$3). This means the government would receive the $36 plus $18.20 (about $54) from a 
corporation. For the income trust, the $40 to the regular investor would be taxed at their 
marginal rate which was slightly over 50 per cent in Ontario— or $20. There would be no 
taxes paid by the institutional shareholders (e.g., pension funds) and only the 15 per cent 
withholding tax for the U.S. investors—or the $3 as above. This means the government 
receives only $23 versus $54 per $100 of earnings for firms using the income trust 
structure versus a standard corporate structure. 
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Appendix 3-D: A Comparison with Industry Average 
To address the concern of imperfection in our matching method, we compare an income trust to the average 
firm in the same industry.  
 
 
 
Median Difference by Year in Effective Tax Rate between Trusts and Industry Median 
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Chapter 4  
4 Offshore Bonds and Maturity Diversification 
4.1 Introduction 
How firms manage the maturities of their debts is an important research topic in 
corporate financing that begins as early as Stiglitz (1974) and Myers (1977). An aspect of 
maturity management that has raised growing interest in the literature is maturity 
diversification. Scholars show that by spreading out maturities of debts across different 
ranges, firms can avoid rollover risk and better manage their financing (Norden, 
Roosenboom, and Wang, 2016, Gopalan, Song, and Yerramilli, 2015, and Choi, 
Hackbarth, and Zechner, forthcoming). 
In an internationalized financial market, it has been hypothesized that tapping the 
offshore bond market is a way firms can diversify the maturity structure of their bond 
profiles. By issuing into a larger and more complete market offshore, firms may 
complement domestic bonds with offshore bonds of different maturities than at home 
(Black and Munro, 2010). For example, in 2001, LG-Caltex Oil Corp, Korea’s second 
largest oil refiner at the time, issued a 300-million U.S. dollar denominated bond into the 
Euro/144A market. The bond was issued into the 10-year maturity, while pre-existing and 
new domestic bonds all had maturities of no more than 3 years.27 In 2015, Apple Inc. 
issued domestic U.S. bonds into the 2-, 5-, 7-, 10-, and 30-year maturity ranges. Yet, the 
firm was able to expand the maturity diversification of its bond profile further to cover 
middle maturity ranges (12-, 14-, 15-, 27-year) by borrowing from the European markets. 
Another example is La Poste SA, a French postal service firm that issued new offshore 
bonds into maturities of 5 and 7 years in 1992. Those maturities are shorter than what the 
firm has in its domestic bond book (7, 8, and 9 years) and are also shorter than what the 
                                               
27 The bond issue was thought as an attempt to lengthen the firm’s maturity profile: "This is not a company 
that needs to raise debt," an observer concludes. "But it is one that's keen to lengthen its maturity profile." 
(Finance Asia). In fact, during the period 1991-2015, South Korean firms borrow relatively short-term in 
the domestic market, with 61% of total dollar value of domestic bonds belonging to the 3-4 year maturity 
range (calculated from SDC Platinum data). 
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majority of French firms borrowed during 1991-2015.28 Those examples are illustrated in 
Figure 4-1 and demonstrate how the maturity structures of firms become more diverse 
after tapping offshore bond markets compared to if the firms issue only domestic bonds. 
This chapter aims to answer the research questions: How do firms manage maturity 
structure of their bond profiles with the presence of the offshore bond market? Is there a 
maturity diversification effect from issuing bonds offshore? 
How might accessing an offshore bond market provide firms with maturity 
diversification benefit? Internationally, different bond markets may have preferences for 
different bond maturities due to tastes of the investors as well as institutional, legal, and 
financial characteristics of the markets. The market segmentation theory to explain the 
yield curve by Culbertson (1957) and the preferred habitat theory by Modigliani and 
Sutch (1966) propose that there are separate markets for different maturities, with each 
maturity having its own supply and demand. Guibaud, Nosbusch, and Vayanos (2013) 
build a theory on clientele model of the yield curve and show that difference in median 
age of the population explains variation in average maturity of OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development) countries’ government debts. Roll (1971) 
views a diversified bond portfolio as one having bonds of different maturities and the 
separation in preferences could be caused by institutional and regulatory factors. Maturity 
structure has been shown by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), Giannetti (2003), 
Zheng et al. (2012), and Fan et al. (2012) to exhibit systematic differences across 
countries due to differences in countries’ financial market development, legal and 
institutional environment, and national culture. Furthermore, the cost of hedging in each 
different maturity can vary across currencies depending on availability of the government 
bond yield curves, making maturity availability specific to each market (Siegfried, 
Simeonova, and Vespro, 2007, Baker and Riddick, 2013).  
While enhancing maturity diversification of the bond profiles is a potential benefit 
that has been hypothesized in previous studies and there is early evidence that lends 
support to this hypothesis, a more thorough study employing different methods to 
                                               
28 Seventy-five per cent of bond value has been issued into the 9- to 20-year maturity range in France 
during 1991-2015 (author’s calculation from SDC Platinum data). 
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investigate the diversification effect may be worthwhile. Prior works have tested the 
maturity diversification hypothesis by comparing average maturities of offshore versus 
domestic bonds. Black and Munro (2010) find that offshore bonds tend to have longer 
maturity than bonds issued onshore. Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2003) also 
document that the proportion of debts with longer maturity is higher for international 
bonds than domestic debts. This evidence supports the diversification benefit by showing 
that firms borrowing in the offshore market get access to longer debt maturity range. 
However, looking only at the average maturity is a limited approach to tell whether there 
is a maturity diversification effect in issuing offshore bonds. For example, such results do 
not account for the case when firms diversify debt maturity structure by issuing offshore 
into the middle maturity ranges while issuing into the short and long ends of the maturity 
spectrum at home. In that case, diversification takes place; however, a comparison of 
average maturity between offshore and domestic bonds may not pick up the case. For the 
Apple Inc. example discussed earlier where offshore bonds diversify the maturity 
structure of domestic bonds in the middle maturity ranges, simply comparing average 
maturity of offshore bonds with that of domestic bonds will not convey enough 
information about possible maturity diversification effect. 
This study differs from the previous literature in at least two dimensions. While I 
also test the maturity diversification benefit hypothesis, I use more detailed data and 
employ methods that more specifically address potential maturity diversification effect 
compared with previous works on maturity of offshore bonds. My data with transaction 
details merged with firm characteristics control for other factors that could impact the 
maturity choice. I also use different measures of maturity diversification that may more 
accurately address the maturity diversification benefit. I look at the maturity structure of 
offshore bond issues at firm level in addition to average maturities of offshore bond 
issues at aggregate level compared to previous studies. This will allow the examination of 
potential maturity diversification effect in different maturity ranges. I also employ an 
identification strategy which includes the propensity matching method and difference-in-
difference to further the knowledge on potential maturity diversification effect. 
At the firm level, my study shows that throughout their lifetime, firms issue new 
offshore bonds with maturity structure similar to that of new domestic bonds. A higher 
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proportion of new domestic bonds issued into a maturity bin by a firm throughout the 
sample period is associated with a higher proportion of new offshore bonds issued by that 
firm into the same maturity bin. I also find that having new offshore bonds issued in a 
year is associated with a lower degree of maturity diversification (lower inverse of the 
Herfindahl index), whereas the opposite is true for having new domestic bonds issued in 
a year. Looking at all firm-year pairs in the sample (both those that use only the domestic 
bond markets and those that also use the offshore bond markets), I find that in the year a 
firm has offshore bonds outstanding, it has lower inverse of the Herfindahl index, which 
means a lower measure of maturity diversification. To control for selection bias where 
firms that choose to use the offshore bond markets are different from firms that never 
borrow offshore, I use a propensity score matching method to create a matched group of 
domestic-only U.S. firms to compare with U.S. firms that used the offshore bond market 
during the 2008 financial crisis. The crisis is used as a shock in a difference-in-difference 
analysis to examine whether firms that use the offshore bond market have higher maturity 
diversification than firms that never borrow offshore in case there is constraint in the 
domestic credit market. The difference-in-difference analysis does not reveal an impact 
of using the offshore bond market on the degree of maturity diversification post-crisis for 
U.S. firms. The above findings challenge the maturity diversification effect of offshore 
bonds. 
Nevertheless, I do find that for the subsample of firms that use the offshore bond 
markets, a firm has a higher inverse of the Herfindahl index in the years it has offshore 
bonds outstanding, meaning higher maturity diversification in those years. In order to 
find the sources of potential maturity diversification effect in the years a firm has 
offshore bonds outstanding and how firms choose maturity of new offshore bond issues, I 
look closely at how the maturity structures of new offshore, pre-existing offshore, pre-
existing domestic, and new domestic bonds of a firm in a year are related. I find that the 
proportions of outstanding offshore bonds (new and pre-existing) are negatively related 
to the proportions of outstanding domestic bonds (new and pre-existing) for the middle 
maturity ranges and not for the short or long ends of the maturity spectrum. In terms of 
how a firm chooses maturities of new offshore bonds, I also find that a firm is more likely 
to have high proportions of new offshore bonds issued into very short (very long) 
 140 
 
maturity if it has high proportions of pre-existing domestic, pre-existing offshore, and 
new domestic bonds in the very short (very long) maturity ranges. In other words, 
maturity diversification does not happen in the short and long ends of the maturity 
spectrum. A firm is more likely to diversify its maturity profile if it issues offshore bonds 
into the middle ranges of the maturity spectrum as the proportion of new offshore bonds 
are negatively related to the proportion of pre-existing domestic bonds in the middle 
maturity ranges. A plausible explanation is that large firms tend to borrow in the very 
short or very long maturity ranges at home (Guedes and Opler, 1996) and will continue to 
do so in the offshore market. Meanwhile, small firms may have higher proportions of 
bonds in the middle maturity ranges at home, while they borrow more in either the short 
or long maturity ranges in the offshore market. Therefore, it is possible that only smaller 
firms will enjoy maturity diversification benefit when borrowing in the offshore bond 
markets.  
This chapter therefore contributes to the literature in motivations to use the 
offshore bond market. Scholars have investigated various reasons why firms use the 
offshore bond market, which include the hedging motivation (Géczy, Minton, and 
Schrand, 1997, Allayannis and Ofek, 2001, Graham and Harvey, 2001, Bancel and 
Mittoo, 2002, Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper, 2003, Kedia and Mozumdar, 2003, 
Elliott, Huffman, Makar, 2003, and Aabo, Hansen and Muradoglu, 2013), tax (Graham 
and Harvey, 2001, Bancel and Mittoo, 2002, Desai, 1998, Panteghini, 2009), institutional 
constraint (Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper, 2004), market timing (Keloharju and 
Niskanen, 2001, Henderson et al., 2006, and McBrady and Schill, 2007), and maturity 
diversification (Black and Munro, 2010). Among them, the hedging and the maturity 
diversification motivations suggest different outcomes on how maturities of offshore 
bonds and domestic bonds are related. If the maturity diversification motivation is 
dominant in the choice of offshore bond maturity, one would expect firms to choose 
different maturity for offshore bonds compared to maturity of domestic bonds. In the 
survey of financial managers by Bancel and Mittoo (2002), firms tap the offshore bond 
market mostly to provide a natural hedge for their business and to keep the source close 
to the use of funds. Such motivations suggest that offshore bond maturity should not 
differ from what is issued domestically if the business offshore is the same as the 
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business at home. The empirical evidence suggests that there could be maturity 
diversification benefit from issuing offshore bonds; however, this is not a systemic 
phenomenon. Therefore, both the hedging and the maturity diversification motivations 
may play a role in bond maturity management in the offshore market. 
This chapter also contributes to the growing literature on bond maturity 
management and more specifically on the debt maturity profiles of firms. Choi, 
Hackbarth, and Zechner (forthcoming) show that firms actively manage their debt 
maturity profiles by issuing into maturity bins that have low proportions of pre-existing 
bonds remaining. My work adds to this literature by examining how firms manage their 
bond maturity profiles with the presence of the offshore bond market. The results suggest 
that firms that borrow offshore in general do not have a higher degree of maturity 
diversification compared to firms that borrow only domestically.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides a 
literature review for relevant papers to my study, specifically in the fields of offshore 
bond market and maturity structure management. Section 4.3 describes the data and 
variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4.4 develops the hypotheses for testing, 
which include the hypothesis about choice of maturity at issuance and the hypothesis 
about the degree of maturity diversification. Section 4.5 reports the results for the tests, 
where I examine how maturity at issuance differs between offshore versus domestic 
bonds, and how offshore bonds add to the degree of maturity diversification each year. 
Section 4.6 performs robustness checks. Section 4.7 concludes.  
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Figure 4-1: Examples on Maturity Structure of Offshore versus Domestic Bonds 
a. Maturity Structure of Bonds for Apple Inc. 2015 
 
 
 
In 2015, Apple Inc. issued new offshore bonds into maturities of 4,5,7,9, 12, 14, 15, and 27 years. Of those 
maturities, the 12-, 14-, 15-, and 27-year bonds diversify maturity structure of existing domestic bonds as 
well as new domestic bonds. Data source: SDC Platinum. 
 
Data: Apple Inc.’s New Bond Issuance in 2015 
Issuer Principal Amount ($mil) Currency Target Market Maturity 
Apple Inc 1938.875 STG Euro Public 14 
Apple Inc 6500 US United States 10 
Apple Inc 6500 US United States 5 
Apple Inc 1348.29 SFR Foreign Public 15 
Apple Inc 2009.5 Y Euro Private 5 
Apple Inc 6500 US United States 5 
Apple Inc 2256.318 EUR Euro Public 12 
Apple Inc 1646.775 AU Foreign Private 4 
Apple Inc 1646.775 AU Foreign Private 4 
Apple Inc 6500 US United States 7 
Apple Inc 8000 US United States 10 
Apple Inc 6500 US United States 30 
Apple Inc 8000 US United States 7 
Apple Inc 1348.29 SFR Foreign Public 9 
Apple Inc 8000 US United States 2 
Apple Inc 8000 US United States 2 
Apple Inc 8000 US United States 5 
Apple Inc 8000 US United States 5 
Apple Inc 1938.875 STG Euro Public 27 
Apple Inc 8000 US United States 30 
Apple Inc 2256.318 EUR Euro Public 9 
Apple Inc 1646.775 AU Foreign Private 7 
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b. Maturity Structure of Bonds for La Poste SA 1992 (French Firm) 
 
 
 
French firms used to borrow longer term in the domestic market compared to other countries. Most bonds 
(75% of total dollar amount) are issued into the 9-10-year and 11-20-year ranges. In 1992, La Poste SA had 
domestic bonds of 7-, 8-, and 9-year maturities. It issued new offshore bonds in shorter maturities (5- and 
7-year) compared to pre-existing and new domestic bonds, therefore diversifying the range of maturities in 
its bond maturity structure. 
 
 
c. Maturity Structure of Bonds for LG-Caltex Oil Corp 2001 (South Korean firm) 
 
 
As opposed to French firms, South Korean firms borrow short-term in the domestic market. Sixty-one per 
cent of total dollar value of domestic bonds belongs to the 3-4-year maturity range. When LG-Caltex Oil 
Corp, Korea’s second largest oil refiner at the time, issued new offshore bonds in 2001, it issued into the 
10-year maturity, while its pre-existing and new domestic bonds all had maturities of no more than 3 years. 
Therefore, offshore bonds helped diversify the maturity structure of LG-Caltex Oil Corp. In fact, for LG-
Caltex, all bonds of 10-year maturity at issuance are issued abroad, and all domestic bonds are issued into 
the 3-year maturity tranche. 
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4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Bond Maturity Determinants 
The maturity structure of corporate debts has been an established research topic at least 
since Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Stiglitz (1974). Early works such as Modigliani 
and Miller’s (1958) irrelevance proposition show that the choice among various financing 
options does not affect the value of a firm. Stiglitz (1974) extends Modigliani and 
Miller’s (1958) theory to show that the maturity structure of debt also does not matter for 
firm valuation. However, underlying the results in Modigliani and Miller (1958) and 
Stiglitz (1974) are assumptions that can be violated such as market completeness and 
imperfection. The theories include asset matching, agency conflict, signaling, information 
asymmetry, taxes, market timing, and recently the supply from the government bond 
market.  
Asset Matching 
The matching principle refers to the practice that firms tend to match the 
maturities of their assets and liabilities. Myers (1977) suggests that matching maturities 
could be explained by his theory of underinvestment by timing the maturity of debt to be 
the time when the assets start to decline in value. Therefore, agency theory can serve as 
the theoretical ground for the matching principle. Hart and Moore (1994) emphasize that 
the choice of debt maturity depends on the use of the debt; for example, long-term debt is 
associated with real-estate properties, whereas short-term debt is used for working capital 
purposes. Stohs and Mauer (1996) find that firms with longer-term asset maturity use 
more long-term debt. Emery (2001) models the choice of maturity of debts for a firm so 
as to match the demand for its products. The choice of short-term debt is to match 
production and sales to the demand of final goods. For example, if the demand for a 
firm’s product is cyclical, the debt and assets also follow the cyclical pattern. However, 
Mitchell (1991) finds no evidence that firms match debt to asset maturity. Guedes and 
Opler (1996) find that the matching theory is partly correct that firms issuing debts of 
longer than 30 years have longer asset lives than those issuing in maturities shorter than 
30 years, while asset lives among those issuing bonds shorter than 30 years do not exhibit 
a major difference. 
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Asymmetric Information and Signaling 
The asymmetric information theory assumes that the type of firms is known to the 
borrowers but not the lenders. The choice of maturity serves as a way to signal the type of 
firm. Myers and Majluf (1984) propose that the type of a firm is known only to the firm 
and not the investors; therefore, the firm will prefer the type of securities that the 
investors value most and the investors will rationally interpret the firm’s choice as a 
signal about its type. Fama (1980) suggests that maturity structure of a debt contract 
serves as a mechanism to lower monitoring costs since it reflects the determination to 
provide information, monitoring, and bonding. Therefore, it could be used as a signal 
about the type of borrower in the debt contract. Theoretical papers such as Flannery 
(1986), Robbins and Schatzberg (1986), Kale and Noe (1990), and Diamond (1991) 
concentrate on the role of information asymmetry between the borrowers and the lenders 
and debt maturity. When there is less information about the borrowers, short-term loans 
are used more because this is a way for good firms to signal their quality (Diamond, 
1991), or it can be that long-term debt is underpriced (Flannery, 1986).  
In Flannery’s model, good firms would prefer to borrow short-term debt. They 
think long-term debt is underpriced by investors since only bad firms who want to avoid 
transaction cost in issuing short-term debts will borrow long-term debts. Bad firms will 
borrow long-term debt since they save the refinancing cost and gain. That would lead to a 
separating equilibrium. However, if transaction cost is too high, even good firms will 
borrow long-term debts because the cost offsets the benefits of borrowing short-term. 
Therefore, a pooling equilibrium occurs when all firms borrow long-term. The 
implications from Flannery (1989) are that (1) debt is correlated with asset risk: the 
higher the risk of the debt, the higher the maturity and (2) the higher the information 
asymmetry, the more short-term debts firm issue since long-term debt would be more 
underpriced. However, without knowing the cost of issuing short term debts, the model is 
difficult to test. Diamond (1991) also models the choice of debt maturity using the 
asymmetric information explanation. There can be good firms or bad firms in the market, 
where good firms are more likely to be upgraded and bad firms are more likely to be 
downgraded at the end of one short-term debt contract. This is different from Flannery’s 
assumption that firms are concerned about long-term debt underpricing and transaction 
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cost. Good firms may prefer to issue short-term debt because they have higher credit 
rating improvement probability and thus can signal their quality through the short-term 
debt. However, they face the risk that they cannot refinance the debt for the next period 
(liquidity risk). Bad firms will always mimic the action of good firms since they don’t 
want to be uncovered about their type. The result is a pooling equilibrium where bad 
firms mimic good firms, and the choice of debt maturity of good firms depends on the 
probability that a random firm is a good firm. The implication from Diamond (1991) is 
that the relationship between maturity and firm performance is non-monotonic where the 
highly rated and the very low-rated firms borrow short-term debts. Only the middle-rated 
firms borrow long-term debt.  
  Empirical evidence by Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame, and Miller (2005), Barclay 
and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), Stohs and Mauer (1996), Benmelech (2008), 
and Benmelech, Garmaise, and Moskowitz (2004) support the role of asymmetry 
information on debt maturity. Berger et al. (2005) test Flannery’s and Diamond’s models 
by relating the choice of maturity to firm risk. They employ data on debt maturity at the 
issuance of the debts and therefore could more accurately test the implications from 
Flannery’s and Diamond’s models. They confirm the prediction of Flannery (1986) and 
Diamond (1991) for low-risk firms that they have shorter debt maturities and the maturity 
lengthens as the degree of asymmetric information increases. They also test Diamond’s 
implication that high-risk firms have shorter debt maturities compared to middle-rated 
firms. However, they find no significant difference between maturities of the two types. 
Therefore, the evidence is not consistent with Diamond’s model for high-risk firms. Stohs 
and Mauer (1996) empirically show that firms with very high or very low bond ratings 
use short-term debt, supporting the non-monotonic relation predicted by Diamond (1991). 
Mitchell (1991) also finds evidence supporting the role of information asymmetry that 
firms not traded on the NYSE have more short-term debts. Benmelech (2009) conducts a 
test on asset salability and debt maturity. They hypothesize that creditors are willing to 
lend for a longer term if the asset is liquid. The paper looks at American railroads with 
the track gauge as proxy for their asset salability. The size of the track is exogenous to the 
ability to refinance; however, it determines whether the railroad’s assets are liquid if the 
firm needs to liquidate them to pay back its debts. The author finds that higher asset 
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salability leads to longer debt maturity, linking asset risk and debt maturity. The higher 
liquidity- longer-term debts relation is also found in Benmelech, Garmaise, and 
Moskowitz (2005). They show that debts on properties that have more potential uses 
(higher liquidity) have more favorable terms and longer maturity. Barclay and Smith 
(1995) show that lower information asymmetry (larger, more regulated firms) leads to the 
use of more long-term debt. Guedes and Opler (1996) empirically test the determinants 
for new corporate bond issues (incremental approach) instead of maturity structure of 
corporate debt (balance sheet approach). They also test the role of information 
asymmetry via performance and rating subsequent to the issuance, firm size, and 
dispersion of earning forecasts. They find that large firms issue at the short or long ends 
of the spectrum, supporting the role of information asymmetry. However, they do not 
find evidence with earning forecast dispersion and subsequent performance.  
Agency Conflict 
Myers (1977) implies that short-term debt could be used to mitigate the agency 
problem of underinvestment therefore resolving the imperfection of the debt contract. If a 
firm faces debt overhang or debt distress, it may forego positive NPV projects 
(underinvestment problem). If there are more positive NPV projects, the conflict between 
debtholders and shareholders is more intense. Using short-term debt reduces this agency 
conflict because it increases the chance that the debt matures before the firm decides on 
which projects to take. Furthermore, instead of using long-term debt, the rolling short-
term debts could also be negotiated and alleviate debt overhang pressure therefore 
mitigating an underinvestment problem. This theory also explains why firms tend to 
match the maturity of assets with maturity of liabilities. However, using rolling short-
term debt has its cost (Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet, 1980); for example, the firm may 
suffer from periods of undervaluation of the market.  
Barnea et al. (1980) consider the effect of agency cost on maturity structure of 
debt. The choice of debt maturity serves to solve the asset substitution problem 
(managerial/stockholder risk incentives) as well as the underinvestment problem 
(foregone growth opportunities). Call provision of debt could also solve the agency 
problem since, if the firm takes on risky investment opportunities for growth, it can do so 
and call the debt back (Bodie and Taggart, 1978). In some senses, call feature is 
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comparable to short-term debt since it also shortens the maturity of debt. However, 
callable feature is more costly than short-term debt because bondholders require a 
premium for this flexibility of the firm.  
Taxes 
Boyce and Kalotay (1979) and Brick and David (1985) argue that long-term debt 
may be optimal in the presence of an upward-sloping interest rate structure since long-
term debt maximizes the tax benefits of debts. The tax deductibles if firms use long-term 
debts will be higher if the long-term interest rate is higher than the short-term interest 
rate. However, Lewis (1990) argues that even considering tax implication, debt maturity 
is irrelevant to a firm’s value since there is no tax distinction between short and long-term 
debts. Stohs and Mauers (1996) show empirically that debt maturity varies inversely with 
a firm’s effective tax rate, indicating a relation between tax and debt maturities.  
Market Condition 
Recent literature focuses on how managers react to market conditions in making 
debt maturity choice. The theory concerns market timing behavior of managers, i.e., how 
managers respond to potential mispricing of debts of different maturities. Guedes and 
Opler (1996) relate the term premium to debt maturity and find that managers issue short-
term when the yield curve is steep. Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003) find that 
more long-term debt issued indicates higher excess bond return in the future. In the 
international bond market, Henderson et al., (2006) find weak evidence on interest rate 
timing of foreign corporate bond issues. Also, see Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs 
and Mauer (1996). 
Related to timing of the interest rates, another strand of the literature links debt 
maturity choice to supply and demand of bonds. The theory is based on the market 
segmentation theory in explaining the yield curve by Culbertson (1957) and the preferred 
habitat theory of Modigliani and Stuch (1966) and Vayanos and Vila (2009). Greenwood 
and Vayanos (2010, 2014) argue that the maturity structure of government bonds impacts 
the yield curve, leading to arbitrageurs issuing bonds into the maturity that is mispriced. 
Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010) build a gap-filling theory of corporate maturity 
where firms have more flexibility than other arbitrageurs (e.g., hedge funds) in issuing 
bonds in response to supply shock from the government bond market. Firms then act as 
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liquidity providers by issuing longer-term debt when the government issues more short-
term debts and vice versa. Greenwood, Hanson, and Liao (2015) share this view by 
suggesting that pricing in the corporate bond market can move in response to shocks from 
the Treasury bond market although slowly since the two markets are partially segmented. 
Graham, Leary, and Roberts (2014) document a negative relationship between the U.S. 
treasury and corporate issuance of debt, suggesting a competing relationship between the 
two sources of supply for debts. Greenwood et al. (2010) show in their empirical tests for 
the case of the U.S. market during 1963-2005 that when the government increases the 
share of long-term debt, corporations do the opposite. Their model has implications in 
explaining time-varying corporate debt maturity. In an international context, scholars 
have also linked maturity of corporate bond issues to maturity structure of the 
government bond market. Siegfried et al. (2007) find that a firm is more likely to issue a 
long-term bond in the United Kingdom as opposed to the United States, Japan, or Europe. 
They conjecture that this is because the sovereign yield curve for British pounds is the 
longest. In other words, firms tend to issue bonds into the maturity spectrum where 
government bonds span.  
4.2.2 Motivations to Use the Offshore Bond Markets 
The literature has discussed the motivations for firms to use the international debt market. 
The most popular motivation has been to hedge foreign revenues. Foreign sales exposure 
leads to higher use of foreign debt for exchange rate hedging (Géczy et al., 1997, 
Allayannis and Ofek, 2001, Allayannis et al., 2003, Kedia and Mozumdar, 2003, Elliott et 
al., 2003, Graham and Harvey, 2001, Bancel and Mittoo, 2002, Aabo, Hansen, and 
Muradoglu, 2013). Withholding tax of the domestic market is another reason why firms 
may want to issue bonds overseas (Graham and Harvey, 2001, Bancel and Mittoo, 2002, 
Desai, 1998, Panteghini, 2009). The international bond market can also be used to 
overcome institutional constraints in the home market (Allayannis et al., 2004). Market 
timing of the international bond market has also been studied by Keloharju and Niskanen 
(2001), Henderson et al. (2006), and McBrady and Schill (2007). Maturity diversification 
is another possible motivation that has been proposed. Black and Munro (2010) 
specifically propose that the offshore bond market can be used to complement the 
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domestic market in case of maturity mismatch. They find that Asia-Pacific firms issue 
longer-term bonds overseas and view this as a diversification benefit for firms. 
Schmuckler and Vesperoni (2006) study how globalization impacts debt structure of 
firms in emerging economies. They show that the maturity structure (long-term debt over 
total debts) is longer after accessing the international capital markets.  
Although not specifically pointing to maturity diversification as a motivation to 
use the offshore bond markets, several other studies have also addressed how the maturity 
of domestic bonds differs from maturity of offshore bonds. Henderson et al. (2006) 
document that firms borrow more from the international markets for long-term debts as 
opposed to short-term debts and propose that this could be due to high fixed cost of 
issuing international securities. Gozzi et al. (2015) show that international debts have 
shorter maturity than domestic debts after controlling for country-year dummies, size, 
and firm fixed effect.  
4.2.3 Maturity Diversification 
This study is also related to the literature on how firms manage maturity structure of their 
debts and the level of maturity diversification. Researchers have recently examined how 
bonds are spread across different maturities. For risk management reasons, managers 
want to issue bonds in diversified maturities so that the amount to refinance is not too 
large in any given year to avoid rollover risk. Choi et al. (forthcoming) find that new 
bonds are issued to complement pre-existing bond maturities. Norden et al. (2016) find 
that firms with higher debt maturity diversification can better manage their financing with 
lower cost of financing, lower financial constraints, and lower stock return volatility. 
Gopalan et al. (2015) also find that firms with higher rollover risk, measured as a higher 
proportion of long-term bonds maturing in a year, have lower credit rating and higher 
borrowing cost.  
 
4.3 Data 
The data for testing is taken from the SDC Platinum database, where information on new 
domestic and foreign bond issues is collected. The SDC database has been used in 
previous studies related to the international bond market such as Henderson, Jegadeesh, 
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and Weisbach (2006), McBrady and Schill (2007), and Gozzi et al. (2015). It provides 
transaction-level information on new bond issuances worldwide and records transactions 
with maturity longer than one year. SDC Platinum’s data dates back to the 1970s. 
However, the dataset becomes more comprehensive only since the 1990s. Therefore, the 
sample covers the period from 1991 to 2015. I first get transaction data for new issuances 
of non-convertible bonds, excluding those from municipal, financial, and unknown 
sectors. I also exclude transactions with maturity of less than one year since those 
transactions either are included for completeness of the data, are tranches of a larger bond 
issue with higher maturity or are subject to data errors. That leaves 96,166 bond issues 
worldwide as the starting sample. I define domestic bonds as those issued into a target 
market that is the same as the country of domicile of the firm, while offshore bonds are 
defined as those issued into a target market that is not the same as the country of domicile 
of the firm.  
I obtain firm characteristics from Datastream. I used CUSIP and ISIN as the 
identifiers to match firms in the SDC Platinum database to Datastream. Control variables 
that have been used in previous studies on bond maturity are included in the empirical 
tests. LogTA (log of total assets) controls for size. There can be more information 
available on large firms; therefore, large firms may be able to issue shorter-term loans 
(Flannery, 1989 and Diamond, 1991). DebttoEquity (the ratio of total debt over total 
common equity) and profitability (EBITDA/Total Assets) are proxies for a firm’s 
riskiness. Less risky firms are more likely to issue short term bonds (Diamond, 1991); 
therefore, lower DebttoEquity and higher EBITDA/TA are expected to be associated with 
issuance of short-term debts. MKTB (market-to-book ratio) is a proxy for growth. Firms 
with higher growth opportunities are less likely to issue long-term debt since long-term 
debts exacerbate the underinvestment problem, especially in firms with high growth 
opportunities (Myers, 1977). DEP_TA is the proxy for asset life. According to the 
matching principle, firms with longer asset life are more likely to borrow longer term 
(Myers, 1977), thus DEP_TA is expected to be negatively related to debt maturity. 
TANG is the ratio of a net fixed asset over total assets for firm i. Tangibility matters, for 
example, in Benmelech et al. (2005) and Benmelech (2008); asset risk and salability 
impact debt maturity. Higher tangibility means less risk and higher salability of asset 
 152 
 
risks and thus longer debt maturity. D_Util is also included to control for industry effect. 
Utility firms are more regulated and will be able to issue short-term debts because they 
are not concerned by the liquidity risk as risky firms (Guedes and Opler, 1996). On the 
other hand, utility firms may borrow long-term debts since they do not have to signal 
their low risk business. Table 4-1 summarizes data on debt issues and firm characteristics 
used in the study. 
 153 
 
Table 4-1: Maturity at Issuance—Comparison between Domestic Bonds and 
Offshore Bonds 
 
a. All Firms Domestic 
Mean  
Obs Offshore 
Mean 
Obs Difference (p-value) 
Maturity 7.43 67,223 8.00 23,856 -0.57 0.000 
PrincipalAmt 156.67 67,223 368.73 23,856 -212.06 0.000 
SpreadtoBench 167.83 23,229 292.34 12,304 -124.51 0.000 
 
b. Firms w. 
Acct 
Domestic 
Mean  
Obs Offshore 
Mean 
Obs Difference (p-value) 
Maturity 9.91 19,818 8.89 6,625 1.03 0.000 
PrincipalAmt 284.25 19,818 467.33 6,625 -183.08 0.000 
SpreadtoBench 158.53 12,852 271.62 4,286 -113.09 0.000 
TA 27,900,476 19,818 39,191,191 6,625 -11,290,715 0.000 
TANG 0.32 19,605 0.32 6,382 0.00 0.874 
DEP_TA 0.05 19,373 0.05 6,506 -0.00 0.000 
EBITDA_TA 0.13 19,400 0.13 6,499 0.00 0.699 
 
c. Firms w/o 
Acct 
Domestic 
Mean  
Obs Offshore 
Mean 
Obs Difference (p-value) 
Maturity 6.39 47,405 7.66 17,231 -1.27 0.000 
PrincipalAmt 103.34 47,405 330.82 17,231 -227.48 0.000 
SpreadtoBench 179.35 10,377 303.42 8,018 -124.06 0.000 
 
This table reports and compares characteristics of the bonds issued in the domestic markets versus those 
issued in the offshore markets, as well as comparing characteristics of the firms issuing the bonds. Maturity 
(years) is the maturity at issuance of the issues. PrincipalAmt ($mil) is the principal amount of the issue. 
SpreadtoBench (bps) is the number of basis points over the comparable maturity treasury. TA is Total 
Assets in thousands of dollars. TANG is calculated as NTA/TA or Net Tangible Assets/Total Assets. 
DEP_TA is calculated as Depreciation/Total Assets. EBITDA_TA is calculated as EBITDA/Total Assets.  
Panel a reports the average maturity, principal amount, and spread to benchmark of all domestic and 
offshore bond issues. Panel b reports the statistics for bonds issued by firms that have accounting data (total 
assets), and the characteristics of the firms underlying the issues. Panel c reports the statistics for bonds 
issued by firms that do not have accounting data.  
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4.4 Hypothesis Development 
How can the offshore bond market provide higher maturity diversification? As discussed 
earlier in the Introduction, each bond market can have availability and preferences for 
different ranges of maturities due to the level of market development and investor tastes. 
If a firm can access a more diversified market than at home, I expect it can issue bonds 
into a difference maturity range from what it can borrow at home. Therefore, the first 
hypothesis regards the comparison between maturity at issuance of offshore versus 
domestic bonds. First, as previous studies have shown, there is a systematic difference 
between average maturity at issuance of offshore bonds versus that of domestic bonds 
(Black and Munro, 2010, Henderson et al., 2006, Gozzi et al., 2015). Researchers 
consider such results to be indicative of a diversification impact. To confirm previous 
studies, my study will also look at the average maturity at issuance to determine if there 
is difference in the maturities at issuance of offshore versus domestic bonds, as in H1a.  
However, average maturity is only one aspect of maturity diversification and 
information can be missing from analyzing only average maturity. For example, average 
maturity does not account for the case of diversification caused by firms issuing into the 
middle maturity in the offshore markets while issuing into the short/long maturities in the 
domestic market. In such a case, average maturities at issuance of offshore and domestic 
bonds are similar. I then form another hypothesis regarding the maturity structure at 
issuance of offshore bonds versus that of domestic bonds. If a firm diversifies the range 
of maturities it can issue into, I expect that firms issue offshore bonds into maturity 
ranges that are different from what it used to issue at home. In that case, I expect a 
negative relationship between the proportion of offshore bonds issued into a maturity 
range and the proportion of domestic bonds issued into that same maturity range. I 
therefore form hypothesis H1b. 
 
H1: For firms that use the offshore bond market, maturity at issuance of offshore bonds is 
different from maturity at issuance of domestic bonds: 
-H1a: Average maturity at issuance of offshore bonds is different from average 
maturity at issuance of domestic bonds.  
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-H1b: The maturity at issuance of all the bonds ever issued by a firm is such that 
a higher proportion of offshore bonds in a maturity range is associated with a 
lower proportion of domestic bonds in the same maturity range.  
 
Secondly, I look at yearly management of the bond structure by a firm. I examine 
how the degree of maturity diversification of a firm’s bond profile changes as offshore 
bonds are issued. If a firm issues offshore bonds to diversify its maturity structure, I 
expect that the degree of maturity diversification is higher. I use two methods to analyze 
the degree maturity diversification. Hypothesis H2a regards the Herfindahl index for 
maturity structure, which has been used in previous studies on maturity diversification 
such as Choi, Hackbarth, and Zechner (2015) and Norden et al. (2016). The Herfindahl 
index is the sum of squares of the proportions of bonds issued into seven maturity ranges 
and can range from close to zero (very diverse bond maturity profile) to one (the firm 
issues into only one maturity range). The inverse of the Herfindahl index is therefore 
higher if the maturity structure is more diverse. 
However, the Herfindahl index does not reveal in detail how maturity 
diversification happens. By looking at how maturity of new offshore bonds differs from 
maturity of pre-existing and newly issued domestic bonds, one can gain more insights 
into how new offshore bonds are related to the domestic counterpart so that the degree of 
maturity diversification can change in the year with a new offshore bond issuance. 
Therefore, I form hypothesis H2b that relates maturity structure of new offshore bond 
issues to maturity structure of pre-existing and new domestic bonds.  
 
H2: If a firm uses the offshore bond market for maturity diversification, the degree of 
maturity diversification is higher as the firm issues offshore bonds. 
H2a (Herfindahl Index Method): A firm has higher bond maturity diversification 
in the year with offshore bonds in the bond profile, where the higher degree of 
diversification is measured by the higher inverse of the Herfindahl index. 
H2b (Maturity Structure Method): A firm chooses a yearly bond maturity 
structure such that the higher proportion of offshore bonds in a maturity bin is associated 
with lower proportion of domestic bonds in the same maturity bin. 
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4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Maturity at Issuance of Offshore Bonds versus Domestic 
Bonds 
In this section, I examine hypothesis 1 of how the choice of maturity at issuance when 
firms issue new bonds offshore differs from the choice of maturity when firms issue new 
bonds domestically. Two aspects of maturity at issuance are looked at: the average 
maturity at issuance and the composition of maturity at issuance. 
 
4.5.1.a. Average Maturity at Issuance of New Offshore Bonds versus New Domestic 
Bonds 
First, I look at the average bond maturity at issuance. This method has been used in 
previous studies such as Black and Munro (2010) and Gozzi et al. (2015). Table 4-1 
reports results of the univariate analysis that compares average maturities at issuance of 
new offshore bonds versus that of new domestic bonds and characteristics of the 
underlying firms. For the full sample, new offshore bonds have longer average maturities 
of about half a year (0.57), are issued in larger amounts (higher principal amount), and 
are costlier to issue (higher spread to benchmark) compared to new domestic bonds. The 
differences are significant, as confirmed by the t-test results. The firm’s underlying 
offshore bonds are larger and have shorter asset life (higher DEP_TA) while having 
similar tangibility (TANG) and profitability (EBITDA_TA) compared to the firm’s 
underlying domestic bonds. Those results are in line with previous studies on the 
international bond market (Black and Munro, 2010). 
The subsample of firms without accounting data also has longer average offshore 
bond maturity at issuance. However, for the subsample of firms with accounting data, 
average maturity at issuance of offshore bonds is shorter. Table 4-2 runs an OLS 
regression that aims to explain bond maturity at issuance controlling for firm 
characteristics: 
 
MatYri,k = a + β D_Offshorei,k + F Controlsi+ ei,k (1), 
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where MatYri,k,t is the maturity at issuance in terms of years for a bond k issued 
by firm i, D_Offshorei,k is a dummy for whether the bond is issued offshore or 
domestically. Controlsi is the matrix of characteristics of the underlying firm i that issues 
the bond k and is taken in the year prior to the issue year. To control for the role of 
issuance cost on the choice of maturity, I include the cost of issuance (SpreadtoBench) of 
the issue k into Model 1 which studies the determinants for maturity of all bonds. The 
expectation is that the higher the cost of issuance, the longer the maturity chosen. 
Table 4-2 shows that for the group of firms with accounting data, even when 
conditioned on firm characteristics, bonds issued offshore are associated with a shorter 
bond maturity. Gozzi et al. (2015) also find that for the group firms from developed 
countries, offshore bonds have shorter maturity both unconditionally and when 
conditioned on country and firm fixed effects, while firms from developing countries 
issue longer term bonds into the offshore market than at home. My results are in line with 
Gozzi et al. (2015) if firms from developed countries are those that are more likely to 
have accounting data.  
My results on average bond maturity at issuance and firm characteristics are in 
line with previous studies in the field and suggest a significant difference between 
average maturities at issuance of new offshore versus new domestic bonds, supporting 
hypothesis 1a. However, it is inconclusive as to whether offshore bonds have longer or 
shorter maturities on average compared to domestic bonds, as the sign of the differences 
depend on the subsample of firms. Therefore, it is not straightforward to tell whether 
borrowing offshore will lengthen or shorten the average maturity of the bond profile for 
an assessment of the maturity diversification effect. 
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Table 4-2: Maturity at Issuance Conditioned on Firm Characteristics 
 
 (1) (2) 
D_Offshore -1.520*** -1.453*** 
 (-11.64) (-8.14) 
PrincipalAmount 0.00209*** 0.00105*** 
 (14.95) (5.85) 
logTA 0.127*** 0.0641 
 (3.46) (1.09) 
TANG 0.648** 2.980*** 
 (2.18) (7.40) 
DEP_TA -12.30*** -4.108* 
 (-7.22) (-1.65) 
EBITDA_TA 2.399*** 1.825*** 
 (6.05) (3.96) 
SpreadtoBench  -0.00100** 
  (-2.15) 
_cons 7.386*** 9.152*** 
 (12.30) (9.14) 
N 25366 16496 
adj. R2 0.019 0.013 
 
In this table I use the OLS regression to explain maturity of bond issues as in Model 1: 
MatYri,k = a + β D_Offshorei,k + F Controlsi+ ei,k (1), 
where MatYri,k,t is the maturity at issuance in terms of years for a bond k issued by firm i, D_Offshorei,k is a 
dummy for whether the bond is issued offshore or domestically, Controlsi is the matrix of characteristics of 
the underlying firm i that issues the bond k and is taken in the year prior to the issue year. Principal Amt 
($mil) is the principal amount of the issue. SpreadtoBench (bps) is the number of basis points over the 
comparable maturity treasury. TA is Total Assets in thousands of dollars. TANG is calculated as NTA/TA 
or Net Tangible Assets/Total Assets. DEP_TA is calculated as Depreciation/Total Assets. EBITDA_TA is 
calculated as EBITDA/Total Assets. Column (2) includes the spread to benchmark to control for the cost of 
issuance. t-statistics are in parenthesis, *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
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4.5.1.b. Structure of Maturity at Issuance of Offshore Bonds versus Domestic Bonds 
The previous analysis looks at average maturity of offshore and domestic bonds and 
suggests that there can be difference in term of maturity between offshore bonds and 
domestic bonds. This part of the analysis compares maturity structure at issuance of 
offshore bonds with maturity structure at issuance of domestic bonds for the bonds issued 
by a firm over its lifetime as recorded in the SDC database. This helps address in more 
detail the diversification effect of using the offshore bond markets compared to previous 
studies and test hypothesis H1b.  
The maturity structure is formed by dividing the maturity spectrum into seven 
ranges called seven bins and then calculating the proportion of bonds issued into each 
bin. The seven bins are 1-2 Yr, 3-4 Yr, 5-6 Yr, 7-8 Yr, 9-10 Yr, 11-20 Yr, and >21Yr 
following Choi et al. (forthcoming). For each firm, I look at the maturity structure of all 
offshore bonds ever issued by the firm and compare that to the maturity structure of all 
domestic bonds ever issued by that firm. Model 2a, 2b, and 2c then compare the 
compositions of domestic bonds versus offshore bonds in terms of maturities at issuance. 
If a firm uses offshore bond markets to diversify the ranges of maturities of bonds issued 
at home, it is expected that firms issue new offshore bonds into maturity ranges that 
fewer domestic bonds are issued into. Following are the specifications for Models 2a, 2b, 
and 2c. Model 2a does not control for firm characteristics and allows one to examine the 
relationship for the groups of firms with and without accounting data, while model 2b 
controls for firm characteristics averaged across the years a firm issues offshore bonds. 
Model 2c takes into account proportions of domestic bonds in other maturity bins and not 
just the same maturity bin as the offshore bonds examined. For each bin j, I estimate: 
 
OProp_Alli = a + β DProp_Alli + ei (2a) 
OProp_Alli = a + β DProp_Alli + F Controlsi + ei (2b) 
 
OProp_Alli is the proportion of all new offshore bonds issued by firm i into 
maturity bin j throughout the sample period. DProp_Alli is the proportion of all new 
domestic bonds issued by firm i into maturity bin j throughout the sample period. Control 
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variables are firm i’s characteristics averaged across the years before the years the bonds 
are issued. 
OProp_Alli = a + D DPROP_ALLi + F Controlsi + ei (2c) 
 
The dependent variable OProp_Alli is proportion of new offshore bonds issued by 
firm i into maturity bin j throughout the sample period. DPROP_ALLi is the matrix of the 
proportions of new domestic bonds issued by firm i into maturity bins 2 to 7 throughout 
the sample period. Here, the proportion of new domestic bonds issued into bin 1 is taken 
as the base case.  
The overall result reported in Tables 4-3, 4-4, and 4-5 is that when comparing 
maturity at issuance of all new offshore versus that of all new domestic bonds ever issued 
by a firm, the proportion of new offshore bonds issued into each maturity bin is positively 
related to the proportion of new domestic bonds issued by the same firm into the same 
maturity bin. In Table 4-3a, the coefficients for DProp_Alli are all positive, and they are 
significant for all bins except for Bin 3. It is notable that the high proportion of offshore 
bonds issued into Bin 2 and 3 (the short maturity ranges) are associated with high 
proportions of domestic bonds issued into those ranges for both groups of firms. The 
coefficients are above 0.5 for all cases and R-squared measures are high. For firms 
without accounting data, there is a high tendency that they issue a high proportion of 
bonds into the 9-10 year maturity range both offshore and domestically. The coefficient is 
significant at 0.724 and R-squared is at 62.8 per cent. A very low R-squared in several 
bins could maybe be explained by there being few bonds issued into those maturity 
ranges both domestically and offshore. The results suggest that throughout their lifetime, 
firms use the offshore bond market and domestic bond market in quite a similar manner. 
The maturities at issuance of offshore and domestic bonds issued by a firm exhibit 
positively related structures. This does not lend support to hypothesis 1b. 
The results are the same controlling for firm characteristics (Table 4-4) and 
proportions of domestic bonds in other maturity bins (Table 4-5). In Table 4-5, the results 
for Model (2c) are reported, with the proportion of offshore bonds issued into each 
maturity bin explained by the set of firm characteristics, the proportion of domestic bonds 
issued into the same maturity bin, and also the proportions of domestic bonds issued into 
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other bins. Again, it is confirmed that the proportion of new offshore bonds issued by a 
firm is positively related to the proportions of new offshore bonds the firm ever issues 
throughout its lifetime into the same maturity bin. It can be observed that the proportions 
of new domestic bonds issued into other maturity bins throughout the sample period are 
not related to or are negatively related to the proportion of new offshore bonds issued into 
a specific maturity bin (Table 4-5). The results for proportions of bonds in other maturity 
bins, although insignificant, suggest that a firm is less likely to issue offshore bonds into 
maturity ranges that it does not issue into in the domestic market.  
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Table 4-3: Composition of Maturity at Issuance of Offshore Bonds versus Domestic 
Bonds at Firm Level 
 
  Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Bin 5 Bin 6 Bin 7 
 1-2 Yr 3-4 Yr 5-6 Yr 7-8 Yr 9-10 Yr 11-20 Yr >21 Yr 
a) All firms 
DProp_All 0.531*** 0.431*** 0.0473 0.158*** 0.500*** 0.0595** 0.215*** 
 (17.82) (14.60) (1.60) (7.03) (28.07) (2.06) (7.43) 
_cons 0.185*** 0.221*** 0.0235*** 0.00210* 0.000589 0.00119*** 0.00672*** 
 (14.38) (15.74) (6.90) (1.71) (0.58) (3.17) (3.17) 
N 1255 1255 1255 1255 1255 1255 1255 
adj. R2 0.202 0.145 0.001 0.037 0.386 0.003 0.041 
 
b) Firms with accounting data 
DProp_All 0.512*** 0.348*** 0.0641 0.796** 0.0208 0.0691** -0.00460 
 (10.70) (7.69) (1.58) (1.97) (1.00) (2.18) (-0.08) 
_cons 0.123*** 0.295*** 0.0236*** 0.00248 0.00157 0.00141** 0.00769*** 
 (8.23) (13.84) (5.03) (1.33) (1.62) (2.51) (3.30) 
N 587 587 587 587 587 587 587 
adj. R2 0.162 0.090 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.006 -0.002 
 
c) Firms without accounting data 
DProp_All 0.479*** 0.485*** 0.0325 0.157*** 0.724*** -0.00773 0.255*** 
 (11.99) (12.60) (0.76) (7.14) (33.57) (-0.10) (6.90) 
_cons 0.259*** 0.163*** 0.0233*** 0.00154 -
0.0000995 
0.00101** 0.00668* 
 (12.63) (8.89) (4.76) (0.93) (-0.07) (1.99) (1.96) 
N 668 668 668 668 668 668 668 
adj. R2 0.176 0.191 -0.001 0.070 0.628 -0.001 0.065 
 
Taking all offshore bonds and all domestic bonds a firm ever issues throughout the sample period into 
consideration, the following OLS regression is run for each maturity bin j (j from 1 to 7). There are seven 
regressions to explain proportion of bonds issued into seven bins. 
OProp_Alli = a + β DProp_Alli + ei (2a) 
OProp_Alli is the proportion of offshore bonds issued into maturity bin j by firm i throughout the sample 
period. DProp_Alli is the proportion of domestic bonds issued into maturity bin j by firm i throughout the 
sample period. The proportion of offshore bonds in each maturity j is then related to the proportion of 
domestic bonds in the same maturity bin. Panel a reports the results for all firms, while Panel b reports the 
results for firms with accounting data (Total Assets), and Panel c reports the results for firms without 
accounting data (missing Total Assets). t-statistics are in parenthesis, *, **, and *** denote significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4-4: Composition of Maturity at Issuance of Offshore Bonds versus Domestic Bonds at Firm Level—With Controls  
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Bin 5 Bin 6 Bin 7 
 1-2 Yr 3-4 Yr 5-6 Yr 7-8 Yr 9-10 Yr 11-20 Yr >21 Yr 
DProp_All 0.521*** 0.259*** 0.0460 0.766* 0.114** 0.0656** -0.0252 
 (10.50) (5.45) (1.10) (1.82) (2.52) (2.07) (-0.43) 
logMeanTA 0.0114 -0.0731*** 0.0112*** 0.00312** 0.00150** 0.000534 0.00329** 
 (1.29) (-7.16) (3.48) (2.34) (2.17) (1.37) (1.99) 
MeanTANG 0.0411 -0.158* -0.0337 0.0159 0.0118* 0.00541 0.0136 
 (0.53) (-1.84) (-1.19) (1.36) (1.95) (1.59) (0.95) 
MeanDEP_TA -0.0662 0.0519 -0.210 -0.0202 -0.0162 -0.0101 -0.0452 
 (-0.17) (0.12) (-1.51) (-0.35) (-0.54) (-0.60) (-0.64) 
D_Util -0.106*** -0.0173 0.0168 0.000418 -0.00310 0.00258* 0.0170*** 
 (-3.31) (-0.49) (1.45) (0.09) (-1.23) (1.83) (2.88) 
MeanDebttoEquity -0.0000700 -0.000140 -0.0000075 0.00000804 0.00000416 0.00000111 0.0000117 
 (-0.27) (-0.49) (-0.08) (0.21) (0.21) (0.10) (0.25) 
MeanEBITDA_TA -0.320* -0.0809 0.132** 0.0157 0.00401 0.00819 0.00398 
 (-1.90) (-0.43) (2.16) (0.62) (0.30) (1.10) (0.13) 
MeanMKTB 0.000149 0.0000993 0.0000313 -0.0000144 -0.0000081 -0.0000015 -0.0000169 
 (0.31) (0.19) (0.18) (-0.20) (-0.22) (-0.07) (-0.19) 
_cons 0.00183 1.531*** -0.150*** -0.0523** -0.0247** -0.00988 -0.0501* 
 (0.01) (9.11) (-2.91) (-2.45) (-2.23) (-1.58) (-1.90) 
N 556 556 556 556 556 556 556 
adj. R2 0.184 0.182 0.039 0.008 0.015 0.012 0.013 
 
Taking all offshore bonds and all domestic bonds a firm ever issues throughout the sample period into consideration, the following OLS regression is run for 
each maturity bin j. There are seven regressions to explain proportion of bonds issued into each of the seven bins. 
OProp_Alli = a + β DProp_Alli + F Controlsi + ei (2b) 
OProp_Alli is the proportion of offshore bonds issued into maturity bin j by firm i throughout the sample period. DProp_Alli is the proportion of domestic bonds 
issued into maturity bin j by firm i throughout the sample period. The proportion of offshore bonds in each maturity j is then related to the proportion of domestic 
bonds in the same maturity bin. Control variables are firm i’s characteristics averaged across the years prior to when the bonds are issued, where TA is Total 
Assets in thousands of dollars. TANG is calculated as NTA/TA or Net Tangible Assets/Total Assets. DEP_TA is calculated as Depreciation/Total Assets. 
EBITDA_TA is calculated as EBITDA/Total Assets. DebttoEquity is Total Debt/Common Equity. MKTB is the market-to-book value sourced from Datastream. 
t-statistics are in parenthesis, *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4-5: Composition of Maturity at Issuance of Offshore Bonds versus Domestic Bonds at Firm Level - With Controls and 
Proportions of Domestic Bonds in other Bins 
 Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Bin 5 Bin 6 Bin 7 
 (1-2 Yr) (3-4 Yr) (5-6 Yr) (7-8 Yr) (9-10 Yr) (11-20 Yr) (>21 Yr) 
DProp_All2 -0.264*** 0.241*** -0.0141 -0.00292 -0.00197 0.00112 -0.00871 
 (-5.66) (4.95) (-0.91) (-0.44) (-0.57) (0.58) (-1.07) 
DProp_All3 -0.324** -0.167 0.0422 0.00304 0.0000181 0.00311 -0.0187 
 (-2.57) (-1.27) (1.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.59) (-0.85) 
DProp_All4 -0.817 -3.139 0.824 0.777* -0.0403 -0.0299 -0.257 
 (-0.27) (-1.00) (0.82) (1.82) (-0.18) (-0.24) (-0.49) 
DProp_All5 -0.486 -0.634 -0.00540 -0.0140 0.113** 0.000490 0.187* 
 (-0.78) (-0.98) (-0.03) (-0.16) (2.47) (0.02) (1.73) 
DProp_All6 -1.025 -1.634** 1.314*** -0.0494 -0.00992 0.0686** 0.0618 
 (-1.33) (-2.03) (5.10) (-0.45) (-0.17) (2.13) (0.46) 
DProp_All7 -0.398 0.378 0.0516 0.00120 -0.0166 0.00103 -0.0316 
 (-1.17) (1.07) (0.45) (0.02) (-0.66) (0.07) (-0.53) 
        
logMeanTA -0.000678 -0.0742*** 0.0102*** 0.00293** 0.00145** 0.000583 0.00303* 
 (-0.07) (-7.26) (3.12) (2.10) (2.00) (1.43) (1.78) 
MeanTANG 0.0753 -0.185** -0.0336 0.0158 0.0117* 0.00570* 0.0131 
 (0.90) (-2.13) (-1.21) (1.33) (1.91) (1.65) (0.90) 
MeanDEP_TA 0.0556 0.0550 -0.148 -0.0191 -0.0156 -0.0119 -0.0313 
 (0.14) (0.13) (-1.08) (-0.33) (-0.51) (-0.70) (-0.44) 
D_Util -0.100*** -0.0113 0.0130 0.000533 -0.00310 0.00267* 0.0151** 
 (-2.91) (-0.32) (1.13) (0.11) (-1.22) (1.86) (2.52) 
MeanDebttoEquity 0.00000094 -0.000148 -0.0000028 0.00000992 0.00000525 0.00000085 0.0000145 
 (0.00) (-0.52) (-0.03) (0.25) (0.26) (0.08) (0.30) 
MeanEBITDA_TA -0.463** -0.0444 0.116* 0.0157 0.00383 0.00803 0.00133 
 (-2.57) (-0.24) (1.93) (0.62) (0.29) (1.07) (0.04) 
MeanMKTB 0.0000291 0.000108 0.0000212 -0.0000176 -0.0000100 -0.0000009 -0.0000233 
 (0.06) (0.20) (0.13) (-0.24) (-0.27) (-0.05) (-0.26) 
_cons 0.383** 1.566*** -0.133** -0.0483** -0.0230* -0.0111* -0.0428 
 (2.37) (9.31) (-2.47) (-2.11) (-1.93) (-1.65) (-1.52) 
N 556 556 556 556 556 556 556 
adj. R2 0.072 0.188 0.081 -0.000 0.007 0.004 0.013 
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Taking all offshore bonds and all domestic bonds for each firm into consideration, the following OLS regression is run for each maturity bin j.  
OProp_Alli = a + D DPROP_ALLi + F Controlsi + ei (2c) 
The dependent variable OProp_Alli is proportion of new offshore bonds issued by firm i into maturity bin j throughout the sample period. DPROP_ALLi is the 
proportions of new domestic bonds issued by firm i into maturity bins 2 to 7 throughout the sample period. Here, the proportion of new domestic bonds issued 
into bin 1 is taken as the base case. Control variables are firm i’s characteristics averaged across the years prior to when the bonds are issued. TA is Total Assets 
in thousands of dollars. TANG is calculated as NTA/TA or Net Tangible Assets/Total Assets. DEP_TA is calculated as Depreciation/Total Assets. EBITDA_TA 
is calculated as EBITDA/Total Assets. DebttoEquity is Total Debt/Common Equity. MKTB is the market-to-book value sourced from Datastream. t-statistics are 
in parenthesis, *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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4.5.2 Maturity Diversification and Maturity Structure Management 
4.5.2.a. The Inverse of the Herfindahl Index Measure 
In this part, I carry out the tests for hypothesis 2. While the previous section has 
examined maturity at issuance of new offshore bonds versus new domestic bonds, the 
current section will look at the impact of having offshore bonds on the degree of maturity 
diversification as well as the maturity structure of a firm’s bond profile. Maturities at 
issuance of new bonds and remaining maturities of pre-existing bonds will be looked at, 
which extend previous studies that only look at maturity at issuance. First, I examine the 
Herfindahl index for analyzing the maturity diversification degree of the overall bond 
profile. The diversification measure inverse of the Herfindahl index is calculated as: 
 InvHERF(,* = 1	/	HERF(,* = 	1	// 01,2,345167  (3a), 
 
which is the sum of the square of the proportion of bonds (new and pre-existing) 
from maturity bins 1 through 7 for firm i in year t. The proportion of bonds in each bin is 
denoted wB,i,t as in the equation. In this case, a firm has bonds issued into only one 
maturity bin, which means low diversification, the HERF measure takes the value one, 
and InvHERF is one. In the case of higher diversification, HERF takes the value of less 
than one and InvHERF becomes larger. Therefore, the higher InvHERF is, the more 
diversified the maturity structure is. 
 
InvHERFi,t = a + β D_HasOffshorei,t / D_NewOffshorei,t / D_ NewDomestici,t 
+ F Controlsi,t-1 + ei,t (3b), 
 
where InvHERFi,t is inverse of the Herfindahl index, D_HasOffshore i,t is whether 
the firm i has offshore bonds (either new or pre-existing) in year t. D_NewOffshorei,t is an 
indication for whether the firm i has new offshore bonds issued in year t. 
D_NewDomestici,t is an indication for whether the firm i has new domestic bonds issued 
in year t. Control variables are taken in the year before the inversed Herfindahl index is 
calculated. 
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The results in Table 4-6 reveal that having outstanding offshore bonds (either new 
or pre-existing) is associated with lower InvHERF for the full sample (column 1, Table 4-
6), while it does increase InvHERF for the sample of firms that ever use the offshore 
bond markets (column 4, Table 4-6). Having new offshore bonds issued in a year is 
associated with having lower InvHERF (i.e., lower maturity diversification degree) as 
evidenced by significantly negative coefficients to D_NewOffshorei,t in column 2 and 5, 
Table 4-6. Meanwhile, having new domestic bonds issued in a year is associated with 
having higher InvHERF in that year as evidenced by significantly positive coefficients to 
D_NewDomestici,t in column 3 and 6, Table 4-6. The results are consistent across groups 
of firms that larger firms, firms with lower tangibility and depreciation, lower leverage, 
and higher profitability, and utility firms have a higher degree of maturity diversification. 
Overall, this suggests a diversification effect of having offshore bonds outstanding for 
firms that use the offshore bond market and lends some support to hypothesis 2a within 
this group of firms. However, the results do not support that issuing new offshore bonds 
helps increase maturity diversification.  
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Table 4-6: Offshore Bond and The Inverse of the Herfindahl Index 
 
 All firms Only firms that ever use the offshore bond 
markets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
D_HasOffshore -0.331***   0.128*   
 (-6.49)   (1.72)   
D_NewOffshore  -0.819***   -0.359***  
  (-15.39)   (-4.87)  
D_NewDomestic   1.219***   0.883*** 
   (22.05)   (10.94) 
logTA 0.994*** 0.997*** 0.978*** 1.134*** 1.142*** 1.104*** 
 (58.22) (59.88) (59.73) (43.17) (44.15) (42.75) 
TANG -0.694*** -0.632*** -0.609*** -0.816*** -0.834*** -0.866*** 
 (-4.14) (-3.80) (-3.71) (-3.15) (-3.23) (-3.38) 
DEP_TA -2.220*** -1.484* -1.196 -2.639** -2.239* -2.170* 
 (-2.60) (-1.75) (-1.43) (-2.07) (-1.76) (-1.72) 
DebttoEquity -0.00395 -0.00326 -0.00282 -0.0156*** -0.0147*** -0.0132*** 
 (-1.29) (-1.07) (-0.94) (-3.26) (-3.09) (-2.81) 
EBITDA_TA 1.091*** 0.984*** 0.821*** 2.749*** 2.744*** 2.544*** 
 (3.97) (3.62) (3.05) (5.94) (5.95) (5.56) 
MKTB -0.0000102 -0.0000498 -0.000122 0.0181*** 0.0177*** 0.0165*** 
 (-0.01) (-0.07) (-0.18) (4.29) (4.23) (3.97) 
D_Util 1.114*** 1.093*** 1.072*** 1.008*** 1.024*** 1.010*** 
 (19.93) (19.73) (19.58) (11.91) (12.15) (12.11) 
_cons -11.61*** -11.57*** -12.43*** -13.96*** -13.90*** -14.04*** 
 (-40.76) (-41.28) (-44.27) (-31.72) (-31.66) (-32.34) 
Year FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 10439 10439 10439 4724 4724 4724 
adj. R2 0.308 0.321 0.336 0.343 0.346 0.359 
 
This table examines inverse of the Herfindahl index as a measure of the degree of maturity diversification if 
a firm has outstanding offshore bonds (either new or pre-existing), if it has new offshore bonds issued, or if 
it has new domestic bonds issued, separately, as recorded in the SDC database. This table reports the results 
for Model 3b:  
InvHERFi,t = a + β D_HasOffshorei,t / D_NewOffshorei,t / D_ NewDomestici,t + F Controls i,t-1 + ei,t (3b), 
where InvHERFi,t is the inverse of the Herfindahl index of firm i in year t, higher InvHERF means higher 
maturity diversification. D_HasOffshorei,t is an indication for whether the firm i has offshore bonds (either 
new or pre-existing) in year t. D_NewOffshorei,t is an indication for whether the firm i has new offshore 
bonds issued in year t. D_NewDomestici,t is an indication for whether the firm i has new domestic bonds 
issued in year t. Controlsi is the matrix of characteristics of the underlying firm i in the previous year. TA is 
Total Assets in thousands of dollars. TANG is calculated as NTA/TA or Net Tangible Assets/Total Assets. 
DEP_TA is calculated as Depreciation/Total Assets. EBITDA_TA is calculated as EBITDA/Total Assets. 
DebttoEquity is Total Debt/Common Equity. MKTB is the market-to-book value sourced from Datastream. 
Year FEs are included in all specifications. t-statistics are in parenthesis, *, **, and *** denote significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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4.5.2.b. Maturity Structure Approach on Diversification Effect 
The analysis on the inverse of the Herfindahl measure gives information on the overall 
diversification of the bond profile annually. However, it does not give further details on 
how the maturity of offshore bonds is related to maturity of domestic bonds. For 
example, it does not specify in which ranges of the maturity spectrum that offshore bonds 
help, or do not help, to diversify the maturity structure. Every year, I consider four parts 
that comprise the bond profile of a firm in a specific year: new offshore bonds, pre-
existing offshore bonds, new domestic bonds, and pre-existing domestic bonds. A 
comparison between composition of offshore bonds (new and pre-existing) and 
composition of domestic bonds (new and pre-existing) can shed more light into how 
firms manage the maturity structure of offshore bonds given that they have domestic 
bonds on their books. If offshore bonds diversify the composition of domestic bonds, I 
expect that offshore bonds are issued more into the maturity bin with a low amount of 
domestic bonds (new and pre-existing) as in hypothesis H2b. There will be several 
specifications for testing H2b. Firstly, I compare the maturity structure of both new and 
pre-existing offshore bonds and the maturity structure of both new and pre-existing 
domestic bonds to understand the role of offshore bonds and domestic bonds in 
diversifying a firm’s maturity profile. Secondly, I look specifically at the maturity 
structure of new offshore bonds and how it is related to the maturity structures of pre-
existing offshore bonds, new domestic bonds, and pre-existing domestic bonds. This will 
shed light into how a firm chooses the maturity of new offshore bonds taking into 
consideration the composition of other types of bonds in the book. 
 
Maturity Structures of Offshore Bonds versus Domestic Bonds at Firm-Year Level (both 
New and Pre-existing) 
In what follows, I test how firms allocate the amount of offshore versus domestic bonds 
into each maturity bin as they manage their yearly maturity structure. Model 4a and 4b 
run the OLS regressions of proportion of offshore bonds (both new and pre-existing) in 
each bin in each year on proportion of domestic bonds (both new and pre-existing) in the 
same bin each year. Model 4a is run for the groups of firms with and without accounting 
data, while Model 4b will also control for firm characteristics for the group of firms with 
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accounting data. The goal is to understand whether there is a relationship between the 
proportion of offshore bonds in a maturity bin and proportion of domestic bonds in the 
same maturity bin when a firm manages the maturity structure of its bond profile each 
year. For each bin j, I run the models: 
 
OProportioni,t = a + β DProportioni,t + ei,t (4a) 
OProportioni,t = a + β DProportioni,t + F Controlsi,t-1 + ei,t (4b) 
 
Here, OProportioni,t is the proportion of all offshore bonds (both new and pre-
existing) for firm i, year t. DProportioni,t is the proportion of all domestic bonds (both 
new and pre-existing) for firm i, year t. 
Table 4-7 has similarities between the structure of offshore bonds (both new and 
pre-existing) and that of domestic bonds (both new and pre-existing) indicated by 
positive and significant coefficients for DProportioni,t in Panel a) (all firms) and Panel c) 
(firms without accounting data). However, the R-squared for those models is low in 
general, except for Bin 7. Interestingly for the group of firms with accounting data, a 
negative relationship between proportion of offshore and domestic bonds is found for the 
middle maturity bins, while a significant positive relationship is found for the longer ends 
of the maturity spectrum (Tables 4-7c and 4-8). There are significantly negative 
coefficients for DProportioni,t especially in Bin 4. This suggests that a higher degree of 
maturity diversification for firms that use the offshore bond market could have been 
achieved through the middle ranges of the maturity spectrum. That is, a higher proportion 
of domestic bonds outstanding and due in 7-8 years comes with a lower proportion of 
offshore bonds outstanding in this maturity range. 
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Table 4-7: Maturity Structure of Offshore Bonds versus Domestic Bonds at Firm-
Year Level 
 
  Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Bin 5 Bin 6 Bin 7 
 1-2 Yr 3-4 Yr 5-6 Yr 7-8 Yr 9-10 Yr 11-20 Yr >21 Yr 
a) All firms 
DProportion 0.0425** 0.0341** 0.0234 0.0432** 0.101*** 0.0938*** 0.431*** 
 (2.57) (2.28) (1.51) (2.27) (5.36) (6.80) (29.86) 
_cons 0.210*** 0.191*** 0.172*** 0.150*** 0.132*** 0.0408*** 0.0311*** 
 (34.89) (34.04) (33.11) (31.51) (28.99) (16.76) (11.83) 
N 5094 5094 5094 5094 5094 5094 5094 
adj. R2 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.009 0.149 
 
b) Firms with accounting data 
DProportion -0.00375 -0.00789 -0.0351 -0.0580** 0.0145 0.0596*** 0.326*** 
 (-0.16) (-0.36) (-1.52) (-2.05) (0.53) (2.71) (16.62) 
_cons 0.205*** 0.197*** 0.189*** 0.174*** 0.142*** 0.0472*** 0.0325*** 
 (25.78) (25.99) (26.01) (25.25) (21.78) (13.08) (9.27) 
N 2638 2638 2638 2638 2638 2638 2638 
adj. R2 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.095 
 
c) Firms without accounting data 
DProportion 0.0741*** 0.0660*** 0.0689*** 0.127*** 0.179*** 0.120*** 0.531*** 
 (3.18) (3.18) (3.30) (5.00) (6.85) (6.95) (25.20) 
_cons 0.219*** 0.186*** 0.156*** 0.129*** 0.125*** 0.0346*** 0.0323*** 
 (23.96) (22.38) (21.02) (19.62) (19.61) (10.63) (8.23) 
N 2456 2456 2456 2456 2456 2456 2456 
adj. R2 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.010 0.018 0.019 0.205 
 
This table aims to find the sources of possible maturity diversification in the year a firm has offshore bonds 
(either new or pre-existing) on record. I examine the relationship between the maturity structure of offshore 
bonds (both new and pre-existing) and that of domestic bonds (both new and existing) for a firm in the 
years that it has both offshore and domestic bonds on record. The table reports results for the OLS 
regression of proportion of new and existing offshore bonds in a bin on proportion of new and existing 
domestic bonds in the same bin for each firm-year. For each bin there is one regression. For each bin j (1 to 
7), estimate: 
OProportioni,t = a + β DProportioni,t + ei,t (4a) (7 bins means 7 regressions) 
OProportioni,j,t is the proportion of offshore bonds (both new and pre-existing) for firm i in year t and 
DProportioni,j,t is the proportion of domestic bonds (both new and pre-existing) for firm i in year t. Panel a 
reports the results for all firms, while Panel b reports the results for firms with accounting data (Total 
Assets), and Panel c reports the results for firms without accounting data (missing Total Assets). t-statistics 
are in parenthesis, *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 172 
 
Table 4-8: Maturity Structure of Offshore Bonds versus Domestic Bonds at Firm-
Year Level with Controls 
 
  Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Bin 5 Bin 6 Bin 7 
 1-2 Yr 3-4 Yr 5-6 Yr 7-8 Yr 9-10 Yr 11-20 Yr >21 Yr 
DProportion 0.00211 -0.00101 -0.0678*** -0.0677** -0.0510* 0.0502** 0.297*** 
 (0.08) (-0.04) (-2.75) (-2.33) (-1.80) (2.10) (13.57) 
logTA 0.0404*** 0.0337*** -0.00315 -0.0535*** -0.0457*** 0.0156*** 0.00508* 
 (7.71) (6.97) (-0.66) (-11.52) (-10.28) (5.57) (1.86) 
TANG -0.250*** -0.121*** 0.0120 0.0599 0.153*** 0.0454* 0.0615** 
 (-5.01) (-2.63) (0.26) (1.35) (3.60) (1.70) (2.38) 
DEP_TA 0.306 0.140 0.527** 0.388* -0.526** -0.186 -0.299** 
 (1.26) (0.63) (2.39) (1.81) (-2.56) (-1.44) (-2.36) 
D_Util -0.0784*** -0.0390*** -0.00538 0.00583 0.0360*** 0.0200** 0.0476*** 
 (-5.03) (-2.71) (-0.38) (0.42) (2.71) (2.39) (5.91) 
DebttoEquity -0.000404 -0.000992 -0.000574 0.000285 0.000839 0.00109*** -0.000014 
 (-0.57) (-1.51) (-0.88) (0.45) (1.38) (2.87) (-0.04) 
EBITDA_TA -0.120 0.00361 -0.110 -0.185** 0.101 0.0917** 0.113** 
 (-1.38) (0.05) (-1.40) (-2.42) (1.38) (1.99) (2.52) 
MKTB -0.000479 0.000430 0.0000283 0.000474 -0.000106 -0.000431 -0.000204 
 (-0.72) (0.70) (0.05) (0.80) (-0.19) (-1.21) (-0.59) 
_cons -0.350*** -0.313*** 0.233*** 1.027*** 0.849*** -0.229*** -0.0800* 
 (-3.92) (-3.80) (2.88) (13.04) (11.27) (-4.83) (-1.73) 
N 2358 2358 2358 2358 2358 2358 2358 
adj. R2 0.039 0.022 0.003 0.060 0.049 0.022 0.113 
 
This table re-runs the models in Table 7 for firms with accounting data and therefore examines also firm 
characteristics’ impacts on the proportion of offshore bond (both new and existing) held by a firm in the 
year it has both offshore and domestic bonds outstanding. For each bin j (1 to 7), estimate: 
OProportioni,t = a + β DProportioni,t + F Controlsi,t-1 + ei,t (4b) (7 bins means 7 regressions) 
OProportioni,j,t is the proportion of offshore bonds (both new and pre-existing) for firm i in year t. 
DProportioni,t is the proportion of domestic bonds (both new and pre-existing) for firm i in year t. 
Controlsi,t-1 is the matrix of characteristics of the underlying firm i in year t-1. TA is Total Assets in 
thousands of dollars. TANG is calculated as NTA/TA or Net Tangible Assets/Total Assets. DEP_TA is 
calculated as Depreciation/Total Assets. EBITDA_TA is calculated as EBITDA/Total Assets. DebttoEquity 
is Total Debt/Common Equity. MKTB is the market-to-book value sourced from Datastream. t-statistics are 
in parenthesis, *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Maturity Structure of New Offshore Bonds 
I also look at how firms choose the structure for maturity of new offshore bonds relative 
to maturities of pre-existing bonds, new domestic bonds, and pre-existing offshore bonds. 
Model 5a and 5b aim to explain the factors that could drive the proportion of new 
offshore bonds in each maturity bin including proportion of pre-existing domestic bonds 
and proportion of new domestic bonds in the same bin, controlling for proportion of pre-
existing offshore bonds in the same bin and firm characteristics. For each bin j (1 to 7), 
estimate: 
 
NOProportioni,t = a + β1 PEDProportioni,t + β2 NDProportioni,t + β3 PEOProportioni,t + ei,t 
(5a) 
NOProportioni,t = a + β1 PEDProportioni,t + β2 NDProportioni,t + β3 PEOProportioni,t + F 
Controlsi,t-1 + ei,t (5b) 
 
Here, NOProportioni,t is the proportion of new offshore bonds in bin j, firm i, year 
t. PEDProportioni,t is the proportion of pre-existing domestic bonds in bin j, firm i, year t. 
NDProportioni,t is the proportion of new domestic bonds in bin j, firm i, year t. 
PEOProportioni,t is the proportion of pre-existing offshore bonds in bin j, firm i, year t. 
 In Model 5a, I could examine the structure of new offshore bonds for the groups 
of firms with and without accounting data, while Model 5b allows control for the impacts 
of firm characteristics for the group of firms that have accounting data available. Results 
for models 5a and 5b are reported in Table 4-9 and 4-10. I hypothesized that new 
offshore bonds are issued to diversify pre-existing maturity structure of domestic bonds. 
Table 4-9 shows a negative relationship between new offshore bond composition and pre-
existing domestic bond composition in the middle maturity bins, suggesting that new 
offshore bonds might have a diversification impact on pre-existing domestic bonds. For 
firms with accounting data, I also find non-significant relationship between proportion of 
new offshore bonds in Bin 4 and proportion of new domestic bonds in Bin 4. Table 4-9b 
and Table 4-10 therefore indicate that diversification happens at the middle maturities 
and not at the shorter and longer ends of the maturity spectrum for firms with accounting 
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data. However, for those without accounting data, I find a significant positive relationship 
between new offshore bond composition and new domestic bond composition especially 
for firms without accounting data. This suggests that both new offshore and domestic 
bonds may help to diversify pre-existing domestic bonds for this group of firms.  
A possible explanation for why maturity diversification may happen when firms issue 
into the middle maturity ranges is that firms that borrow in the short and long ranges have 
certain characteristics that make them more likely to keep borrowing in the short and long 
ranges in the offshore market. For example, Guedes and Opler (1996) find that large 
firms with better credit rating borrow at the short and long ends of the maturity spectrum, 
while those with worse ratings borrow in the middle ranges. We also find in Table 4-10 
that larger firms have higher proportions of offshore bonds in the short and long maturity 
ranges while having lower proportions of offshore bonds in the middle ranges. Smaller 
firms might have borrowed more into the middle ranges at home, however, and will move 
to other maturity ranges (short or long) when they issue overseas, which will contribute 
to a higher degree of maturity diversification. 
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Table 4-9: Maturity Structures of New Offshore Bonds versus New Domestic, Pre-
existing Domestic and Pre-existing Offshore Bonds 
 
  Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Bin 5 Bin 6 Bin 7 
 1-2 Yr 3-4 Yr 5-6 Yr 7-8 Yr 9-10 Yr 11-20 Yr >21 Yr 
a) All firms 
PEDProportion 0.0329*** -0.0197 -0.0440* -0.0579* 0.155*** 0.0470* 0.176*** 
 (3.17) (-1.14) (-1.67) (-1.74) (3.55) (1.87) (7.15) 
NDProportion 0.381*** 0.284*** 0.192*** 0.0880** 0.0409 0.0460* 0.123*** 
 (15.26) (11.95) (6.80) (2.37) (1.27) (1.68) (4.44) 
PEOProportion 0.0652*** 0.0360* 0.00211 0.0523 0.189*** 0.399*** 0.404*** 
 (4.75) (1.76) (0.07) (1.56) (4.52) (9.25) (14.43) 
_cons 0.0247*** 0.101*** 0.211*** 0.202*** 0.244*** 0.0588*** 0.0307*** 
 (5.01) (13.31) (23.09) (24.12) (28.00) (12.85) (8.12) 
N 2853 2853 2853 2853 2853 2853 2853 
adj. R2 0.090 0.049 0.017 0.003 0.012 0.032 0.122 
 
b) Firms with accounting data 
PEDProportion 0.0370*** -0.0511** -0.0203 -0.145*** 0.0890 0.0113 0.0677** 
 (2.85) (-2.34) (-0.53) (-2.87) (1.34) (0.32) (1.99) 
NDProportion 0.101*** 0.148*** 0.112** 0.0119 -0.0486 0.0480 0.104*** 
 (3.21) (4.02) (2.53) (0.22) (-1.11) (1.17) (2.96) 
PEOProportion 0.0380** 0.0439* -0.0229 0.0519 0.199*** 0.203*** 0.332*** 
 (2.34) (1.72) (-0.56) (1.07) (3.36) (3.37) (8.36) 
_cons 0.0162*** 0.0891*** 0.219*** 0.250*** 0.274*** 0.0649*** 0.0339*** 
 (2.82) (9.27) (16.29) (19.30) (21.15) (9.93) (6.20) 
N 1398 1398 1398 1398 1398 1398 1398 
adj. R2 0.016 0.016 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.078 
 
c) Firms without accounting data 
PEDProportion 0.0236 0.0180 -0.0687* 0.00627 0.202*** 0.0979*** 0.319*** 
 (1.54) (0.68) (-1.90) (0.14) (3.48) (2.76) (9.00) 
NDProportion 0.572*** 0.339*** 0.246*** 0.155*** 0.142*** 0.0326 0.207*** 
 (15.63) (10.63) (6.74) (3.14) (2.98) (0.89) (4.66) 
PEOProportion 0.0868*** 0.0428 0.0358 0.0382 0.179*** 0.612*** 0.510*** 
 (4.11) (1.35) (0.79) (0.83) (3.04) (9.95) (13.02) 
_cons 0.0353*** 0.111*** 0.203*** 0.161*** 0.218*** 0.0525*** 0.0276*** 
 (4.59) (9.73) (16.31) (15.03) (18.62) (8.26) (5.36) 
N 1455 1455 1455 1455 1455 1455 1455 
adj. R2 0.162 0.071 0.032 0.005 0.021 0.070 0.193 
 
This table aims to understand how firms choose maturities of new offshore bond issues through exploring 
the relationship between the maturity structure of new offshore bonds and those of new domestic, pre-
existing domestic, and pre-existing offshore bonds. The comparison is for a firm in the years that it has new 
offshore bonds issued and has domestic bonds on record. An OLS regression of proportion of new offshore 
bonds in a bin on proportions of pre-existing domestic bond, pre-existing offshore bond, and new domestic 
bond in the same bin is run. For each bin there is one regression. For each bin j (1 to 7), I estimate: 
NOProportioni,t = a + β1 PEDProportioni,t + β2 NDProportioni,t + β3 PEOProportioni,t + ei,t (5a) 
NOProportioni,t is the proportion of new offshore bonds in bin j, firm i, year t. PEDProportioni,t is the 
proportion of pre-existing domestic bonds in bin j, firm i, year t. NDProportioni,t is the proportion of new 
domestic bonds in bin j, firm i, year t. PEOProportioni,t is the proportion of pre-existing offshore bonds in 
bin j, firm i, year t. Panel a reports the results for all firms, while Panel b reports the results for firms with 
accounting data (Total Assets), and Panel c reports the results for firms without accounting data (missing 
Total Assets). t-statistics are in parenthesis, *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 4-10: Maturity Structures of New Offshore Bonds versus New Domestic, Pre-
existing Domestic, and Pre-existing Offshore Bonds—With Controls 
  
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Bin 5 Bin 6 Bin 7 
 1-2 Yr 3-4 Yr 5-6 Yr 7-8 Yr 9-10 Yr 11-20 Yr >21 Yr 
PEDProportion 0.0493*** -0.0341 -0.0633 -0.102* 0.0118 0.00845 0.0607 
 (3.43) (-1.43) (-1.53) (-1.93) (0.16) (0.22) (1.64) 
NDProportion 0.109*** 0.107*** 0.0659 0.0484 -0.0683 0.0285 0.0851** 
 (3.20) (2.69) (1.41) (0.82) (-1.42) (0.60) (2.26) 
PEOProportion 0.0140 0.0203 -0.0976** 0.0388 0.216*** 0.162** 0.307*** 
 (0.76) (0.72) (-2.23) (0.76) (3.49) (2.51) (7.22) 
logTA 0.00913** 0.0200*** 0.0405*** -0.0425*** -0.0582*** 0.0167*** 0.00290 
 (2.54) (3.62) (5.17) (-5.29) (-6.84) (3.44) (0.71) 
TANG -0.0886*** -0.00708 -0.0619 -0.0230 0.128 -0.0220 0.0581 
 (-2.59) (-0.13) (-0.81) (-0.29) (1.55) (-0.46) (1.46) 
DEP_TA 0.231 -0.147 0.0549 0.817** -0.564 -0.0973 -0.140 
 (1.47) (-0.59) (0.16) (2.22) (-1.47) (-0.44) (-0.76) 
D_Util -0.00716 -0.0333* -0.0274 -0.0592** 0.0953*** -0.00413 0.0251* 
 (-0.63) (-1.89) (-1.08) (-2.25) (3.47) (-0.26) (1.91) 
DebttoEquity -0.000171 -0.000340 -0.000638 0.000575 0.0000850 0.000822 -0.000018 
 (-0.46) (-0.59) (-0.77) (0.66) (0.09) (1.59) (-0.04) 
EBITDA_TA -0.0771 0.0353 -0.101 -0.350*** 0.286** 0.0436 0.0990 
 (-1.44) (0.42) (-0.84) (-2.80) (2.19) (0.59) (1.59) 
MKTB -0.000063 0.0000318 -0.000361 0.00109 -0.000414 -0.000189 -0.000184 
 (-0.18) (0.06) (-0.45) (1.30) (-0.48) (-0.38) (-0.44) 
_cons -0.101* -0.217** -0.382*** 0.952*** 1.149*** -0.193** -0.0415 
 (-1.71) (-2.38) (-2.95) (7.11) (8.15) (-2.41) (-0.62) 
N 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 1213 
adj. R2 0.026 0.018 0.026 0.041 0.051 0.014 0.079 
 
This table re-runs Table 4-9 for the group of firms that have accounting data and controls for firm 
characteristics. For each bin j (1 to 7), I estimate: 
NOProportioni,t = a + β1 PEDProportioni,t + β2 NDProportioni,t + β3 PEOProportioni,t  
+ F Controlsi,t-1 + ei,t (5b) 
NOProportioni,t is the proportion of new offshore bonds in bin j, firm i, year t. PEDProportioni,t is the 
proportion of pre-existing domestic bonds in bin j, firm i, year t. NDProportioni,t is the proportion of new 
domestic bonds in bin j, firm i, year t. PEOProportioni,t is the proportion of pre-existing offshore bonds in 
bin j, firm i, year t. Controls i,t-1 is the matrix of characteristics of the underlying firm i that issue the bond k 
in the previous year. TA is Total Assets in thousands of dollars. TANG is calculated as NTA/TA or Net 
Tangible Assets/Total Assets. DEP_TA is calculated as Depreciation/Total Assets. EBITDA_TA is 
calculated as EBITDA/Total Assets. DebttoEquity is Total Debt/Common Equity. MKTB is the market-to-
book value sourced from Datastream. t-statistics are in parenthesis, ⁎, ⁎⁎, ⁎⁎⁎ denote significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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4.5.3 Robustness Checks 
Using Proportions as Dependent Variables  
I use GLM method besides OLS regression for dependent variables as proportions, which 
take value from 0 to 1. The results are largely the same. 
 
Market Saturation  
Market saturation is another possible motivation for why firms use the offshore bond 
markets, i.e., when the market for a certain maturity has exhausted domestically and a 
firm will tap the offshore market to borrow in that maturity. To examine this possibility, 
an initial test for market saturation is performed using a logit regression where the 
probability of being an offshore transaction (D_Offshore = 1) is explained by the 
accumulated amount of new domestic bonds that has been issued in the year in gross 
amount (AccND_Yr) or as a fraction of total assets in that year (AccND_Yr_TA) for a 
firm: 
 
Prob (D_Offshore = 1) = f(AccND_Yr, Controls) (6) 
 
I find that offshore bonds are more likely to be issued if there are fewer new domestic 
bonds issued previously in the year, contradicting to the domestic market saturation 
hypothesis (a significant negative coefficient for AccND_Yr). The result can be found in 
Table 4-11.  
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Table 4-11: Market Saturation- Accumulated New Domestic Bond Issue and 
Probability of Being an Offshore Bond 
 
 (1) (2) 
AccND_Yr -0.00114***  
 (-21.77)  
AccND_Yr_TA  -0.0793*** 
  (-36.52) 
logTA 0.246*** -0.207*** 
 (13.45) (-10.44) 
TANG 0.865*** 1.610*** 
 (5.06) (8.28) 
DEP_TA 1.055 -0.567 
 (1.36) (-0.62) 
D_Util 0.0675 0.186*** 
 (1.33) (3.25) 
DebttoEquity 0.0121** -0.00187 
 (2.30) (-0.39) 
EBITDA_TA 0.0312 0.488 
 (0.10) (1.38) 
MKTB 0.00211 0.0121*** 
 (1.03) (4.76) 
_cons -4.974*** 3.032*** 
 (-15.87) (8.77) 
N 11702 11702 
LR chi2 899.99 3292.27 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
 
This table runs the logit regression where the probability of being an offshore transaction (D_Offshore = 1) 
is explained by the accumulated amount of new domestic bonds that have been issued in the year by the 
firm (as raw amount, AccND_Yr, in Column 1 and as fraction of Total Assets of the previous year, 
AccND_Yr_TA, in Column 2). TA is Total Assets in thousands of dollars. TANG is calculated as NTA/TA 
or Net Tangible Assets/Total Assets. DEP_TA is calculated as Depreciation/Total Assets. EBITDA_TA is 
calculated as EBITDA/Total Assets. DebttoEquity is Total Debt/Common Equity. MKTB is the market-to-
book value sourced from Datastream. If offshore bonds are issued because the domestic market has been 
exhausted, the higher the accumulated amount of new domestic bonds that have been issued by the firm, 
the more likely that the next issue will be an offshore bond. The result indicates that a bond is more likely 
to be issued if there are fewer new domestic bonds issued previously in the year, contradicting the domestic 
market saturation hypothesis. ⁎, ⁎⁎, ⁎⁎⁎ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Selection Bias  
There could be selection bias issue if the type of firms that use the offshore bond market 
is also the type of firms that maintain a diversified bond maturity structure regardless of 
whether the firms tap the offshore bond market or not. To address this issue, I test 
whether firms issuing bonds overseas enjoy higher debt maturity diversification 
compared to similar firms that might have used the offshore market but stay in the 
domestic market during a shock that limits borrowing conditions at home. Using the 2008 
financial crisis in the United States, I employ the propensity matching and a difference-
in-difference method to address the selection bias issue. I match the firms based on the 
characteristics that may impact the likelihood to use the offshore bond market. The 
characteristics I employ to match firms that use the offshore bond market in 2008 with 
those that never use the offshore bond market are based on Gozzi et al. (2015). They find 
that larger firms with more leverage are those that issue debt abroad. Within firms from 
developing countries, firms that are older and less profitable are more likely to use the 
offshore market. I therefore use the propensity matching method with firm size (as the 
natural log of total assets), leverage, and profitability as the characteristics to match. 
Model (3) on the Herfindahl index will be run for the groups of firms that issued bonds 
offshore and the matched sample, with the hypothesis that firms that use the offshore 
bond market during financial crisis enjoy higher maturity diversification compared to 
similar firms that stay in the domestic market. The model estimated is as follows: 
 
InvHERFi,t = a + β1 Postt*D_Treati + β2 Postt + β3 D_Treati + ei,t (7) 
 
where Postt is 1 if the value is in the year during (2008) or after (2009) the 2008 financial 
crisis, depending on the test, and is 0 for year 2007. D_Treati is 1 if a firm is treated (i.e., 
issues offshore bonds in 2008) and 0 if not.  
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Table 4-12: Selection Bias with Propensity Matching and Difference-in-difference 
Analysis 
Logit Regression 
 D_Treat 
logTA -0.124 
 (-0.59) 
DebttoEquity -0.118 
 (-0.87) 
EBITDA_TA -13.21*** 
 (-2.62) 
_cons 2.853 
 (0.87) 
N 91 
LR chi2 15.09 
Prob > chi2 0.0017 
 
Comparison of Characteristics between the Matched and the Control Samples 
Variable Unmatched/Matched Mean t p>|t| 
Treated Control 
logTA U 15.767 16.172 -1.28 0.204 
 
M 15.767 16.007 -0.66 0.51 
DebttoEquity U -0.29677 1.2332 -1.51 0.133  
M -0.29677 1.1024 -1.06 0.296 
EBITDA_TA U 0.09781 0.1627 -3.13 0.002 
 
M 0.09781 0.12048 -1.18 0.244 
 
Difference-in-difference Results 
 2007 vs. 2008 2007 vs. 2009 
PostxTreatment -0.341 -0.373 
 (-0.23) (-0.25) 
Post 0.945 1.338 
 (0.90) (1.24) 
D_Treat -1.803* -1.803* 
 (-1.72) (-1.67) 
_cons 5.721*** 5.721*** 
 (7.71) (7.51) 
N 100 100 
adj. R2 0.050 0.059 
 
This table reports the results for the difference-in-difference analysis where I match U.S. firms that issue 
offshore bonds in 2008 (the U.S. financial crisis event) with U.S. firms that do not use the offshore bond 
market, then examine if borrowing offshore during the U.S. financial crisis leads to higher maturity 
diversification. Postt is 1 if the value is in the year during (2008) or after (2009) the 2008 financial crisis, 
depending on the test, and is 0 for year 2007. D_Treati is 1 if a firm is treated (i.e., issues offshore bonds in 
2008) and 0 if not. Panel a reports the logit regression of being a firm that used the offshore market in 2008 
versus one that borrows only domestically, from which the propensity score used for matching is 
calculated. Panel b reports the matching results where characteristics between the treated firms (U.S. firms 
that issue offshore bonds in 2008) and the control firms (U.S. firms that borrow only domestically). Panel c 
reports the results of the difference-in-difference analysis to assess the impact of being a firm that uses the 
offshore bond market in 2008 on the inverse of the Herfindahl index measure. ⁎, ⁎⁎, ⁎⁎⁎ denote significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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In table 4-12, I report the results for the logistic regression for whether a firm is treated or 
not, the comparison in characteristics between the treated and the matched groups before 
and after the matching, and finally the difference-in-difference analysis. Due to 
requirements that accounting data are available for 2008 and InvHERF measure is 
available for all three years of 2007, 2008, and 2009, the final sample has 25 firms to 
match and 91 firms in the control sample. One can tell that EBITDA_TA is the factor that 
is most significant in distinguishing a treated firm versus one that is not. Also, the 
matched group and the control group are not significantly different in terms of size, 
leverage, and profitability. I find that U.S. firms that stay in the domestic market have 
higher InvHERF, which means a higher degree of maturity diversification, and there is no 
indication that borrowing offshore makes a firm have a higher degree of maturity 
diversification during or after the financial crisis.  
 
Utility Firms 
I also test the subgroup of firms from the utility sector to rule out the foreign currency 
hedging motive since those firms do not usually have operations overseas. If firms have 
to hedge income from foreign business, for example, they may tend to borrow in the 
same manner as they borrow at home because the business at home and offshore should 
not be different. Table 4-13 reports the results for the group of utility firms. Table 13a 
reveals that utility firms tend to issue bonds into the 1-2 year, 3-4 year, 7-8 year, and over 
11 years both offshore and domestically. The remaining maturities for offshore bonds 
(new and existing) have similar structure to the remaining maturities for domestic bonds 
(new and existing) in Table 13b. New offshore bonds seem to diversify maturity structure 
for Bin 3 and 4 (Table 13c). However, proportions of new offshore bonds in Bin 3 and 4 
are significantly positively related to proportions of new domestic bonds in those bins. 
The results suggest that there is little impact of borrowing bonds offshore versus 
borrowing domestically on maturity diversification for utility firms, even when they have 
little incentive to hedge foreign currency. 
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Table 4-13: Management of Maturity Structure for Utility Firms 
 
All Bond Issues Throughout the Sample Period (Table 4-3) 
  Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Bin 5 Bin 6 Bin 7 
 1-2 Yr 3-4 Yr 5-6 Yr 7-8 Yr 9-10 Yr 11-20 Yr >21 Yr 
DProp_All 0.336*** 0.279*** -0.00493 0.366*** -0.00861 0.170** 0.169** 
 (5.38) (4.47) (-0.06) (7.48) (-0.22) (2.19) (2.32) 
_cons 0.158*** 0.236*** 0.0530*** 0.00413 0.00248 0.00270** 0.0165** 
 (6.96) (8.66) (4.98) (1.21) (1.53) (2.32) (2.56) 
N 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 
adj. R2 0.078 0.055 -0.003 0.143 -0.003 0.011 0.013 
 
Offshore Bonds Outstanding versus Domestic Bonds Outstanding (Table 4-7) 
  Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Bin 5 Bin 6 Bin 7 
 1-2 Yr 3-4 Yr 5-6 Yr 7-8 Yr 9-10 Yr 11-20 Yr >21 Yr 
DProportion 0.0432 0.0529** 0.0176 0.0521* 0.0998*** 0.0839*** 0.540*** 
 (1.59) (2.01) (0.67) (1.65) (2.97) (3.46) (21.80) 
_cons 0.160*** 0.166*** 0.165*** 0.138*** 0.158*** 0.0624*** 0.0517*** 
 (18.76) (19.69) (20.04) (17.99) (18.95) (12.33) (9.14) 
N 1827 1827 1827 1827 1827 1827 1827 
adj. R2 0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.004 0.006 0.206 
 
New Offshore Bonds versus Pre-existing Domestic, New Domestic, and Pre-existing Offshore Bonds 
(Table 4-9) 
  Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Bin 5 Bin 6 Bin 7 
 1-2 Yr 3-4 Yr 5-6 Yr 7-8 Yr 9-10 Yr 11-20 Yr >21 Yr 
PEDProportion 0.000242 0.0221 -0.0900* -0.0318 0.146** 0.113** 0.257*** 
 (0.01) (0.81) (-1.88) (-0.64) (2.05) (2.27) (5.93) 
NDProportion 0.302*** 0.239*** 0.147*** 0.137*** -0.00838 -0.0111 0.126** 
 (6.29) (5.41) (3.12) (2.58) (-0.16) (-0.26) (2.44) 
PEOProportion 0.0469** 0.0379 -0.0125 0.0275 0.0160 0.294*** 0.281*** 
 (2.17) (1.27) (-0.24) (0.56) (0.25) (4.48) (5.52) 
_cons 0.0272*** 0.0673*** 0.215*** 0.138*** 0.310*** 0.0867*** 0.0497*** 
 (3.89) (5.99) (13.78) (10.82) (18.73) (8.95) (6.23) 
N 982 982 982 982 982 982 982 
adj. R2 0.041 0.028 0.012 0.005 0.001 0.023 0.109 
 
This table examines how utility firms manage the maturity structures for the offshore bonds issued 
throughout its lifetime (Table 4-3), for the offshore bonds outstanding each year (Table 4-7), and for the 
new offshore bonds issued each year (Table 4-9). ⁎, ⁎⁎, ⁎⁎⁎ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Subsamples of Firms by Countries of Domicile 
I check whether firms having different countries of domicile have different motives to 
use the offshore bond market. The hypothesis is that firms coming from smaller markets 
may have a stronger need of diversifying the maturity structure of their bonds as they 
have limited options in the domestic market. Table 4-14 groups firms by groups of those 
coming from high-income nations (Panel a) and those coming from middle- and low-
income nations (Panel b). The results do not indicate a diversification effect of new 
offshore bond issues, with all positive coefficients representing a positive relationship 
between the proportion of new offshore bonds in each maturity bin and the proportion of 
new domestic bonds a firm ever issues in the same maturity bin. 
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Table 4-14: Robustness Check by Nation Subsamples 
 
a) High-income Nations 
  Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Bin 5 Bin 6 Bin 7 
 1-2 Yr 3-4 Yr 5-6 Yr 7-8 Yr 9-10 Yr 11-20 Yr >21 Yr 
DProp_All 0.0507*** 0.0313* 0.0112 0.0249 0.0937*** 0.0948*** 0.436*** 
 (2.78) (1.94) (0.68) (1.23) (4.75) (6.49) (29.17) 
_cons 0.212*** 0.192*** 0.170*** 0.155*** 0.129*** 0.0406*** 0.0293*** 
 (33.16) (32.54) (31.57) (30.25) (26.79) (15.56) (10.12) 
N 4492 4492 4492 4492 4492 4492 4492 
adj. R2 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.005 0.009 0.159 
 
b) Middle-income and Low-income Nations 
  Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Bin 5 Bin 6 Bin 7 
 1-2 Yr 3-4 Yr 5-6 Yr 7-8 Yr 9-10 Yr 11-20 Yr >21 Yr 
DProp_All 0.000580 0.0494 0.0798 0.207*** 0.177*** 0.0793 0.431*** 
 (0.01) (1.12) (1.56) (3.57) (2.62) (1.55) (2.76) 
_cons 0.207*** 0.183*** 0.188*** 0.105*** 0.158*** 0.0458*** 0.0427*** 
 (9.96) (9.28) (9.78) (7.80) (10.12) (5.69) (6.53) 
N 492 492 492 492 492 492 492 
adj. R2 -0.002 0.001 0.003 0.023 0.012 0.003 0.013 
 
 
This table examines how the maturity structure of the offshore bonds and that of the domestic bonds a firm 
ever issues throughout its lifetime differs from each other for firms coming from different countries of 
domicile. I revisit the model in Table 4-3 for subgroups of firms from nations with high income (Panel a) 
and those from nations with middle or low income (Panel b). ⁎, ⁎⁎, ⁎⁎⁎ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the motivation to use the offshore bond market as a way to 
diversify the bond profile. If there are segmentations across bond markets around the 
world such that each market has its own preferred ranges of maturity firms can borrow in, 
it is likely that issuing bonds in an offshore market may broaden the ranges of maturities 
a firm can issue bonds into. On the other hand, if a firm issues bonds to hedge currency 
exposure or to keep the source of funds close to the use, one may expect a firm to issue 
bonds with similar maturity in the offshore markets. To examine whether maturity 
diversification happens, I look at maturity at issuance of new offshore bonds and extend 
previous works to focus on comparing the composition of maturity for offshore bonds 
with that of domestic bonds. I also employ the inverse of the Herfindahl index as a 
measure of maturity diversification for a firm’s bond profile. 
I find that average maturity at issuance of offshore bonds is significantly different 
from that of domestic bonds. However, the difference changes sign depending on the sub-
sample. A closer investigation into the composition of maturity ranges at issuance for all 
the bonds that a firm has issued throughout its life finds a generally positive relationship 
between the proportions of new offshore versus new domestic bonds for each maturity 
range. Also, having new offshore bonds issued in a year lowers the inverse of the 
Herfindahl index, i.e., lower degree of maturity diversification, while having new 
domestic bonds issued in a year increases the degree of maturity diversification.  
There could be some evidence that indicates a potential maturity diversification 
effect of having offshore bonds. For the group of firms that use the offshore bond 
markets, I find that the inverse of the Herfindahl index is higher in the year with offshore 
bonds outstanding (either new or existing), suggesting a higher bond maturity 
diversification when a firm holds offshore bonds. However, for the full sample of firms, a 
firm in the year with offshore bonds in its book has a lower inverse of the Herfindahl 
index. It is possible that firms that stay at home have higher maturity diversification than 
firms that tap the offshore bond market. I also find that firms manage their yearly bond 
profile (new and pre-existing bonds) so that proportions of offshore bonds in the short 
and the long ends of the maturity ranges are positively related to the proportions of 
domestic bonds in the same maturity bins. However, in the middle maturity ranges, there 
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is a negative relationship between proportions of offshore bonds (new plus pre-existing) 
and domestic bonds (new plus pre-existing), at least for the group of firms with 
accounting data. There is also a negative relationship between the proportion of new 
offshore bonds in a maturity range and the proportion of pre-existing domestic bonds in 
the same maturity range. 
In summary, the paper challenges the view that new offshore bonds lead to higher 
maturity diversification for a firm’s bond profile. Nevertheless, new offshore bonds may 
help to diversify maturities of pre-existing domestic bonds in the middle maturity ranges, 
but my analysis cannot preclude that new domestic bonds can have the same effect. In 
this paper, we have not made a distinction for whether the lack of maturity diversification 
effect of new offshore bonds can be attributed to the absence of market segmentation or 
because firms do not seek to use the offshore bond market to diversify its bond maturity 
structure. The results do suggest that other considerations such as asset matching, 
hedging motivation, market timing motivation, and location of use of funds to use the 
offshore bond market are important as they explain why maturity structures of new 
offshore bonds and new domestic bonds a firm ever issues are similar. 
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Chapter 5  
5 Conclusion 
The thesis consists of three studies that shed light on the interaction between firms’ 
financing decisions and the financial capital market condition.  
 Chapter 2 examines the risk profiles of Canadian income trusts, a corporate 
structure that creates tax incentives for a firm to payout cash distribution while allowing 
investors to gain exposure to movements from the firm’s equity. The risk aspect we look 
at is the stock-like/bond-like behavior of the income trust returns, which will have 
implications on the pricing of hybrid assets as well as portfolio management. We employ 
a shock to the tax policy (the TFP announcement) that would presumably change the 
stock-like/bond-like behavior of income trusts. Firstly, we examine how income trusts 
behave compared to ordinary corporations matched by industry and size. We find that 
income trusts are priced more like bonds compared to the matched group of corporations 
before the TFP announcement, while behaving more like stocks and having similar risk 
profiles compared to matched corporations after the TFP announcement. Secondly, we 
find that by having been formed from the selective spin-off of less than 100 per cent 
assets of a previous firm, having low market-to-book ratios, high tangibility, high 
dividend payout, low ROA, and high prospective tax shield, an income trust has less 
pronounced change towards being more stock-like after the TFP announcement. The 
chapter therefore sheds light on the practical question of how Canadian income trusts 
have been priced and the factors that impact the stock-like/bond-like behavior of hybrid 
assets. 
 While the majority of studies on the pricing of Canadian income trusts have 
focused on valuation around tax policy events in the 2005-2006 period to find a role for 
tax-related factors, we take a different approach in Chapter 3 by examining the valuation 
of income trusts throughout the life cycle of the structure. The hypothesis is that there has 
been a higher premium valuation given to Canadian income trusts earlier in time when 
the structure is new and less well-understood. We document a higher median earnings 
multiples of income trusts (EV/EBITDA, Market-to-Book, P/E, Q Ratio) in early 2000s 
that can be partly but not completely explained by tax and accounting traits. This leaves a 
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role for other factors including behavioral factors in the pricing of this corporate 
structure.  
 Chapter 4 examines how firms make bond maturity decisions when issuing 
offshore bonds. As maturity diversification is an important aspect of a firm’s debt 
structure, it is interesting to know if a firm achieves a higher degree of maturity 
diversification if it goes beyond the national border to issue bonds assuming bond 
markets around the world are segmented. Firstly, I confirm a different average maturity 
of offshore bonds versus domestic bonds on aggregate, which suggests that offshore 
bonds and domestic bonds have different maturities as have been documented in the 
literature. The chapter extends previous studies by looking at the structure of maturities 
(i.e., the proportion of bonds issued into different maturity bins) and the inverse of the 
Herfindahl index to more adequately measure the diversification effect. I find secondly 
that at the firm level, when one looks at all the bonds a firm ever issues in the sample 
period, the maturity structures of offshore bonds and domestic bonds issued by the same 
firm do not differ. Thirdly, at the firm-year level, a firm has a lower maturity 
diversification degree as measured by the lower inverse of the Herfindahl index in the 
years with new offshore bonds issued, while the opposite is true in the years with new 
domestic bonds issued. Finally, I find that if a firm issues new offshore bonds in a year, a 
high proportion of offshore bonds issued into the short and long maturity bins can be 
explained by a high proportion of pre-existing domestic bonds in those same bins. 
However, there is a negative relationship between proportions of new offshore bonds 
versus pre-existing domestic bonds in the middle maturity bins. This suggests that the 
maturity diversification effect of having offshore bonds may take place, but only in the 
middle maturity ranges. However, I cannot preclude the case that domestic bonds also 
have the same effect. This chapter therefore challenges the view that offshore bonds 
diversify domestic bond markets in terms of maturity. It indicates that other 
considerations such as asset matching or currency hedging can be at play when firms tap 
the offshore bond market.  
 The evidence on the financial capital market’s regularities would assist market 
participants in their decision making. From the two chapters on Canadian income trusts, 
firms know about the factors that are priced if they consider issuing hybrid assets. Firms 
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and investors understand that behavioral factors can be at play in the valuation of a new 
type of assets. The fourth chapter on maturity of offshore bonds lets us understand the 
motivations that lead firms to use the offshore bond markets. In summary, this thesis 
contributes to our understanding of the financial capital market and corporate financing. 
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